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ABSTRACT
The Political Economy of Heterogeneous Communities
Pieter van der Windt
In much of the developing world, the community is the arena of social interaction. Het-
erogeneity at this local level, combined with a weak state and economic underdevelopment,
has been found to make communities particularly receptive to conflict. We know little about
cooperation between members of different groups in such communities, and we know even
less about the influence of actors — such as the village chief and Non-Governmental Organi-
zations (NGOs) — that substitute for the state at this level. What role do the village chief
and NGOs play in governing communities characterized by the influx of migrants? Do NGOs
strengthen cleavages in heterogeneous societies? What is the role of the village elite in man-
aging cooperation within a village? And which tools should researchers use to understand
behavior at this local level? To answer these questions, this dissertation collected original
data in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone. Specifically, this project
builds on carefully designed lab-in-the-field and field experiments, as well as original sur-
vey and ethnographic data, to explore the political economy of heterogeneous communities.
The first essay shows how local institutions in the DRC are resilient to outside intervention.
Importantly, I find causal evidence that local institutions, not NGOs, are key in sustaining
high levels of intra-village cooperation in the presence of migrants. The second essay shows
that NGOs in the same context influence how individuals relate to their social categories. I
find that NGO activity can strengthen social categories that relate to access to development
resources at the cost of those that benefit local cohesion. The final essay explores discrimi-
natory behavior based on social status in rural Sierra Leone. I find that classic experiments
may be insufficient in understanding behavior at the local level. In summary, this disser-
tation emphasizes the importance of research tools designed to measure local behavior, and
challenges the basis for current international interventions by showing the positive role of the
village chief and by providing micro-level evidence for the possible harmful role that NGOs
can play in heterogeneous communities.
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In what follows I introduce this project’s motivation and objectives, and then discuss the
study’s research approach and outline the three papers that form the dissertation.
1.1 Motivation and Dissertation Objectives
The Second Congolese War has been the deadliest conflict worldwide since World War II.
Between 1998 and 2003, it is estimated that 3.9 million people were killed, mostly indirectly
from disease and starvation (Coghlan et al. (2006)). Despite the formal end to the war in
July 2003, the east of the country continues to be an epicenter of conflict. Around that same
time — between 1991 and 2002 — a civil war took place in Sierra Leone. That conflict, which
is estimated to have killed 50,000 people directly, has plunged the country deep into poverty.
Fundamental to both wars were dynamics at the local level, in heterogeneous communities.1
A leading explanation for the war in Sierra Leone argues that it can be best understood
as the result of the confrontation between socially excluded youths and governing elites,
where the former responded to the elites’ demands for labor in unpaid ‘community work’ and
their control over the customary marriage system (e.g. Richards (1996)). Similarly, leading
explanations of the war in Congo argue for the importance of agendas at the community level,
in which ethnicity and local antagonisms over access to land and traditional power played a
1Throughout this document I will use the adjectives “community”, “village”, and “local” interchangeably.
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key role (e.g. Autesserre (2006)).
Although both conflicts have officially concluded, communities in the Congo and Sierra
Leone remain fragile. A combination of three key characteristics drive the current context.
First, many individuals live at subsistance level and basic infrastructure — roads, schools,
and health facilities —is absent. Second, in both countries the central authority is weak,
and lacks the ability to implement and enforce rules at the local level.2 Third, in both rural
Congo and rural Sierra Leone the primary arena of social interaction is the community, in
which villagers depend on local cooperation to mitigate negative income shocks and provide
basic public goods. There are good reasons to belief these cooperative structures are under
pressure. Chief among them is that many communities are characterized by heterogeneity,
which has been found to decrease cooperation (e.g. Habyarimana et al. (2007)). In Sierra
Leone, there is evidence that grievances based on social status have persisted in the post-
war period (Mokuwa et al. (2011)), and there are reasons to belief that recent attempts
at decentralization have the potential to increase tension between social classes (Fanthorpe
(2005)). In Congo, over 2.6 million people are currently internally displaced. This migration
takes place in an area with large numbers of different ethnic groups, and the influx of migrants
into communities can increase pressures on scarce land — a factor that has played a dominant
role in the Congolese conflict in the first place (Claessens et al. (2013)).
The first objective of this dissertation is to understand cooperative behaviors within
heterogeneous communities. This dissertation focuses on interaction based on migration
status in the Congo (essay one and two), and interaction based on social status in Sierra
Leone (essay three). Despite their evident significance for the countries in question, both
cleavages have received surprisingly little attention in academic literatures.
An absence of the state at the local level does not automatically translate into the absence
of local governance. In fact, governance without a state appears to be an empirical reality
in many parts of the world (e.g. Risse (2010)). This dissertation focuses on two actors
2To illustrate this, compared to the author’s country, the Netherlands, the Congo is 67 times larger but its
government budget is 64 times smaller. And while Sierra Leone is only 2 times larger than the Netherlands,




that substitute for the state. The first are local institutions. In the absence of formal
institutions, traditional authority is pivotal to village life in most of the developing world
(e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2014)). In both the Congo and Sierra Leone, it is the village chief that
occupies this central position. The second actor is internationally-funded Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs). Largely in response to the limited capacity of the state, these actors
contribute billions of dollars in development and emergency aid. A major pillar of post-
conflict interventions are community-driven development (CDD) projects — see e.g. Casey
et al. (2013) for Sierra Leone and Humphreys et al. (2015) for the Congo. Mansuri and Rao
(2013) estimate that in the last decade the World Bank alone spent $85bn on this broad
class of interventions. These programs reflect the conventional wisdom about the role of local
institutions: they are unaccountable despots (Mamdani (1996)). As a result, NGOs often
actively bypass the village chief or undertake actions to weaken their position.
Another goal of this dissertation is to gain an understanding of the role of community
institutions for local social interaction. Specifically, the first essay focuses on the role of the
village chief for native-migrant cooperation. The dissertation also aims to understand the
direct impact of NGOs on native-migrant cooperation (essay one), and community members’
affiliation with different social categories (essay two). Finally, this project seeks to explore
the interaction between NGOs and local institutions. Are external interventions indeed able
to affect the role of local institutions in heterogeneous communities?
Communities in rural Congo and rural Sierra Leone are small. The villages under study
in Eastern Congo have an average of less than 300 inhabitants. In Sierra Leone, the sampled
villages have only around 200 inhabitants, on average spread across less than 30 houses.
As a result, individuals in these communities have a lot of information about each other:
they know each other well, have had previous interaction, and can recognize each others
position inside their relevant social networks. However, traditional behavioral approaches
to measure social interaction — such as lab-in-the-field experiments — are characterized by
limited information: participants in these games are strangers and only know about each other
what the experimenter reveals to them, which is often little. Researchers do this to isolate
3
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underlying individual preferences without contamination by social considerations. However,
there are good reasons to believe that at the local level social considerations are an important
driver for behavior and might even dominate individual preferences.
A final goal of this project is thus methodological. The dissertation (essay three) aims
to understand in how far classic games can be applied across contexts, and proposes a novel
lab-in-the-field experiment to measure behavior at the local level. In doing so, this project
contributes to the understanding of the relative importance of basic individual preferences
versus socially determined preferences as a driver for behavior across contexts.
1.2 Research Approach
A first feature of this dissertation is an emphasis on original data collection — in the Congo
and Sierra Leone — using a variety of methodological tools.3 The instruments used can be
found in the appendix. Four data collection strategies stand out:
1. Migration-specific survey Between January and August 2012, I conducted an original
survey in 24 randomly selected villages in Eastern Congo’s Buhavu chiefdom. The sur-
vey was specifically designed to learn about local-level migration patterns, and collected
complete migration histories for 8,199 adults.
2. Migration-specific lab-in-the-field experiment Reliably measuring social outcomes using
surveys is often difficult. In the Congo, for example, in response to a question asking
about their opinion about migrants, natives may prefer to respond not with the truth
but with what is socially desirable. Consequently, to measure discrimination in cooper-
ation based on migration status, I also conducted a set of lab-in-the-field experiments
in the same 24 villages with a total of 416 subjects. Because of this project’s inter-
est in native-migrant relationships, the sample is stratified based on the individuals’
migration status to obtain equal numbers of natives and migrants.
3The data from the Congo was collected under Columbia University’s IRB protocols “Migration and Coop-
eration” (IRB-AAAI0272) and “Measuring Cooperation Networks” (IRB-AAAJ2401). The data from Sierra
Leone data was collected under Chicago University’s IRB protocol H10076 (PI is John List), with subsequent
approval from Columbia University’s IRB to use the data.
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3. Status-specific lab-in-the-field experiment Similarly, in Sierra Leone we might expect low
status individuals to be hesitant to state their opinions about village elites truthfully.
As a result, during spring 2013, I conducted a set of lab-in-the-field experiment in 46
villages in rural Sierra Leone. The games were played with a total of 736 subjects, half
of which were high status and the other half were low status.
4. In-depth qualitative work Finally, essential to this dissertation is the combination of the
experimental and statistical data with a deep contextual understanding of the topics in
question. In the case of the Congo, the project draws on almost two years of in-country
experience that includes several months of ethnographic work that I conducted in the
Buhavu chiefdom in 2012. During this period I interviewed dozens of natives, migrant
families and village chiefs to learn more about migrant-native interactions.
Another feature of this dissertation is the aim to move beyond simple correlations, and
to make claims about causal relationships. Randomization is therefore fundamental to this
project. In addition to the random selection of villages and individuals in the Congo and
Sierra Leone, the dissertation builds on four other types of randomization:
1. NGO variation A study measuring the impact of NGOs faces the problem that such
organizations might choose to work in certain villages and not others. For example, an
NGO might choose exactly those villages where migrants face problems to integration,
or where the chief is particularly despotic. To overcome this problem, the disserta-
tion (essay one and two) makes use of the exogenous presence of a Community-Driven
Development (CDD) program. The latter — implemented by the IRC and CARE In-
ternational — operated between 2007 and 2011 in 1,250 villages in Eastern Congo.
Important to this dissertation is that a public lottery was used to select villages into
this program. To leverage the exogeneity in the presence of NGO activity, the 24 re-
search villages in the Congo were randomly selected, taking into account the villages’
treatment status to obtain balance between NGO and control communities.
2. Experimental variation in the Congo To assess the role of the village chief for native-
5
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
migrant sharing, I implemented the lab-in-the-field experiment in Eastern Congo with
a variation. Each of the 416 participants played two versions of the experimental game:
one where the dictator made allocations in private, and one where the dictator made
allocations in the presence of the chief and a set of village notables. The order in which
each version was played was randomized. Because the game makes use of a round-robin
design, in which each player plays once with all other n−1 players, both the order of the
dictators and the order of the receivers for each dictator was also randomly assigned.
3. Experimental variation in Sierra Leone Similar to the experimental variation in the
Congo, in Sierra Leone each subject played four different types of lab-in-the-field ex-
periments. The order in which these were played was assigned randomly. The order
of the dictators and the order of the receivers for each dictator were also assigned
randomly.
4. Survey experiment To understand individual strategic behavior in response to NGO
activity, this dissertation (essay two) exploits a survey experiment. Before respondents
decide how to rank their affiliation with five social categories, they received a prime
about the identity of the enumerator — the enumerator is from a ‘University’ or from
a ‘NGO’. Each respondent was randomly allocated to one of the two primes.
A final characteristic of this dissertation is the aim for transparency. It is now a well-
known fact that researchers have a lot of discretion to select positive findings, whether inten-
tionally or not. For example, researchers can select certain dependent variables over others,
select the sample size as a function of results to date, add additional covariates and/or inter-
actions, and report only subsets of experimental conditions (e.g. Simmons et al. (2011)). One
important reason to do so intentionally is that editors and reviewers may prefer significant
results and reject methodologically sound articles that do not achieve certain statistical sig-
nificance thresholds, such as the infamous p < 0.05 (Gerber and Malhotra (2008)). The result




First, the data collection projects in the Congo and Sierra Leone have been pre-registered
online: www.egap.org/. That is, the complete research designs were posted publicly before
any analysis with collected data took place. There are several benefits of registration, in-
cluding a reduced scope for “fishing”, an opportunity to build a databank of studies and
research designs, the ability to encourage study replication, and a new tool for communica-
tion. Regarding the latter, in a paper co-written with Macartan Humphreys (Columbia) and
Raul Sanchez de la Sierra (Columbia), I argue how detailed preregistered designs can pro-
vide a mechanism for researchers and readers to distinguish between three different sorts of
results: those that were executed according to predetermined specifications, those registered
and that deviated on grounds that may be defended by researchers, and those that were
not preregistered at all and for that reason should be interpreted as speculative (Humphreys
et al. (2013)). As the study notes “The middle category constitutes something of a gray
zone in which analysis may stay true to the intent of the registered design but the defense
of the details of implementation must be provided ex post rather than ex ante (p.18).” On
reflection, this dissertation is located in the dark gray zone for two major reasons. First,
both registered designs featured in this dissertation moved away from hypothesis testing: the
design did not state “X leads to an increase in Y”, but stated “If X leads to an increase in Y,
then we are in world A; and if X leads to a decrease in Y, then we are in world B”.4 Second,
significant changes were made after registration. For example, while a key component of the
dissertation (essay one and two) is the exogenous variation in NGO activity that comes from
the CDD program, it was not pre-registered.
Second, the data and code for this dissertation (essay one and two) are available online:
www.petervanderwindt.com.5 In fact, all data necessary to write essay two were publicly
available months before the paper was written. A major benefit of doing so is that readers
can best assess the quality of research when they can analyze the data themselves. It allows
the readers to probe arguments, and makes the dissertation’s findings challengeable (Green
et al. (2013)). As a result, I made all the data collected — not just the data necessary for
4I will return to this in Chapter 4.
5Note that the data and code for essay three is not yet online.
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replication — publicly available.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The next three chapters consist each of a separate essay. The first investigates the impact of
local governance structures on native-migrant sharing in Eastern Congo. Classic literatures
suggest that the influx of migrants endangers such cooperation. Conscious of the risks posed
by such heterogeneity, international actors implement interventions to ease the integration
of new migrants and to prevent their exploitation by local despots. This essay uses an
original survey among 8,199 Congolese villagers and a set of innovative experiments (with 416
participants: half native, half migrant), to reassess the relationship between migration and
cooperation. Using an experimental variation I find that the village chief plays a key role in
sustaining high levels of cooperation between migrants and natives. In contrast, evidence from
a downstream experiment and in-depth qualitative work demonstrates that NGO activity
might have a harmful impact on relations by natives and migrants by engendering resentment
from the first to the latter. Finally, I find no empirical evidence that NGOs are successful in
changing the role of the village chief within heterogeneous communities.
The second essay focuses on the role NGOs play in shaping how villagers in Eastern Congo
identify themselves. It posits that Congolese strategically choose to associate with certain
social categories over others in order to maximize the probability of obtaining access to NGO
resources. This statement is supported by empirical evidence from a survey experiment I
conducted among 1,929 Congolese villagers. Furthermore, by exploiting exogenous variation
in the presence of NGO activity across Congolese villages, I find evidence that those social
categories initially chosen for strategic reasons can persist over time. This essay highlights
that NGO activity can be harmful in heterogeneous communities: I find that the presence of
external resources solidifies self-categorization among migrants that benefit access to resources
(“I am poor” and “I am a migrant”) at the cost of those that benefit cohesion within the
community (“I am Congolese” and “I am a member of the village”).
The final essay, written in collaboration with Neelanjan Sircar (Columbia), Maarten Voors
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(Wageningen) and Ty Turley (Brigham Young), has two objectives. First, the essay explores
sharing behaviors based on social status in Sierra Leone. To do so we conducted a lab-in-
the-field experiment with 736 participants (half are members of the village elite, half are
not) in 46 rural villages. We find empirical evidence that individuals discriminate based on
social status. Second, the essay investigates how well popular lab-in-the-field experiments
travel across contexts. We directly compare a classic attribute-based dictator game, which is
characterized by limited information, to a set of attribute-based dictator games specifically
tailored to the local level where individuals know a lot about each other. We find that classic
experimental games do not directly translate to the community level in which basic individual
preferences are likely to be swamped by local, social considerations.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the study’s main findings, relates these findings to the
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Abstract
In much of the developing world, households depend on sharing arrangements within
the village to mitigate risks. These areas are also characterized by the influx of new
migrants into the village, which might undermine village sharing. Local institutions (e.g.
the village chief) and NGOs play an important role in shaping relations between natives
and migrants. By making use of a set of novel experiments in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, this paper explores sharing behaviors between natives and migrants at the village
level. Furthermore, I exploit an experimental variation and find that local institutions
play a key role in sustaining high levels of native-migrant sharing. Next, by leveraging
the random assignment of an international NGO program across my research villages, I
find causal evidence that NGOs decrease native-migrant sharing when decisions are taken
in private. However, this effect disappears when decisions are monitored by the village
chief suggesting that local institutions are resilient to outside intervention, and that it are
local institutions, not NGOs, that uphold within village sharing. This study challenges
the basis for current international interventions, and provides micro-level evidence for the
important role local institutions play in divided societies in areas where the state is weak.
11
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2.1 Introduction
Because the reach of the state is limited and formal insurance markets are absent, many
individuals in the developing world depend on informal, within-village sharing—often in the
form of gift giving, shared meals, no interest loans, and access to land—to mitigate negative
income shocks. A large literature argues that such arrangements are uphold because of the
presence of directed altruism (individuals share because they are similar), and due to repeated
interactions (people share because they care enough about the future and interactions are
repeated over time).2 Another key characteristic of the developing world is high rates of
internal migration (UNDP (2009)). Little, however, is known about the relationship between
migration and sharing despite the fact that there are good reasons to believe that migrants
endanger within village sharing. First, migrants often have different attributes than the
native population and thus weakens motivations for directed altruism. Second, migrants
are less integrated and more likely to leave the village and thereby weakening motivations
for reciprocity. Indeed, the few studies that refer to both topics suggest that migration
puts sharing at risk. Bowles and Gintis (1998), for example, show the need for restricted
mobility for village sharing to persist, and Greif (2006) discusses how sharing among traders
in medieval Europe broke down due to increased levels of migration. It is necessary that
we obtain a better understanding of migration and sharing. For example, poverty is a well-
known determinant for participation in conflicts (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008)).
If migration indeed undermines within-village sharing, and thus a community’s ability to
mitigate risks, migration might function as a vehicle for conflict to spillover from one village
to the next.3 This paper takes a first step to understand sharing among migrants and natives.
While the political economy literature on migration has largely focused on rural-urban
2The existence, efficiency and motivations for informal sharing have been well-documented: Coate and
Ravallion (1993), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), Udry (1994), Platteau (1997), Fafchamps (1992), Ligon
et al. (2002), Ligon and Schechter (2012), Das Gupta (1987), Rosenzweig (1988), Townsend (1994), Besley
(1995), Chapter 8 in Bardhan and Udry (1999), and Chapter 15 in Ray (1998) A third reason for sharing is
more closely related “moral economists” such as Scott (1977) and Thomson (1971). Bowles and Gintis (2011)
argue that cooperation exists because of the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and the
capacity to internalize social norms.
3See e.g. (Buhaug, 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Van der Windt and Humphreys, 2015) for evidence
on conflict spillovers.
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migration,4 the vast majority of migration in the developing world can be classified as local,
rural to rural migration.5 As a result, this study focuses exclusively on native-migrant sharing
at the village-level. In the absence of the state, two actors have to be introduced without
which an understanding of cooperative behaviors between natives and migrants at the village
level would be incomplete: local institutions and international actors.
The lowest layer of hierarchy in most developing countries is often occupied by the village
chief. Village chiefs manage local conflict, raise taxes, control the judicial system, and allocate
land—the most important resource in rural areas. Despite their central role, relatively little
is known about the workings and impact of this local institution. This study argues that
chiefs play a key role for within-village sharing by allowing access to only those migrants
that increase average levels of donations. Moreover, villages in the developing world are
characterized by high level of public scrutiny. The village chief is able to leverage this
scrutiny to allocate resources to those individuals that behave well, and punish those that
do not. In response, migrants undertake cooperative behaviors to integrate into the village.
Cognizant of these factors, only certain individuals sort into the village in the first place. The
second key actor that has a large impact on native-migrant interactions are internationally
funded Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). NGOs are especially active in areas with
high levels of population movements, in part to assist new migrants. Resources introduced by
NGOs—such as food items, jerry cans, agricultural inputs, etc.—are substantial compared
to the resources the village can raise internally. These outside resources have the potential
to provide the village with the means to absorb incoming migrants and alleviate pressures on
4This literature has focused primarily upon the decision to migrate and the selection of destination (Borjas
(1994), Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013)). For example, people may migrate voluntarily to earn higher wages
Sjaastad (1962) or higher expected wages Todaro (1969), to diversity income risk Rosenzweig and Stark
(1989), in response to an NGO project or price change (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1988), or may be forced to
do so because of violence: Schultz (1971), Davenport et al. (2003), Melander and Öberg (2007), Moore and
Shellman (2004), Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011), Engel and Maŕıa (2007), Ibáñez and Vélez (2008), and
Adhikari (2013). Throughout this paper I use the term ‘migration’ also for ‘displacement’, or conflict-induced
migration.
5Lucas (1997) writes “The extent of rural-rural migration is not well documented, particularly when this
involves intra-regional movements. Where analysis proves possible, the rate of rural-rural migration typically
proves far higher than of rural-urban migration (p. 728).” One reason for this neglect in the literature, Lucas
(1997) continues, is, in addition to increased data collection difficulties, that the early dualistic development
models envisioned a rather homogeneous rural sector, within which migration was seen to confer no real
benefit.
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within village sharing. On the other hand, by specifically targeting resources to migrants only
NGOs can harden cleavages between natives and migrants and hamper migrant integration.
Furthermore, conventional wisdom about the role of local institutions holds that they are
unaccountable to local populations, and that chiefs act as unaccountable despots (Mamdani
(1996)). As a result, to prevent the exploitation of migrants by local despots, NGOs often
actively bypass the village chief or undertake actions to weaken their position. In so far
as chiefs play a positive role for native-migrant sharing, international interventions in local
social processes might thus actually undermine sharing.
To sum up, this study makes an important contribution to the literature on institutions
by providing micro-level evidence of the role of local institutions in the absence of the state.
In doing so the paper adds to a very nascent literature that analyzes the impact of local
institutions on development outcomes (e.g. Logan (2013), Acemoglu et al. (2014), Turley
et al. (2014)). Furthermore, this paper joins a small number of studies that investigate the
developmental impact of NGOs (Fearon et al., 2009; Casey et al., 2013; Humphreys et al.,
2015) and resource windfalls (e.g. Paler (2013)) at the micro level.
To explore native-migrant sharing, and the role of the village chief and international inter-
vention, I employ original data collected in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Four
characteristics of this study’s empirical strategy are particularly noteworthy. First, to learn
about migration patterns I conducted a detailed survey specifically designed to learn about
migration. That is, in 24 randomly selected villages of Eastern Congo’s Buhavu chiefdom,
complete migration histories were collected for about 8,199 adults. I find that: 1) migration
rates are high, with more than two-third of all individuals currently living outside their village
of birth, 2) migration is characterized by local, rural to rural migration, 3) migrants are very
different from natives on a number of key individual and household level characteristics, 4)
the chief plays an important role in village life for both natives and migrants, and 5) NGOs
are an important actor in the region. Second, I overcome selection effects present in survey
data and move beyond self-reported information, and measure discrimination in sharing by
employing experimental games. In the 24 villages a total of 416 subjects (half migrants, half
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natives) were selected to play attribute-based dictator games (ADG). Importantly, I extend
this classic game to a local ADG, where participants know each other (they are members
of the same village) and the identity of the receiver is revealed to the dictator. this study
will argue that results from such a game provide better estimates of sharing at the local
level. Third, I implement the experiment with a key variation, in that all participants play
the dictator game twice: once in private, and once in the presence of the chief and several
village notables. This makes it possible to isolate the pivotal role of chief scrutiny for sharing
within the village. Finally, to learn about the causal impact of international intervention on
native-migrant sharing directly, and indirectly via their impact on the village chief, I exploit
a downstream experiment in which NGO resources are randomly allocated to villages.
This study has four major results. First, in private, migration is negatively associated
with village contributions to sharing: 1) migrants contribute less to natives than natives
do, and 2) both migrants and (especially) natives exhibit ingroup bias: both discriminate in
favor of those with the same migration status. This suggests that natives are not successful
in allowing access to only those migrants that would increase average levels of donations.
Second, local institutions are key in sustaining high levels of contributions between natives
and migrants. Specifically, when the chief is observing game decisions, a setting that better
reflects the realities of social interaction at the village level, contributions to sharing increases.
Especially contributions by migrants to natives increases in the presence of the chief. Third,
by making use of a downstream experiment, I find that, in private, NGOs have a negative
impact on individual contributions. Especially contributions by natives to migrants go down.
Extensive qualitative evidence suggest that this can best be explained by resentment of natives
that do not benefit from the distribution of aid resources by NGOs. Finally, by combining
the the experimental variation in NGO activity and the chief observing game play, I find
that NGOs do not undermine local institutions. In fact, by comparing the NGO impact in
the private and the public game, I find that the village chief is able offset the decrease in
contributions resulting from NGO activity.
The results in this study therefore suggest that not only are local institutions resilient to
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outside intervention, it are these local institutions, and not NGOs, that uphold within village
sharing.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section anchors this study in the Congolese
context, and introduces the relationship between local institutions, international intervention
and native-migrant sharing. Section 2.3 and 2.4 present the positive and negative role of
local institutions and international intervention, respectively. I conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Context: Migration in the Congo
This study focuses on Eastern Congo, an area where migration is prevalent. A survey con-
ducted in 2007 throughout Eastern Congo (indicated by the larger black square in the left
panel of Figure 2.1) finds that 42% of the respondents lived in a different village in 1996.6
To investigate population movements in more detail, this study zooms in on a smaller part
of Congo. conducted a census between January and August 2012 in 24 randomly selected
villages of South Kivu’s Buhavu chiefdom (indicated by the smaller red square in the left
panel and the squares in the center and right panel of Figure 2.1).7 For a total of 4,015
household heads and their spouse(s) the survey collected information about all locations of
residence, the year of each migration, and the reason for these movements, creating a dataset
on 8,199 adults and 18,282 movements.
In addition to the prevalence of migration is prevalent, two additional points stand out.8
6The survey contains information about 2,906 households drawn randomly from 588 villages selected ran-
domly from Congo’s Haut Katanga, Maniema, South Kivu and Tanganyika provinces (Humphreys (2008)).
Not surprisingly, an important driver of this migration is conflict. A full 71% of household members have fled
at least once between 1996 to 2007 due to armed conflict. Conflict has engulfed Congo for over two decades,
most prominently during the First and Second Congolese Wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003). The latter, with
the direct involvement of eight African nations and 25 armed groups, has been the deadliest war in modern
African history It is estimated that between 1998 and 2007 the war and its aftermath had killed 5.4 million
people, mostly from indirect causes such as disease and starvation (IRC, 2007). Despite the formal end to the
war in July 2003, the country, and in particular the South Kivu province where this study’s data has been
collected, continues to be an epicenter of conflict. The roots and the dynamics of the Congolese conflict are
too complex to be discussed in detail here. For a good discussion see: Autesserre (2010) and Prunier (2009).
7The sampling frame was created together with the International Rescue Committee and CARE Interna-
tional in 2010 and includes all villages in the Buhavu chiefdom. Village selection was conditioned on migrant
presence (more than 25 migrant households), basic safety conditions for the surveyors and the condition that
half of the villages were part of the Tuungane development program (see Section 2.4). The sampling frame
and code is available upon request.
885% of individuals moved at least once in their life, and more than two-thirds currently live outside their
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Table 2.1: Map Research Area
Goma
Bukavu
Notes: Left panel: The Democratic Republic of Congo with the cities (from left to right):
Maniema, Lubumbashi, Bukavu and Goma. Center panel: Lake Kivu. Right panel: The
research villages where solid (hollow) squares denote participation (no participation) in the
Tuungane program (Section 2.4). For identification reasons village names are omitted.
First, the vast majority of movements in Eastern Congo can be characterized as local, rural to
rural migration with individuals not moving to larger cities but to other rural villages.9 This
observation is in line with recent evidence that in Eastern Congo conflict spillovers (possibly
driven by population movement) operate at the very local level geographically (Van der Windt
and Humphreys (2015)).
Second, there are good reasons to believe that migrants endanger within village sharing in
Congo. As discussed above, migrants may not mirror the attributes of the native population
and thus weaken motivations for directed altruism, and they may weaken motivations for
reciprocity as they are more likely to leave the village again. Information from the survey
village of birth. While this result is in part due to the criteria for village selection. Individuals move for a
large number of reasons. Not surprisingly, conflict has been the major driver for migration in Congo. While
it is not in the scope of the paper to look at subgroups, this is interesting future work.
9There are two major urban centers in this region: Bukavu and Goma, respectively the capitals of the
South Kivu and North Kivu provinces. Of the 18,282 movement destinations mentioned, Bukavu and Goma
were mentioned only 3% (511) and 4% (775) of the time. The main reason to visit these cities was for work
or family, and these visits were often only brief — the majority moved back to the rural area that same year
and almost 90% moved back within two years. To be confident that this result is not driven by no-return
individuals I compared per village the household list created from the census in 2012, with household lists
created in 2010 for another project. The presence of a household on the latter but not on the first is evidence
for death or outmigration. For those households that migrated out of the village I obtained their ethnic
membership, the reason for outmigration and destination. Less than two percent moved to Bukavu or Goma.
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corroborates these worries. Table 2.2 compares natives and migrants for a set of individual
and household-level characteristics.10 Migrants in the Buhavu chiefdom are very different
than natives. Migrants are more likely to be female, young, less educated, and less likely to
be member of the Havu tribe (the chiefdom’s majority ethnic group). Migrant households
are also poorer, have fewer agricultural plots and poultry. Importantly, migrants are also less
integrated: they are more likely to expect and want to live in another village in five years;
are less biologically related to the village chief; meet the chief less often than natives; are less
likely to be part of a village association or committee; and are less likely to feel member of
the village.11 In a setting where migration is prevalent, and where they are very different,
a better understand of the interaction between natives and migrants, and the role of local
institutions and external interventions, is important. I turn to this now.
2.3 Native-Migrant Cooperation and Local Institutions
In this section I propose two mechanisms how local institutions maintain cooperation between
natives and migrants: selection-at-the-gate and ingratiation period. In both mechanism the
village chief plays a key role. In the absence of formal institutions, traditional authority is
pivotal to village life in most of the developing world (e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2014)). In the
DRC, it is the village chief that occupies this central position.12 Among villagers in Eastern
Congo, 66% indicate that the village chief is the most influential person to resolve conflict
10Throughout this study I define a migrant as anyone who satisfies the following two criteria: 1) the
individual is not born in the village; and 2) the individual took up residence in the village within the last 5
years. The complement is the native population. This definition was decided upon after months of fieldwork
that included interviews with dozens of migrants, natives and villages chiefs. Table 2.2 shows how natives and
migrants do not differ significantly in the number of times moved. Sensitivity of the results to the migrant
definition might thus be a worry. Defining migrants as those individuals that took up residence in the village
within the last two years, and natives as those that have lived in the village for more than two years, gives
very similar result to those reported in the paper.
11Biological relatedness is measured by the Hamilton index, which indicates the biologic relatedness —
based on genes — between two individuals: for a parent-offspring or full sibling relationship this index is
0.5, for an aunt/uncle or nephew/niece relationship this is 0.25, etc. Feelings towards village membership are
measured by individuals’ responses to a survey assignment in which I ask them to rank from important (1) to
least important (5) the following five identities: “I am a migrant”, “I am Congolese”, “I am a member of the
village”, “I am a member of ethnic group [ethnic group of the respondent]” and “I am poor”.
12The 2007 survey finds that 44% of all chiefs inherited their position. Others are chosen by the king (12%),
village elders (15%), or via a village election (25%).
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Table 2.2: Comparison Migrants and Native
Natives Migrants
Mean SD N Mean SD N Diff.
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.84 0.37 2344 0.80 0.40 1230 -0.04***
Age 42.06 15.74 2277 36.94 13.52 1179 -5.13***
Member of Buhavu tribe 0.86 0.35 2350 0.51 0.50 1228 -0.35***
Ownership
Total number of fields 1.59 1.32 2361 0.85 1.18 1244 -0.75***
Owns a field inside the village 0.75 0.44 2361 0.23 0.42 1244 -0.51***
Wives 1.10 0.52 2361 0.92 0.52 1244 -0.18***
Has a wife inside village 0.87 0.34 2361 0.73 0.44 1244 -0.13***
Poultry (chicken, turkey, ducks) 1.07 2.38 1421 0.62 1.59 728 -0.46***
People in household 7.29 4.05 2306 6.99 4.00 967 -0.29*
Migration History
Times moved 2.51 2.14 2361 2.68 1.99 1244 0.17**
Times moved due to conflict 0.77 0.88 1914 0.95 0.98 1244 0.18***
Number of different villages lived in 2.43 1.20 2361 3.08 1.23 1244 0.65***
Integration
Hamilton index to village chief 0.04 0.14 1647 0.01 0.06 835 -0.03***
Expects to live here in five years 0.98 0.15 1597 0.91 0.28 828 -0.06***
Feels member of the village (1-5) 2.71 1.05 1467 2.11 1.10 876 -0.60***
Notes: Top panel based on 1,243 migrants and 2,362 natives. One, two or three aster-
isks indicate, respectively, significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1%. Variables Hamilton
(Expects) [feels member of village] {Poultry} only from and including village 3 (4) [5] {6}
onwards, which explains the lower number of observations.
among villagers. This number increases to 80% if also village elders and religious leaders —
often the chiefs’ right hand when it comes to managing village affairs — are included. There
are three main reasons why chiefs play such an important role in village life. First, chiefs
enjoy popular legitimacy, giving the chief a moral claim to undertake such activities. Indeed,
of the same villagers, 63% indicate that the chief should be the most influential person to
resolve conflict among villagers (78% if elders and religious leaders are included). A second
reason is the chief’s control over within village resources such as land, which in rural Congo
is the most important resource for survival (e.g. Van Acker (2005), Vlassenroot and Huggins
(2005), and Claessens et al. (2013)). Finally, Congolese villages are small and the spheres of
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private and public life are not neatly separated. Chiefs use the high levels of public scrutiny to
monitor behavior by fellow villagers. This study explores two mechanisms to understand the
role of local institutions for native-migrant cooperation: selection at the gate and ingratiation
period.
First, to safeguard existing sharing arrangements within the village, natives undertake
what I will call selection-at-the-gate, where some migrants upon arrival are allowed entry into
the village whereas others are not. Natives may use diffuse social networks such as common
friends and acquaintances to decrease the level of uncertainty about the type of migrant.
In practice, selection-at-the-gate is often more subtle than outright rejection by the village
chief. Upon entry into the village the migrant will be dependent on the native villagers for an
extended period of time for things like accommodation and food. In the Congo, as in most
of the developing world, a village’s absorption capacity is limited and often only a subset
of potential immigrants can be accommodated. Those migrants that have family ties in the
village are often better informed and more able to obtain the available accommodation than
those without ties to the village. In Congo, as a rule, upon arrival in the village migrants first
visit the village chief. In turn, (potential) migrants take this mechanism into account when
making the decision whether and where to migrate. Migrants thus do not settle randomly
across the landscape. Migrants enter certain villages, and not others. This mechanism consist
of two parts: the extent to which natives are successful in only allowing good migrants into the
village, and the extent to which this is taken into account by (potential) migrant populations
in their destination choice, and in their decision whether to migrate in the first place.13
Second, scrutiny refers to the extent individuals leverage the village’s high levels of infor-
mation and social interaction. After receiving access to the village, natives submit migrants
to an ingratiation period to separate ‘good’ migrants from those that are not. That is, na-
13Tiebout (1956) described “sorting equilibria where populations sort into optimum communities based on
the offering of varying baskets of goods (government services) at a variety of prices (tax rates). This logic has
been extended to understand to strategic extension/dissolution of welfare benefits by governments in order
to manipulate migration into the territory (Peterson and Rom (1989), Voldon (2002)). In this literature,
however, benefits are provided by the government. In the scenario under study in this paper, benefits are tied
to interpersonal relations in the village, and, thus, the level of benefits are endogenous in a very different way
and relate to who migrates into the village.
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tives may grant migrants entry to the village but wait before reciprocating contributions by
migrants. During this period, natives (and in particular the village chief) restrict access to
the tools necessary for integration, such as access to land and marriage, until the migrant has
shown to be a sufficiently good citizen of the village.14 On their side, migrants can utilize
this initial period to create a favorable standing in the village. A favorable standing in the
village has direct strategic benefits such as access to land and marriage. Moreover, a lack
of cooperative behavior may be cause for isolation, or even expulsion from the village. In
Congo, then over time the chief allocates plots of land to often only a subset of the hosted
migrants. Two types of data provide evidence in support that migrants are absorbed into
the village’s public scrutiny network.15 First, the census was specifically designed to learn
about host relationships.16 I find that of the 4,015 households in the sample almost 10% (387
households) are hosted. Second, I collected GPS locations for all these households, and find
that migrants do not cluster but are spread throughout the community. Migrants and natives
are thus equally captured by the scrutiny mechanism. However, while both natives and mi-
grants are influenced by this mechanism, migrant behavior, given migrants’ weaker position
in the village, is expected to be particularly sensitive to scrutiny. This latter mechanism we
will test directly now.
2.3.1 Experimental Design
The census (Section 2.2) was implemented in concert with a set of experimental games to
obtain a better understanding of migration patterns and native-migrant interactions. There
14In Western countries, immigrants are typically expected to go through a naturalization process. The
ingratiation period discussed here can be seen as a village-level equivalent to this process.
15I also test directly whether migrants are known in the village. To do so each game participant is asked
about each other player whether she knows the other. Almost all players know each other, and migrants are
equally known in the village as natives.
16A common definition for a household is “Those that share the same cooking pot in the last month”. This
is not a suitable definition for this context for two reasons. First, Congo is a polygamous society where the
head of the household often eats with one wife for an extended period of time. Second, while hosted families
live on the same premise, they often do not share their cooking pot with the hosting household. The definition
used for this study is “Those that share the same cooking pot with the head of the household in the last
month”. The enumerator then records whether and if so which other household it is hosting or is hosted by.
This results in a database with hosted households nested into other hosting households. Beaman and Dillon
(2012) discuss the importance of the household definition in more detail.
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are two key benefits of adding an experimental component. First, it can often be difficult
to determine behavior from survey responses alone. For example, in response to a question
asking about their opinion about migrants, natives may prefer to respond not with the truth
but with what is socially desirably. A second reason is that measuring cooperative behavior
as recorded contributions in a survey faces the problem that this captures not just other
regarding preferences but also the need for such sharing. The introduction of a new sharing
problems — for example, in the form of an experimental game — overcomes such selection
effects. Specifically, to measure native-migrant sharing I extend the attribute-based dictator
game, the workhorse game to measure discrimination in the willingness to take action in
the interest of others at personal material cost. In brief, the attribute-based dictator game
takes a single player, the sender, and asks her to split a fixed sum of money, the endowment,
between herself and another person, the receiver. The sender is under no obligation to
donate any money to the receiver.17 Before the allocation decision the dictator receives an
experimentally-controlled “cue” regarding the receiver and no other information, and then
plays the game at least twice — each time with a different ‘type’ of receiver. For example,
a researcher interested in discrimination based on migration status designs an experiment in
which the dictator splits a fixed sum of money once between herself and a “migrant”, and a
second time between herself and a “native”. The difference in contribution is then a measure
of migration-based discrimination.18 The sample was chosen in such a way to ensure an equal
number of native and migrant players. Specifically, the heads of household resulting from
the census, in conjunction with their native/migrant status, were used as sampling frame to
select nine native and nine migrant individuals per village. In total I obtain game-behavior
for a total of 416 participants from 24 villages.19
17Predictions based on standard Nash equilibria are that the dictator will keep all of the money for herself.
Empirically, however, one finds that 60% of dictators donate a positive amount of money towards the receiver,
with a mean transfer of around 20% of the endowment (Camerer (2003)). This suggests that people have more
complex preferences beyond personal gain, which is typically referred to as “other-regarding preferences” (Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). For a critique of this interpretation see List (2007).
18A recent literature in political science and economics has used this technique to show discrimination in
pro-social behavior by gender Holm (2000), ethnicity (Whitt and Wilson (2007), Habyarimana et al. (2007)),
and partisanship (Fowler and Kam (2007)).
19In the first village, the pilot village, 10 individuals (5 natives and 5 migrants) participated. In the
subsequent three villages 16 individuals (8 natives and 8 migrants) were selected. It was only after these four
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The experimental games conducted for this study, however, extended the classic dictator
game in two important respects. First, villagers in Congo know each other well and have
regular interaction. I introduce a new version of the dictator game that actively takes the local
context into account. How do such games relate to real-life behavior in a Congolese village?
The classic game is played anonymously — the dictator does not know anything about the
receiver beyond the cue under study. As a result, the intuitive empirical interpretation of
such games is that it measures the extent of discrimination between random strangers who
can only discern the attribute under question. An important feature of interaction among
villagers in Congo, however, is that they make more informed decisions. First, these rural
villagers know more about each other than only the cue under study. Second, behavior
between them is also guided by previous experiences. Finally, their interaction also depends
on their relationship with other, third actors. These three factors are important for sharing
at the local level, and Levitt and List (2007), for example, argue that by not taking into
account such factors classic lab games could incorrectly estimate levels of discrimination. I
extended the classic games to what I call a local attribute-based dictator game, where the
dictator plays with individuals who are from the same village, and the identity of the receiver
is revealed to the dictator (in this study by means of an instant picture). Because dictators
now make informed allocation decisions, I obtain more realistic estimates of sharing at the
village level.20
To test the importance of scrutiny for native-migrant sharing I implemented the experi-
ment with a variation. Each of the 18 participants played two versions of the experimental
game: one where the dictator made allocations in private (the “private” version), and one
where the dictator made allocations in the presence of the chief and a set of village notables
(the “public” version). In the latter, the participant introduced herself to the village chief and
notables present. Moreover, in each round the enumerator showed the picture of the receiver
and read out the receiver’s name to those present—so that the identity of the receiver is
villages, when the research team was more experienced, that the number of participants per village could be
increased to 18.
20This is part of a larger agenda to incorporate context into experimental games. See Sircar and Van der
Windt (2015), and Sircar et al. (2014b) for a more formal discussion and a direct test.
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known to both the dictator and the chief and notables. Finally, after each of the 17 rounds,
the enumerator told out loud the dictator’s allocation decision to the chief and notables.
The order in which each version was played was randomized to prevent contamination of the
results by learning effects.21
2.3.2 Results
The left panel of Figure 2.1 shows the average donation by dyad type and game variation,
where hollow (solid) circles indicate the private (public) variation.23 N→M, for example,
indicates the contribution by a native dictator to a migrant receiver. The 95% confidence
intervals are constructed from the test whether the average contribution are bounded away
from zero.24
The hollow dots in the left panel in Figure 2.1 illustrate average contributions in private.
Contributions in all four dyads are significantly bounded away from zero with average con-
tributions at 20.3%, 17.0%, 16.5% and 17.3% in the N→N, N→M, M→N and M→M dyad,
respectively.25 A first result is that native dictators donate on average 23% more to native
21Note that by comparing anonymous play to play in the presence of the village chief and notables this
design does not allow me to separate between a “hierarchy effect”, capturing behavior in response to potential
negative/positive repercussions by the chief and notables to improper/proper game behavior, and behavior in
response to a more general “transparency effect”.22 While future work may try to separate out both effects,
two remarks are in order here. This study is interested not in the impact of the chief or public scrutiny alone
on changes in native-migrant behavior, but their combined effect. Furthermore, in the Congolese setting it
is also not realistic to look at both effects separately. As Section 2.2 discussed, migrants are taken up in the
the village public scrutiny network which is leveraged by the villages chief and other natives. In extensive
debriefings that I undertook after the games, in which each participant was asked for the difference between
the two versions of the game, players mentioned especially the hierarchy effect: “The two games are different
because one is played in the presence of the chief and he controls our way of life in the village.”, “The presence
of the chief and the chief of the avenue impacted my play. I am afraid that if I do not give they may punish
me, and if I only give to my brother they will judge me.” and “Yes, the games are different. During the first
game the chief of the center observed me a lot. During the second game we were together, and I only gave to
my friends.”
23Figure 2.3 in the appendix shows the frequency distribution of contributions in private and public, where
I separate out the four possible dyads between migrant and native players. When playing anonymously, zero
is the modal contribution, accounting for 51% of all dyads. Congolese villagers donate on average 17.7% of
their endowment to the other player in private. In public, 40% of the contributions equal zero, and average
contribution rates are substantially higher. On average, Congolese villagers give 30% higher in the presence
of the village chief, with the mean donation at 23.1% of endowment.
24The analysis in this section controls for village level fixed effects in order to avoid that results are driven
by village main effects. I also cluster the standard error in two dimensions — by sender and receiver — to
account for correlation among the n− 1 allocations to different receivers by the same dictator and the n− 1
donations to the same receiver by different dictators (Petersen, 2008; Thompson, 2011; Cameron et al., 2011).
25All p-values are equal to zero.
24
CHAPTER 2. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS SUSTAIN NATIVE-MIGRANT SHARING
receivers than migrant dictators do (N→N −M→N = 3.8). A formal test finds this difference
to be statistically significant (p=0.05). In contrast, I find no evidence that native dictators
contribute differently than migrant dictators to migrant receivers (N→M − M→M =-0.03,
p=0.84). Those dyads that include a migrant are lower than the native-native dyad, which
is the only dyad in the village in the absence of migration. In other words, the presence of
migrants is associated with lower average donation levels in the village. Insofar as sorting
allows village access to only those individuals that increase average levels of donation, I find
empirical evidence that native populations are not particularly successful in screening for
good migrants at the gate.
The solid dots in the left panel in Figure 2.1 are the average contributions in the presence
of the chief and village notables. Again, contributions in all four dyads are significantly
bounded away from zero with average contributions at 25.5%, 21.7%, 23.0% and 22.4%.
Average donations in public are significantly higher than those in private: migrants (natives)
contribute 29% (28%) more to migrants, and migrants (natives) contribute 40% (25%) more
to natives. This result is statistically significant for all four dyads (p=0.00 for all). As a result,
local institutions have a strong positive impact on contributions, which is well illustrated in
the left panel of Figure 2.1.
One result bears specific emphasis. I find a strong difference in the impact of scrutiny
depending on whether the dictator is migrant or native. The right panel of Figure 2.1 shows
ingroup bias by dictator type and variation. Consistent with standard theories of in-group
bias, I find that in private natives donate 19% more on average to fellow natives than to
migrants (N→N − N→M = 3.3). This result is both substantially and statistically significant
(p=0.00). Migrants also exhibit such an ingroup bias and contribute on average 6% more to
receivers of their own group (M→M − M→N =0.8). The latter, however, is only marginally
significant (p=0.07). In public, there is still a native ingroup bias, with natives donating
18% more on average to fellow natives than to migrants (N→N − N→M = 3.8, p=0.00).
In public, however, migrants no longer contribute less to natives than natives do.26 In fact,
26In private, native dictators donate on average 23% more to native receivers than migrant dictators do
(N→N − M→N = 3.8); in public this decreases to only 10% (N→N − M→N = 2.5). In contrast to the first
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Figure 2.1: Average Contributions by Dyad and Ingroup Bias
Contribution


















Notes: Based on 416 dictators and a total of 1,622 (N→N), 1,819 (N→M), 1,819 (M→N),
and 1,604 (M→M) dyads per variation.
under scrutiny migrants increase their contributions significantly towards the outgroup. While
migrants increase their donation by 25% to other migrants, they increase their contribution to
natives by 40%. Migrant behavior thus changes from discrimination against to discrimination
in favor of natives. This reversal is statistically significant (p=0.00), and well illustrated in
the right panel of Figure 2.1.27 That especially migrant behavior towards natives is sensitive
to scrutiny is confirmed in extensive debriefings that I undertook after the experimental
games. Migrants highlight how they contribute more in order to signal their willingness to be
good citizens or because of potential negative consequences for not doing so: “I am displaced,
and by giving I prove to the chief my good nature towards the autochthon”.
(p=0.05), the latter is not statistically significant (p=0.23).
27That is, (M→N − M→M | public) − (M→N − M→M | private)= 0.6 - (-0.8) = 1.4. In contrast, scrutiny
has only a moderate effect on native discriminatory behavior: (N→N − N→M | public) − (N→N − N→M |
private)= 3.8 - 3.3 = 0.5. In contrast to the first (p=0.00), the latter is not statistically significant (p=0.42).
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2.4 The Impact of External Interventions
In response to large population movements, many international organizations implement
interventions to assist migrants in host villages. This dynamic is reflected in my research
villages, where in all but two of the 24 villages the chief reported having hosted NGOs the
preceding six months. With many villagers living at subsistence levels, the funds a village can
pool together from its community members is limited. By comparison, resources introduced
by NGOs may be substantial and potentially provide villages with the means to absorb
incoming migrants. However, rigorously testing the impact of development aid is difficult due
to selection effects of development actors choosing to work in certain villages over others. For
example, NGOs might choose to work exactly in those villages where migrants face problems
to integration, or where the chief is particularly despotic. This study overcomes this problem
by building on the exogenous presence of development activity to overcome this potential
bias. Between 2007 and 2011, a DFID-funded development intervention was implemented
by the International Rescue Committee and CARE International, which was implemented
between 2007 and 2011 throughout Eastern Congo — including in 53 villages in the Buhavu
chiefdom. The project provided communities with financing of up to $70,000 to distribute
resources for livelihood projects, the construction of local infrastructure such as school rooms
or clinics, and so forth (IRC (2012)). The villages were selected into the program by a public
lottery. A major benefit is that this allows me to make causal claims about the impact of
development interventions.28 In order to leverage this benefit, this study’s research villages
were randomly selected taking into account the villages’ treatment status to obtain balance
between treatment and control communities.29 This is illustrated in the right panel of Table
2.1.
28See Humphreys et al. (2015) for more details about Tuungane. They do not find evidence that Tuungane
engendered any migration flows.
29Even with a small sample, random assignment ensures that simple difference in means provides an unbiased
estimate of the treatment effect. Of course with a small sample my power is weak and I can expect the estimates
to be more noisy, though this does not threaten unbiasedness (e.g. Mutz and Pemantle (2011); Imai et al.
(2008)).
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2.4.1 Results
The center panel of Figure 2.2 shows the impact of Tuungane on contributions in private.
Migrants decrease contributions by 18% (from 19.0 to 15.6) to fellow migrants and 18% (from
18.1 to 14.8) to natives, as a result of Tuungane. Native contributions decrease by 19% (from
22.4 to 18.2) to fellow natives and a full 27% (from 19.7 to 14.3) to migrant receivers; the
latter result is statistically significant (p=0.06) and highlighted in the center panel in Figure
2.2 by the dashed line.30 I thus find that in private Tuungane had an overall negative impact
on native-migrant sharing.





























● ●N → N N → M M → N M → M
−4%
Notes: Based on 416 dictators. The 95% confidence intervals are constructed from the test
whether the average contribution are bounded away from zero.
There are a number of mechanisms that might explain this result. First, it might be
that what is at work is a form of neutrality of NGO aid towards otherwise privately pro-
30The p-values are 0.12, 0.06, 0.20, 0.21 for the N→N, N→M, M→N and M→M dyad, respectively. All
p-values in this section are based on randomization inference (Fisher, 1935). In brief, I first regressed the
dyad’s contribution on the actual Tuungane status, obtaining the point estimate of the ‘true’ treatment. I
then randomly re-assigned the 24 villages to the Tuungane treatment 10,000 times, and for each of these new
(fake) re-assignments I estimate a new point estimate. All together these new point estimates constitute the
reference distribution. Comparing the estimate from the true assignment to this distribution makes it possible
to calculate the probability that I find the same estimate or stronger in the data. A regression analysis,
controlling for village level fixed effects and clustering the standard error in two dimensions, gives the same
results.
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vided resources. That is, the decrease in contributions can simply reflect a reduced need
for sharing because NGO aid substitutes for private contributions. Such a result has been
well-documented for the neutrality of government policies toward privately provided public
goods. E.g. Roberts (1984), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Roberts (1987) and Bernheim
and Bagwell (1988). Andreoni (1989) and Andreoni (1990) show that if one assumes some pri-
vate value to the act of giving, such as receiving a ‘warm-glow’, then neutrality breaks down,
and government contributions to charity will incompletely crowd out private contributions.
However, based on considerable qualitative work in the region, I suggest a different mech-
anism. The resource curse literature highlights the negative impacts of resource windfalls.31
In line with this literature, I suggest that NGOs may, contrary to intentions, have a negative
impact on native-migrant sharing by strengthening cleavages between migrants and natives
within communities. First, resource allocation by an outside party to certain villagers, and not
to others, might change the nature of sharing by increasing resentment, which can threaten
informal sharing arrangements within the community. Second, a considerable literature has
argued for the malleability of social identities. For example, the salience of a particular
identity might be formed instrumentally in response to changing social opportunities (Laitin
(1986), Posner (2004)). In so far as individuals can leverage their “migrant” identity to obtain
discriminatory access to resources, NGOs can promote the continuation of exclusive and rigid
migrant identities, inhibiting the integration of new migrants into the village. Qualitative
evidence suggests that both reasons might be at play in Eastern Congo. The active exclusion
of natives from international aid, while also natives live close to subsistence level, and the
faulty process of distribution, is consistently brought up by village chiefs and native villagers,
including that this leads to tensions between the native and the migrant populations. For
example, the process of inclusion on the distribution lists that are used by NGOs is open to
31The “natural resource curse” literature relates windfalls from natural resources with a myriad of worse
outcomes such as lower growth rates (Sachs and Warner (2001)) and more conflict (Ross (2004)). See Van der
Ploeg (2011) for an overview. The literature on the effects of aid windfalls is more mixed but largely points in
the same direction. While Boone (1996) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) find little evidence for any effect
of aid, Djankov et al. (2008) go as far to argue that “aid is a bigger curse than oil (p. 169).” The literature has
put forward several mechanisms that explain why resource windfalls lead to worse outcomes, which include
rent-seeking activities generated by windfalls (Svensson (2000) and Reinikka and Svensson (2004)) and the
reduced need for taxes and thus weak governance (Rajan and Subramanian (2007)).
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abuse. While these lists are meant for migrants a small number of well-connected natives
are included; those that are rich buy their name on the list. As one village chief illustrates:
“NGOs arrive only for the migrants. They make a list who are the migrants. Autochthons
are not on the list. The committee hides and then makes the list. Only if you give them
money you can get on the list.” Migrants also trick NGOs by including more migrants on
the list than that there actually exist in the village. One common way to do so is to include
multiple people of the same migrant household. The household can then sell the additional
resources to native villagers once the NGO has left. As another village chief notes: “The
chief of the Butembo [the migrant committee] has list of all migrants in the area. NGOs use
these lists for distribution. On these lists people appear two or three times so that the same
household receives several times. They then sell it in the evening to the natives. This makes
the natives very angry. Migrants keep it or sell it. They never share.” These statements
resonate closely with the fact that the negative impact of Tuungane (center panel Figure 2.2)
is particularly strong for the N→M dyad.
2.4.2 The Impact of External Intervention on Local Institutions
While our understanding of the role of the village chief is limited, development actors fre-
quently adopt a “chiefs-as-despot” view (Mamdani (1996)). This view holds that chiefs act
as local despots and actively divert NGO funds for private gain. In response, many NGOs
attempt to bypass the village chief when undertaking development activities. Given the im-
portant role of the chief to village life, NGOs may subsequently erode the importance of
an actor that is key in sustaining sharing among natives and migrants. This might happen
directly by circumventing chiefly authority, or indirectly by providing an outside option to
resources over which the village chief holds authority. Tuungane was such a program. It was
a so-called “community-driven development” program. These programs are characterized by
the inclusion and participation of all villagers in order to make local institutions such as
the village chief more accountable and inclusive from the bottom-up (e.g. Mansuri and Rao
(2013)). In fact, a key component of the Tuungane program was to sideline the village chief
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and work directly with the population.32 By bypassing the village chief, NGOs erode the
position of an important local institution.
Do NGOs undermine the village chief? The right panel in Figure 2.2 plots average
donations made in public in control and Tuungane villages. In contrast to the private setting,
when contributions are made in public there is no strong evidence of Tuungane’s negative
impact of local sharing. The negative impact of Tuungane attenuates in the presence of
the village chief. In public, while average contributions for all dyad types are still lower
in Tuungane villages, the differences are substantially smaller and none of the differences
are statistically significant.33 For example, while Tuungane decreased average donations for
the N→M dyad by a full 27% (p=0.06) in private, this decrease is only 4% (p=0.41) in the
presence of the chief and village notables (indicates in the right panel by a dashed line). This
is reflected in the left panel, which shows the impact of local institutions (difference public and
private play). All four point estimates increase: the village chief effect is larger in Tuungane
communities.34 This effect is strongest for the N→M dyad. To conclude, there is little
evidence that international interventions undermine the role of the village chief.35 In fact,
the village chief is able to reverse part of the perverse impact of international interventions
on native-migrant sharing.
2.5 Conclusion
A well-developed literature explores how individuals in the developing world depend on in-
formal, sharing arrangements within the village to mitigate negative income shocks caused
by the vagaries of such things as health, the weather and conflict. Another key characteris-
tic of the developing world is high levels of internal migration (UNDP (2009)). Despite the
large literature on informal, within-village sharing, we know preciously little about how it is
32As one village chief noted “Tuungane marginalized the chiefs entirely even though we are interested;...
(Humphreys et al. (2015), p. 9)”.
33The p-values are 0.42, 0.41, 0.26, 0.32 for the N→N, N→M, M→N and M→M dyad, respectively.
34The p-values are 0.12, 0.06, 0.38, 0.20 for the N→N, N→M, M→N and M→M dyad, respectively.
35This result is supported by Humphreys et al. (2015) who find no evidence that Tuungane had any impact
on local institutions.
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affected by the influx of migrants.36 In fact, related literatures—for example, those exploring
the impact of diversity—suggest that there are good reasons to believe that the arrival of
migrants endangers within-village sharing. This study takes a first step to understand shar-
ing among migrants and natives at the village level. To do so I collect original data in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, combining in-depth qualitative work with a large survey and
a set of innovative lab-in-the-field experiments.
Importantly, this study investigates the role of two actors without which our understand-
ing of native-migrant interactions would be incomplete. The village chief plays a key role
in shaping relations between natives and migrants by 1) acting as a gate keeper, deciding
which migrant can and cannot enter the village, and by 2) leveraging his powers to allocate
resources necessary for integration (especially land) to those individuals that behave well.
To empirically test the impact of this local institution, the aforementioned experiments are
implemented with an original variation. The second key player are NGOs. These actors
are especially active in areas with high levels of population movements, largely to assist
new migrants. This study leverages the random assignment of an international NGO pro-
gram across villages to make causal claims about the impact of international intervention on
native-migrant sharing directly, and indirectly via their impact on the village chief.
This study presents four key results. First, in the private version of the experiment,
migration is negatively associated with levels of sharing: 1) migrants contribute less to natives
than natives do, and 2) both migrants and natives exhibit ingroup bias: both discriminate
in favor of individuals with the same migration status. Empirical evidence thus suggests
that natives are not particularly successful in only allowing access to those migrants that
increase average levels of contributions. Second, the experimental variation demonstrates the
key role of the chief in sustaining high levels of contributions between natives and migrants
in the village. Specifically, when the chief is observing game decisions (the public version of
the experiment), a setting that better reflects the realities of social interaction at the village
36In fact, I know of only one other study that relates within-village sharing directly to migration. Morten
(2012) finds that when people can self-insure via migration they have less need for sharing within the village
and, as a result, the option to migrate reduces sharing.
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level, contributions to sharing increases by both natives and migrants. I find that this impact
is so strong for migrants that they reverse from ingroup to outgroup bias: discriminating in
the presence of the chief in favor of natives. Third, the data suggests that international
interventions have a negative impact on sharing in private. Especially native donations to
migrants goes down. Extensive qualitative evidence suggests that this result is largely driven
by resentment from individuals that do not benefit from NGO activity (natives) to those
individuals that benefit disproportionately from NGO resources (migrants). Finally, many
NGOs actively bypass the village chief or undertake actions to weaken their position, in order
to prevent the exploitation of migrants by local despots. By combining the experimental
variation (to learn about the impact of the village chief) and the random assignment of NGO
activity across villages, I can test this assertion directly. I find that local institutions are
resilient to change. In fact, by comparing the NGO impact in the experiment’s private and
the public setting, I find that the village chief is able counteract the decrease in contributions
resulting from NGO activity.
Apart from their value for the study on informal insurance mechanisms in the developing
world, the arguments advanced in this paper have three additional implications.
The important role for formal state institutions in divided societies is widely recognized
in the literature (e.g. Lijphart (1977), Horowitz (1992)). However, we know little about the
role and impact of local institutions at the micro level in the absence of the state. This study
contributes to the literature by providing micro-level evidence of the role of the village chiefs
for native-migrant sharing. Conventional wisdom holds that chiefs are unaccountable despots
(Mamdani (1996)). This study joins a recent but growing literature that finds an important
and positive role for local, traditional authorities. The findings in this study—that chiefs
are not only resilient to change, but also responsible for maintaining high levels of sharing
between natives and migrants—are in line with recent empirical evidence suggesting that
chiefs command the respect of rural people (Logan (2013) and Humphreys et al. (2015)), and
may be particularly good managers of participatory projects (Turley et al. (2014)).
Second, a well-developed experimental literature has documented the important role for
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monitoring (and thus the threat of punishment/reward) to sustain cooperation (see, for ex-
ample, Chaudhuri (2010) for an overview).37 This paper, which finds differential behavior
depending on whether the subjects plays in private or in the presence of the village chief,
joins this literature. Importantly, this study finds a striking difference in the impact of mon-
itoring depending on whether the dictator is migrant or native. The scrutiny mechanism we
proposed in this study argues that natives submit migrants to a period of monitoring and, in
turn, migrants can utilize this ingratiation period to create a favorable standing in the village.
In line with this argument, I find that the village chief has a particularly strong impact on
the behavior by migrants, who increase their contributions significantly towards the natives.
The study thus contributes to the experimental literature, which currently treats monitoring
as a largely apolitical technical activity.
Finally, this paper also contributes to our understanding of development aid at the micro
level. Since the 1990s a particularly popular model to distribute aid are “Community Driven
Development” programs. Mansuri and Rao (2013), for example, estimate that the World
Bank alone has spent upwards of $54 billion on CDD initiatives between 1999 and 2011.
Building on the chief-as-despot view, the hallmark of these programs are a focus on com-
munity participation and the need to reform local institutions. A set of recently completed
impact evaluations find few positive impacts of such programs, and that local institutions are
resilient to change (Fearon et al., 2009; Casey et al., 2013; Humphreys et al., 2015). I find
that international intervention has little impact on local institutions, and that NGO activity
might undermine within-village sharing. Combined with results from these evaluations, this
study challenges the basis of current international interventions in local social processes and
suggests that the ways in which development actors are engaging in aid distribution needs
to be rethought. In particular, given the important and positive role of the village chief for
within village sharing, I suggest that international interventions should engage and actively
work through local institutions.
37Classic references here are Fehr and Gachter (2000) and Carpenter (2007).
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2.6 Appendix A: Frequency Distribution
Figure 2.3: Frequency Distributions by Dyad and Variation
Contributions in Private















Notes: Players decided to allocate between 0 and 5 tokens. Based on 416 dictators and a
total of 1,622 (N→N), 1,819 (N→M), 1,819 (M→N), and 1,604 (M→M) dyads per variation.
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2.7 Appendix B: Details Experimental Games
The experiments were undertaken in the same 24 villages where the census was conducted.
The heads of household resulting from the census (Section 2.2), in conjunction with their
native/migrant status, were used as sampling frame to select nine native and nine migrant
individuals per village. I obtain game-behavior for a total of 416 participants.38 With the
exception of two natives in the first village, this study had no attrition. The reason is that
the game participants were selected and invited the day preceding the games. Furthermore,
to increase participation, individuals were compensated by 2,000 Congolese Francs; approx-
imately a day’s wage for a laborer/farmer in the region. Finally, at the game-day itself
runners were sent out early in the morning to collect the players. If a player was not found
or could not participate a randomly-selected replacement of the same migration status would
be found.
The games were always played between individuals of the same village, and participants
played the game in 17 rounds, where each round represented a dictator game with one of
the 17 other individuals in the sample serving as the receiver. I obtain 6,930 one-way and
3,465 two-way interactions. This so-called “round-robin” design is another extension by this
study to the classic attribute-based dictator game and has two major benefits. First, for each
dyad each of the two individuals has an opportunity to serve as the dictator, which allows for
direct observation of contribution towards each other. Second, instead of one observation per
n individuals, this study obtains n(n−1)2 unique two-way dyads, and twice as many one-way
dyads.39 The day before the games were played an instant photograph of each individual
was taken. In each of the 17 rounds of the game the dictator was shown a photograph of
the receiver, drawn randomly without replacement. For each round, the individual was then
38In the first village, the pilot village, 10 individuals (5 natives and 5 migrants) participated. In the
subsequent three villages 16 individuals (8 natives and 8 migrants) were selected. It was only after these four
villages, when the research team was more experienced, that the number of participants per village could be
increased to 18.
39A drawback is that donations by a dictator (i→), to a receiver (→ j), and two individuals towards each
other (i ↔ j) are necessarily correlated. To account for this correlation, in addition to controlling for village
level fixed effects, all analyses cluster the standard error in two dimensions—by sender and receiver. For a
discussion about the benefits of and analysis of the round-robin design, see Sircar and Van der Windt (2015).
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asked to allocate a total of 5 tokens between the individual in the photograph and herself.
The total allocation to a particular individual at the end of the game was the sum of: 1) the
number she kept as dictator over the 17 rounds of the game; and 2) the number of token she
received from the other 17 individuals.
Since the participants in the sample knew each other, receivers never learned the dictator’s
allocation decision in order to forestall any disturbances that could be caused by inferences
about how much was donated by others. In order to elicit truthful play, individuals entered
into a group lottery that took place after the games for another 2,000 Congolese Francs, where
the probability of winning the lottery for each individual was a function of the total allocation
accrued to the individual.40 The only information publicly announced was the identity of
the lottery winner.41 Since the prize represented approximately one day’s wages, the award
was sufficiently large to generate truthful play. This was confirmed in the de-briefings with
participants. Much effort was undertaken to make sure the participants not only understood
the lottery, but also the games. Enumerators informed participants individually until the
enumerator was 100% sure the participant understood the game play, which included a correct
explanation of the game by the player to the enumerator. Furthermore, a de-briefing took
place with each of the participants that confirmed a good understanding of the game and the
lottery by participants. In addition, to obtain consistency across enumerators the latter were
trained for over two weeks by the authors in Bukavu and monitored for three months in the
field. Furthermore, a script with the game rules that had to be used verbatim was written
in French and Swahili, and also trained in the local languages Mashi and Havu. At no point
after explaining the rules of the game was it possible for participants to communicate with
one another. Table 2.3 illustrates the sequence of steps in each village. The complete protocol
(in French)—including the steps for the census and the verbatim explanation of the games (in
40When subject’s lottery-winning probability is not independent of the other subjects’ (which is the case in
this set-up), this could influence game play. This is not a major concern in this study for three reasons: 1)
communication was not allowed between players, 2) the percentage of endowment allocated is similar to other
dictator games, and 3) debriefing made it clear that people played to maximize their own winning probabilities.
I thank Becky Morton for bringing up this issue.
41An additional benefit of using a lottery over real money is that the situation were participants keep their
endowments during anonymous play in order to distribute it after the games in public is avoided.
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French and Swahili)—can be found at: www.petervanderwindt.com/research/networks/.
Table 2.3: Sequence of Events per Village
Step Event
1 Enumerators explain the dictator game to the 18 participants. Participants
are then no longer allowed to communicate until everybody has finished the
anonymous and public dictator game.
2 Each enumerator randomly selects one of the 18 participants to be the dicta-
tor, and randomly selects whether to play the anonymous or public dictator
game first with that dictator.
3 Anonymous Game Public Game
4 Explain the rules until the dictator un-
derstands.
Explain the rules until the dictator un-
derstands.
5 Emphasize that the dictator plays
anonymously.
Dictator has to introduce herself to the
village chief and notables.
6 Enumerator randomly selects a re-
ceiver and shows the dictator the re-
ceiver’s picture, and tells the dictator
the name of the receiver.
Enumerator randomly selects a re-
ceiver and shows the receiver’s picture
to the dictator and to the village chief
and notables, and says out loud the
name of the receiver.
7 Enumerator hands 5 tokens to the dic-
tator.
Enumerator hands 5 tokens to the dic-
tator.
8 Dictator decides how much to donate
to the receiver.
Dictator decides how much to donate
to the receiver.
9 Enumerator says out loud the alloca-
tion decision: “X tokens were kept by
[name dictator ] and 5-X tokens were
giving to [name receiver ].”
10 Enumerator randomly draws a new re-
ceiver from the pictures that are left,
and does steps 6-8 again.
Enumerator randomly draws a new re-
ceiver from the pictures that are left,
and does steps 6-8 again.
11 After the dictator has made an allo-
cation decision for all 17 receivers (i.e.
there are no more pictures left), enu-
merator conducts the public game with
this dictator if not yet played.
After the dictator has made an al-
location decision for all 17 receivers
(i.e. there are no more pictures left),
enumerator conducts the private game
with this dictator if not yet played.
12 After this dictator has played both the anonymous and public version of the
game (i.e. has made 2 times 17 allocation decisions), enumerator starts at
step 2 again until all 18 participants have played.
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Abstract
Billions of dollars are spent each year on development projects. Little is known about
whether these resources change how the rural poor associate with available social cate-
gories. Is it possible that development projects change how individuals relate to concepts
of ‘ethnicity’, ‘low economic status’ or any other culturally relevant form of social catego-
rization? I explore this question with original data collected in the Democratic Republic
of Congo. By exploiting exogenous variation in the presence of NGO activity across Con-
golese villages, I offer causal evidence that, paradoxically, development resources make
individuals associate more strongly with their ‘low economic status’ social category —
even after the conclusion of the NGO program. To explain this result, I argue that
Congolese signal to be poor in order to maximize the probability of obtaining access to
development resources. Through repetition, this initially one-off strategic choice is inter-
nalized over time. This proposition is corroborated by evidence from a survey experiment
among 1,929 Congolese respondents in the same villages. The study thus provides original
evidence on the unintended, negative effects of development aid.
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3.1 Introduction
Billions of dollars are spent each year on development projects that aim to improve the
lives of the rural poor.World Bank alone spent upwards of $54 billion on community-driven
development projects between 1999 and 2011 (Mansuri and Rao, 2013), which is just one
of the many types of projects undertaken in villages in the developing world. Especially
in recent years with the rise of randomized field experiments, academics and implementers
have worked closely together to learn about the impact of these projects on a wide range of
outcomes: the use of fertilizer (Duflo et al., 2011), household savings (Dupas and Robinson,
2013), disease (Miguel and Kremer, 2004), teacher attendance (Duflo et al., 2012), social
cohesion (Fearon et al., 2009), corruption (Olken, 2007), et cetera. One outcome, however,
that has yet to receive any attention to date is whether it is possible that development projects
change how the rural poor associate with available social categories? That is, do development
interventions change how individuals relate to ‘ethnicity’, ‘low economic status’ or any other
option from their menu of social categories? This study aims to answer these questions based
upon original data collected in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). I will offer causal
evidence that those individuals in villages that received development resources, paradoxically,
associate more strongly with their ‘poverty’ social category. The paper then explores the
rational behind this result. By building on a survey experiment and previous work in social
psychology, I argue and find evidence that Congolese strategically signal to be poor in order
to obtain access to development resources — a temporary activity that is internalized by the
rural poor over time.
Understanding whether development projects impact how individuals relate to their social
categories — an activity that I term “self-categorization” throughout the paper — is impor-
tant as the latter has been found to be associated with a number of important outcomes. For
example, the relationship between ethnicity and conflict (Esteban et al., 2012b) and public
goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999), have been two very active research agendas within
the past decade. The Congo is particularly well-suited for exploring this topic. The Second
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Congolese War (1998-2003) has been the deadliest conflict worldwide since World War II.2
Despite the formal end to the war in July 2003, the country, and in particular the South
Kivu province where this study’s data was collected, continues to be an epicenter of conflict.
The conflict in Congo is intricately linked with a number of prevalent social categories, both
as a determinant and outcome (this is discussed in detail in Section 4.3). Furthermore, the
conflict has resulted in widespread migration movements of the population as individuals flee
from on rural village to another. Humphreys (2008), for example, finds that in the South
Kivu province a full 71% of household members have fled at least once between 1996 to 2007.
Throughout this paper I will distinguish between native and migrant populations for several
reasons. First, migrants make up a large subgroup in Eastern Congo, with many Congolese
strongly associating with this social category (Section 3.3). Second, the DRC is characterized
by numerous ethnic groups, giving rise to concerns of ethnic driven violence, and migration is a
key vehicle by which such groups are exposed to one another. In light of these considerations,
many development projects are a direct response to the large population movements by either
targeting resources to the migrants directly, or assisting the host community as a whole in
attempts to increase villages’ absorption capacities and facilitate the integration of migrants.
Finally, even small development projects are proportionally large opportunities for Congolese
given their subsistence livelihoods, making competition for participation in development ac-
tivities potential sources of conflict. With their lives in flux migrant self-categorization might
be particularly malleable by development interventions. Thus, a separate understanding of
self-categorization by native and migrant populations is essential. Insofar as successful in-
tegration is dependent upon migrants associating themselves as ‘a member of the village’,
or any other social category that both natives and migrants share, this study explores an
important indirect effect of development activity.
This paper builds on an original approach to quantify self-categorization, and on two ex-
periments to explore the impact of development activity. Between January and August 2012,
face-to-face surveys were conducted with 1,929 individuals from 20 randomly selected villages
2Between 1998 and 2003, it is estimated that 3.9 million people were killed, mostly attributed to indirect
causes of disease and starvation (Coghlan et al., 2006).
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in South Kivu’s Buhavu chiefdom. The survey included a section in which each individual
was asked to rank five social categories that are particularly salient in the Buhavu chiefdom:
‘ethnicity’, ‘nationality’, ‘low economic status’, ‘migrant status’, and ‘village membership’.
This approach thus provides a measure of how Congolese associate themselves into certain
categories relative to other categories. To test whether development activity impacts individ-
uals’ self-categorization, I exploit the presence of an NGO program that operated between
2007-2012 throughout Eastern Congo, including the Buhavu chiefdom. An investigation into
the impact of development activity is normally hamstrung because development actors might
choose to work in certain villages and not others. For example, NGOs might choose exactly
those villages where migrants face problems of integration. The villages under study, how-
ever, were selected into the program by a public lottery. A major benefit is that this allows
me to make causal claims about the impact of development intervention. In order to lever-
age this benefit, this study’s research villages were randomly selected taking into account
the villages’ treatment status to obtain balance between treatment and control communities.
This study will also zoom in on one specific mechanism that might explain why development
activity impacts self-categorization. I will argue that individuals strategically signal their
membership of certain social categories over others to development actors, in order to obtain
access to resources. To test this proposition, a second experiment was conducted in which
the same 1,929 Congolese respondents were primed differently on the strategic opportunities
of their self-categorization. As a result, combined with information from months of in-depth
ethnographic work in the region and a survey conducted in 2007 and 2012 throughout East-
ern Congo, this study is able to paint a nuanced picture of the unintentional impacts of
development interventions.
This study contributes directly to the ‘resource curse’ literature, which has documented
the negative relationship between resource windfalls from natural resources with a myriad
of negative outcomes such as lower growth rates (Sachs and Warner, 2001) and increased
incidents of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998).3 Research that explores the effect of aid
3See Van der Ploeg (2011) and Nillesen and Bulte (2014) for an overview.
43
CHAPTER 3. HOW NGO ACTIVITY IMPACTS SELF-CATEGORIZATION
windfalls largely points in the same direction.4 Nunn and Qian (2014), for example, find
evidence that US food aid increases the incidence and duration of civil conflicts, and Djankov
et al. (2008) go even as far to argue that “aid is a bigger curse than oil (p. 169).” These
studies, however, are largely based on macro-level data. The findings in this study thus pro-
vide rare micro-level support for the resource curse.5 This literature has put forward several
mechanisms that explain why windfalls lead to worse outcomes. Foreign aid may: encourage
rent seeking and corruption (Svensson, 2000; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004); make recipient
governments accountable to their donors rather than to their electorates (Rajan and Subra-
manian, 2007; Easterly, 2007); lead to the ‘Dutch disease’ (Adam, 2006); and decrease the
quality of public service provision by subtracting skilled professionals from domestic sectors
or by changing the role of bureaucrats away from the execution of development functions to
obtaining donor funds (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Whitfield, 2009).6 A key contribution
of this study is in proposing a novel micro-based mechanism to the resource curse literature.
A second literature that is closely related to this study is that on identity. Rejecting
the primordialist thesis that identities are socially or genetically fixed and unchanging, most
researchers nowadays assert that identities are constructed. A particularly popular argument
is that identity is malleable and can be formed instrumentally in response to changing social
opportunities. However, despite considerable research, we still know little about what drives
individuals to associate with one identity over another. Posner (2004) provides evidence that
the salience of a particular identity (‘ethnicity’ in his study) responds to whether or not that
category can be useful as a vehicle for political competition. And Laitin (1998) documents the
emergence of a Russian-speaking national social category among the post-Soviet republics’
diaspora populations in response to the introduction of language laws and the collapse of
the Soviet Union. This paper contributes to this literature by exploring empirically if and
4However, note that Boone (1996) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) find little evidence for any effect of
aid.
5The only other, well-identified study focusing on the effect of windfalls at the micro-level that I am aware
of is Paler (2013).
6Many fewer studies exist that explore the impact of aid at the micro level. Those that exist largely
look at the impact of food aid, which has bound found to negatively impact local market prices, community
contributions to public goods, and inter-household informal insurance arrangements within communities (see
(Barrett, 2006) for an overview).
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how a transnational, somewhat temporary actor without any personal interest in reshaping
identities has an influential and largely accidental effect on identity.7
This paper is organized as follows. The next section anchors the study in the Con-
golese context, introduces how this study measures association with social categories, and
the identification strategy to learn about the impact of development interventions. Section
3.3 introduces the sample and explores what characteristics correlate with social categories
in the Congolese context. The data provides empirical support for arguments put forward
by qualitative scholars on the DRC; e.g. the important relation between land ownership and
self-categorization. Sections 3.4 shows that even after the conclusion of an NGO program,
those Congolese in treatment communities associate themselves more strongly with their low
economic status category than those in control communities: migrants in treatment villages
are a full 64% more likely to associate strongest with their low economic status category.
Importantly, this result seems to come at the cost of integration enhancing social categories:
migrants that were exposed to development activity are less likely to relate with village mem-
bership and being Congolese. In Section 3.5.3 one mechanisms that might explain this result
is explored in detail. Based on an original survey experiment I provide evidence that strate-
gic considerations are one mechanism by which development activity can shape the salience
of some social categories over others. Section 3.6 finds that this mechanism also holds in a
different dataset and beyond the Buhavu chiefdom. Finally, based upon the data and addi-
tional qualitative evidence, I conclude in Section 4.6 that development resources can make
the poor ‘poorer’. Development interventions can have important, unexpected and worrisome
externalities on those living in the developing world.
3.2 Context and Research Design
This section discusses the study’s geographical region of research. Next, the five social cate-
gories most prevalent within the Buhavu chiefdom are introduced. I then discuss the study’s
7Throughout this study I will use the word social category instead of identity. Following Chandra and
Laitin (2002), identity is the social category that an individual uses to describe herself. See Howard (2000);
Fearon (1999); Brubaker and Cooper (2000) for more complete discussions on identity.
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Notes: Left panel: The Democratic Republic of Congo with the cities (from left to right):
Maniema, Lubumbashi, Bukavu and Goma. Small rectangle indicates the study’s research
site. Large rectangle is the area covered by two other surveys that will be used in this study.
Center panel: Lake Kivu. Right panel: The research villages where solid (hollow) squares
denote participation (no participation) in the development program (Section 3.2.3). Village
names are omitted for identification reasons.
approach to measure self-categorization. This section ends by the study’s strategy to make
causal claims about exposure to development interventions.
3.2.1 Congo’s Buhavu Chiefdom
This study was conducted in twenty villages of Eastern Congo’s Buhavu chiefdom.8 Table 3.1
shows the research area and villages included within the study. In this region, association with
certain social categories have historically played an important role for social and economic
life. Based on extensive fieldwork and ethnographic interviews I single out the five most
predominant social categories that are further discussed below.
The Buhavu chiefdom is part of Congo’s South Kivu province, which figures centrally
in the violence that has engulfed the country for the last two decades. Located in the
8In fact, the survey was part of a census conducted in 24 villages, interviewing 4,015 individuals. The survey
assignment used in this study, however, was only introduced after the fourth village. To create a sampling
frame I made use of data created together with the International Rescue Committee and CARE International
in 2010. The selection of the villages was conditioned on a villages containing at least 25 migrant households as
well and basic safety conditions for the surveyors. The sampling frame and the code used for village selection
is available upon request.
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east, the province was the initial start point for both the First and Second Congolese Wars
(1996-1997 and 1998-2003), and continues to be plagued by instability in the form of armed
violence in the ongoing Kivus conflict. Throughout this conflict, ethnicity has played a key
role. The salience of this social category can be traced back to the colonial period. In a
form of indirect rule, the Belgian colonists cultivated ethnic based proto-political entities by
integrating Congolese into the colonial administrative structure based on pre-existing ethnic
cleavages. Land in eastern DRC has traditionally been a communally held good. The stretch
of land that a community controlled was largely circumscribed by ethnic identity. Colonial
policies that limited access to customary land based on ethnic ties only served to strengthen
the preexisting link between ethnic identity and land-access. For those not belonging to the
ethnic community, it became extremely difficult to obtain access to land (e.g. Vlassenroot
and Huggins (2005)). The importance of ethnicity was further strengthened during Mobutu’s
patrimonial rule as he instigated ethnic resentment in order to ensure his own survival. Local
political leaders started to use ethnicity as a vehicle to mobilize their support, often based on
old but unresolved grassroots conflicts over land. Given this entrenched institutionalization
of ethnicity, conflicts easily found their groundings within existing ethnic cleavages, making
ethnicity an especially pertinent social category of interest.9
The effects of the region’s history of violence have been far reaching. Basic infrastructure
such as roads, schools, and health facilities is lacking in Eastern Congo, due to both destruc-
tion and a lack of investment. For example, a 2007 survey conducted in an area of the Congo
roughly equivalent to the size of France (outlined with the larger rectangle in the left panel
of Table 3.1), found that on average household members have to walk 45 minutes in order to
reach drinking water.10 Furthermore, 77% of respondents in South Kivu believe that their
village’s economic situation is worse in comparison to neighboring villages, and over 52%
believe that economic conditions in their village have deteriorated over the past year. There
are thus good reasons to belief that Congolese associate closely low economic status.
9For a more complete discussion see: Prunier (2009) and Autesserre (2010).
10The survey contains information about 21,467 household members (2,906 respondents) drawn randomly
from almost 600 villages, and is available upon request.
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In part due to high levels of conflict, another key characteristic of Eastern Congo is the
prevalence of rural-rural migration. The 2007 survey found that a full 61% of household
members have fled at least once between 1996 to 2007 due to armed activities. Such conflict-
induced migration has also become a common occurrence within the Buhavu chiefdom in
recent years due to sustained armed activity — in particular by the “Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Rwanda” (or FDLR by its French acronym) — and military operations by
the government such as the 2009 joint Congo-Rwanda military offensive Umoja Wetu against
the FDLR, followed by Kimia II and Amani Leo. Those individuals that migrate due to
conflict often move only a few kilometers away from their village of origin — moving to the
nearest safe village or to those villages with family members.11 Thus, within the rural villages
studied, migration status is likely to be an important social category.
Qualitative evidence suggests that Congolese relate closely with their nationality. This
observation might be explained by Mobutu’s official policy of “Zairianization” (or Authen-
ticité in French) that was widely propagated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Mobutu’s
Zairianization campaign was an effort to rid the country of the lingering remnants of colo-
nialism and the continuing influence of Western culture. Zairianization endeavored to create
a centralized and singular national identity that could take precedent over regionalism and
tribalism (e.g. (Young and Turner, 1985; Kabwit, 1979).
Finally, for most Congolese the arena for daily social interaction is the village. With an
average of less than 300 inhabitants, this study’s research villages are small and tightly knit.12
Moreover, a rural Congolese’s daily life is principally governed by factors at the village level.
Arguably the most important among these is the village chief, who plays a pivotal role in
governing a community’s day-to-day life. In the 2007 survey, 66% of respondents indicated
that the village chief is the most influential person to resolve conflict among villagers. This
11The census conducted in the twenty villages (which is discussed in detail in the next section) was specifically
designed to learn about migration by collecting complete migration histories for all respondents. The data
shows that 92% of all conflict-induced movements originating from Buhavu chiefdom ended in a neighboring
village and not an urban center.
12To illustrate this fact I randomly selected 18 individuals in each village stratified upon migration status
(9 native and 9 migrants). Each individual was shown a photo of the other 17 seelcted individuals to estimate
intra-village member recognition levels. On average, two randomly paired individuals have a full 91% chance
of knowing each other.
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number increases to 80% if village elders and religious leaders — essentially the chiefs’ ad-
visory board when it comes to managing village affairs — are also included. Moreover, the
chief is the pivotal actor when it comes to land allocation. In fact, the ownership of land
and village membership is intricately related. Access to land is not only a function of the
availability of resources, but also of an individual’s favorable standing in the village. In turn,
land is deeply embedded in the social structure of the village and acts as an important tool for
integration. Numerous interviews were undertaken by the author with village chiefs, village
natives, and migrants in order to learn about migrant integration. Overall, these interviews
indicate that the primary vehicle for migrants to become accepted as ‘part of the village’ is
to be granted rights to cultivate agricultural land. Village membership is therefore the fifth
social category that is explored in this study.
3.2.2 Measuring Self-Categorization
To measure self-categorization this study moves beyond simply asking in how far an indi-
vidual identifies with a social category.13 In each of the twenty research villages, the survey
conducted included an assignment in which each respondent had to rank order her associ-
ation with the five social categories previously discussed. First, each respondent was given
five slips of paper, each with one of the following statements written on it:14
[1] “I am Congolese”;
[2] “I am a migrant”;
[3] “I am poor”;
[4] “I am from ethnic group [group of the respondent]”;
[5] “I am a member of the village”.
13The World Values Survey, for example, asks about how proud respondents are to be a member of social
category ‘X’.
14A detailed list of steps undertaken by the enumerator can be found in Table 3.5 in the Appendix.
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Next, the enumerator explains to the respondent that for most individuals, there are
multiple applicable social categories simultaneously, but that individuals often associate more
strongly with some categories compared to others. The respondent was then asked to place
the five slips of paper in rank order starting with the one they most strongly associate with (5)
down to that category which they least associate with (1). From this assignment I construct
two dependent variables that will be used throughout the paper.15 The first is the average
rank of a specific social category (a variable between 1 and 5). The second is simply whether
the social category in question was ranked highest (a binary variable).
Two final remarks in so far as they relate to the dependent variable are in order. First, by
construction, self-categorization in this paper is defined in relative terms to the other social
categories. The reality that each respondent is likely to fit more than one social category
necessitates two underpinning assumptions. The first assumption is that each respondent’s
self-categorization is both irreflexive and transitive. In other words, the individual does
not associate equally strong to more than one social category, and if an individual ranks
“I am poor” over “I am a migrant” over “I am Congolese”, then the individual also ranks
“I am poor” over “I am Congolese”. The second assumption is independence of irrelevant
alternatives. That is, the rank order of the five categories selected should not be affected
by the addition or the removal of another, sixth social category. The second remark is that
feelings of association with a social category are likely to vary in intensity over time and
context. Conducting the same survey assignment at a different time or in a different context
might thus give very different responses. In fact, letting respondents rank their own categories
opens the possibility for strategic behavior. The latter is a key interest to this study and I
will return to this in detail in Section 3.5.
15Having “I am a migrant” as an option might be problematic because, in contrast to the other social
categories, some people cannot credibly claim to be a migrant. Three points alleviate this concern. First, less
than 7% of the population have never moved. Excluding these individuals from this paper’s analysis gives the
same results. Second, NGOs are largely unable to distinguish between those with and without a migration
history. Finally, the focus of this paper, and the results that drive it, are specific to the migrant population,
which I explicitly define as having had a history of migration.
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3.2.3 The Exogenous Presence of Development Activity
Rigorously testing the impact of development interventions on self-categorization is difficult
due to selection effects of development actors choosing to work in certain villages over others.
For example, NGOs might choose to target exactly those villages where migrants face prob-
lems to integration. This study builds on the exogenous presence of development activity
to overcome this potential bias. Between 2007 and 2011, a DFID-funded development inter-
vention was implemented by the International Rescue Committee and CARE International
throughout Eastern Congo — including the Buhavu chiefdom. When the social category data
of this study was collected in 2012 the intervention had already concluded. The development
project provided communities with financing of up to $70,000 to construct local projects such
as school rooms or clinics, with part of this money being received and managed by the com-
munities directly (see Humphreys et al. (2015) for details). The villages were selected into
the program by a public lottery. A major benefit is that this allows me to make causal claims
about the impact of development interventions on self-categorization. In order to leverage
this benefit, this study’s research villages were randomly selected taking into account the
villages’ treatment status to obtain balance between treatment and control communities.16
This is illustrated in the right panel of Table 3.1.
3.3 The Buhavu Chiefdom: A First Look at the Data
In this section I introduce the population being studied, and explore self-categorization in
the Buhavu chiefdom and what characteristics are correlated with it. Exploring the latter
can be valuable in its own right. For example, learning the correlates of village membership
can inform NGOs what factors to target to better facilitate migrant integration. Similarly,
shedding light on which factors are negatively correlated with ethnic identity can inform
debates related to conflict prevention and resolution in Congo.
16Even with a small sample, random assignment ensures that simple difference in means provides an unbiased
estimate of the treatment effect. Of course with a small sample my power is weak and I can expect the estimates
to be more noisy, though this does not threaten unbiasedness (e.g. Mutz and Pemantle (2011); Imai et al.
(2008)).
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3.3.1 The Sample
Summary information for the respondents on a set of key characteristics are presented in
Table 3.2, where I distinguish between migrants and natives.17 To begin, I will discuss the
composition of the native population. Given that the Buhavu chiefdom is named for its most
populous ethnic group, it is not surprising that the large majority (80%) of the natives are
Havu. The other three major ethnic groups — the Shi, the Tembo, and the Rwandans (Hutu
and Tutsi) —each make up a much small portion of the remaining natives. That rates of
migration are high in the Buhavu chiefdom is well-illustrated by the fact that even among
natives only 50% of the individuals were born in their current village of residence. Native
households are poor and own on average slightly more than one chicken. Finally, even among
native households only 48% own a field in the village, a statistic that underscores the limited
access to and ownership of land in the Buhavu chiefdom. Turning to the migrant population,
migrants and natives differ in important respects. While the Havu still make up the majority
of the migrant population (58%), the Tembo, Shi and Rwandans each hold a share of the
remaining migrant population of more than 10%.18 Migrants are even poorer than natives,
owning on average less than 0.6 chickens. Finally, and not surprisingly, migrant households
have lower access to land, with only one in twelve owning a field in the village.
The bottom four rows of Table 3.2 provide village-level statistics. From the table it can be
seen that villages range in size between 126 and 661 inhabitants. In part due to migration,
their ethnic diversity is generally high with all villages being composed of more than one
ethnic group. Based upon a calculated ethno-linguistic fractionalization index there is on
average a 40% chance that two randomly paired individuals from the same village do not
belong to the same ethnic group. Finally, the bottom row of Table 3.2 shows that in 18 of
the 20 villages NGOs have undertaken activities within the six months preceding the survey,
17Throughout this study, I define a migrant as anyone who satisfies two criteria: 1) the individual was not
born in the village; and 2) the individual had taken up residence in the village within the last five years. The
complement sample consists of natives. This definition is used throughout the larger project on migration of
which this study is part.
18Many of the migrants in the research villages — in particular the Tembo and the Kinyarwanda-speakers
(Hutu and Tutsi) — fled fighting in the chiefdom’s Haut Plateaux, a mountainous area to the west of the
study area.
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Table 3.2: Sample’s Summary Information
Natives Migrants
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min. Max Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min. Max Obs. Diff. St.Err.
Individual characteristics
Age (in 10) 4.01 1.55 1.80 9.30 1012 3.35 1.28 1.80 8.60 559 -0.66*** (0.12)
Male 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1029 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 582 -0.13*** (0.03)
Havu 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 1021 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 575 -0.22*** (0.06)
Shi 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 1021 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 575 0.03** (0.01)
Tembo 0.04 0.18 0.00 1.00 1021 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 575 0.08** (0.03)
Rwandan 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 1021 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 575 0.06 (0.05)
Born 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1039 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 590 -0.50*** (0.06)
Last entered 9.33 8.35 0.00 58.00 914 2.23 1.58 0.00 5.00 590 -7.10*** (0.42)
Household characteristics
# Chickens 1.09 2.05 0.00 25.00 963 0.59 1.48 0.00 13.00 572 -0.50*** (0.09)
Swahili 0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00 972 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 570 0.02** (0.01)
Owns field 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 1039 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 590 -0.40*** (0.05)
Village characteristics
Pop. (in 100) 2.99 1.35 1.26 6.61 20 na na na na na na na
# Groups 7.70 2.89 2.00 14.00 20 na na na na na na na
ELF 0.40 0.21 0.09 0.76 20 na na na na na na na
NGO 0.90 0.31 0.00 1.00 20 na na na na na na na
Notes: Based on 1,039 natives and 590 migrants. # Chickens and Swahili was not asked
in the first village. ‘Last entered’ is the number of years ago the individual arrived in the
village after the last movement; so only for those that moved at least once. One, two or
three asterisks indicate, respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level and reported in parentheses.
highlighting the prevalence of NGO activity in this area.
3.3.2 Social Categories and Their Correlates
How do individuals in the Buhavu chiefdom characterize themselves? Figure 3.1 plots fre-
quency distributions for each of the five social categories. One result of interest, given the
region’s history of ethnic fragmentation, is the low number of respondents (7.9%) ranking
ethnicity as their most important social category (i.e as a “5”). Only attachment to the social
category of village membership received even lower top-ranking responses (5.5%). Being a
migrant was top-ranked in 15.9% of responses, higher than both ethnicity and village mem-
bership. The two predominant social categories are low economic status (35.1%) and being
Congolese (35.6%). Another finding of import is that the distributions of each social category
is largely characterized by single peaked preferences, as each identity appears to have a clear
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peak (or rank with the highest response level) with response levels falling off to either side
of the peak (e.g. Black (1948)). The exception is the migrant category. Individuals have
a preference to rank this social category either least important (42.7%) or most important
(15.9%). An obvious explanation is that there are large numbers of both migrants and natives
in the population. The lines in Figure 3.1 separate self-categorization by migration status,
where solid (dotted) lines indicate native (migrant) individuals. Not surprisingly, I find that
the definition of migrant used in this study is highly correlated with the migration category,
with many natives placing this social category last, and many migrants placing this social
category first.19
Figure 3.1: Distribution by Social Category
Ethnicity




































































Notes: Bottom axis indicates rank, where “5” (“1”) means highest (lowest) ranked. Based
on data from 1,629 individuals: 1,039 natives and 590 migrants. Solid (dotted) lines indicate
natives (migrants).
19Note that while the distribution for natives is single-peaked, this is not the case for migrants. In fact,
there are a relatively large number of migrants that place the migration identity last. Further analysis reveals
that this result is largely driven by ethnic heterogeneity among migrants.
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What factors correlate with an individual’s social category choice? Table 3.3 presents
results from regressing the individuals’ self-categorization on a set of individual, household
and village level variables that were introduced earlier in Table 3.2. Results are presented for
two types of dependent variable: the average rank of the social category (columns (i)) and
whether that social category was placed first or not (columns (ii)).20
Table 3.3: Correlates of Social Category
Soc. Category: Ethnicity Village Member Migrant Poverty Congolese
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Age (in 10) 0.02 0 0.05** 0.06 -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.03 0.01 0.06** 0.05*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Male 0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.16 0 0.03 -0.13* -0.18** 0.14** 0.17***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Shi -0.16 -0.40** 0.08 0.31* 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.07 -0.14 -0.19
(0.10) (0.19) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
Tembo -0.30* -0.14 -0.53*** -0.21 1.25*** 0.92*** -0.05 -0.37* -0.34*** -0.36*
(0.17) (0.22) (0.09) (0.28) (0.13) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.11) (0.18)
Rwandan 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.38 -0.42*** 0.26*** 0.30**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.11) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14)
Born -0.06 -0.12 0.12 -0.13 -0.26** -0.32*** 0.2 0.25* 0.02 -0.05
(0.10) (0.16) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.06) (0.12)
Chickens 0.02 -0.09** 0.01 -0.03 -0.05*** -0.07** 0 0 0.03** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Swahili -0.2 -0.22 0.13 0.76 0.04 0.18 -0.55*** -0.65*** 0.51*** 0.58***
(0.20) (0.23) (0.11) (0.47) (0.16) (0.27) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17)
Field 0.23** 0.16 0.34*** 0.37** -0.63*** -0.65*** -0.09 -0.01 0.15* 0.18*
(0.10) (0.16) (0.09) (0.17) (0.14) (0.19) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09)
Pop. (in 100) -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.11* 0.07 0.12* -0.06 -0.10* -0.01 0.02
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
ELF 0.97*** 0.09 -0.32 -1.07** -0.33 -0.82** -0.57* -0.13 0.26 0.73*
(0.28) (0.50) (0.30) (0.45) (0.46) (0.36) (0.31) (0.37) (0.37) (0.44)
NGO -0.43 0.21 -0.18 0.21 0.66*** 0.62*** -0.19 -0.41** 0.09 0.06
(0.31) (0.31) (0.11) (0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.15) (0.21)
N 1,592 1,605 1,592 1,605 1,591 1,605 1,592 1,605 1,592 1,605
Notes: Results in columns (i) are based on a simple regression where the dependent variable is
the average rank of the identity. Columns (ii) report marginal effects from a probit regression
where the dependent variable is whether or not the social category was ranked first, evaluated
at the mean of the independent variables. One, two or three asterisks indicate, respectively,
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and
reported in parentheses. Results are robust to different model specifications.
20The variable that measures the number of years since the individual’s most recent move to the village
is excluded from the regression due to a large number of missing observations. Including this variable does
not change the results and, not surprisingly, this variable is negatively (positively) correlated with village
membership (migration).
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The results are largely consistent across columns (i) and (ii). Many variables are asso-
ciated with self-categorization. To keep the discussion concise, I will only focus on the role
of landownership because this has been identified by Congo scholars as pivotal to Congolese
social life.21 Land ownership has been found to be closely linked to ethnic group membership
and village membership (Section 3.2.1). Moreover, many scholars argue that “land access and
control is one of the root causes of local conflict (Vlassenroot and Huggins (2005), p.116).”
Also this paper finds that landownership (variable ‘Field’ in Table 3.3) plays an important
role in how individuals associate with their social categories. In line with previous work on
the DRC, I find that landownership and the average rank of the ethnicity category are pos-
itively correlated. This result is not significant in column (ii), which likely reflects the fact
that land-ownership is also strongly related to the village membership and migrant identities.
Compared to those without land in the village, those respondents that own a field are 37%
more likely to place “I am a member of the village” highest. These respondents are also 65%
less likely to place the migrant category highest. An obvious reason for the latter is that
migrant households own fewer fields. Overall, and in line with the discussion in Section 3.2.1,
I find that land ownership is positively related with the ethnic social category and categories
that are rooted in the concept of belonging (positively with village membership and national
identity, and negatively with migrant identity).
The data that has been presented thus far are correlations, I now move to the main part
of the study and focus on causal relationships.
3.4 The Self-Categorization Impact of Development Activity
Do development projects change how the rural poor associate with available social categories?
The bottom row of Table 3.3 would suggest the answer is yes.22 There is a strong positive
correlation between NGO presence and the migrant social category: individuals in villages
21See: Van Acker (2005); Autesserre (2010); Prunier (2009); Claessens et al. (2013). These studies are
largely based on qualitative evidence. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that the importance
of landownership is explored quantitatively in the Congolese context.
22‘NGO’ indicates those villages that were home to a development project in the six months preceding the
survey.
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with an NGO, compared to those in villages without, are 62% more likely to place this social
category highest. This relationship, however, is not identified. For example, it is possible that
the positive correlation reflects the fact that NGOs target those villages with more migrants.
In this section I exploit the randomly assigned presence of an NGO program in order to
obtain the causal impact of development interventions.
The left column of Figure 3.2 plots the average rank of each social category by NGO
treatment status. Bold lines indicate differences that are statistically significant (p<0.10),
based on simple linear regressions where the dependent variable is the average rank of the
identity with standard errors clustered at the village level. The right column plots this
information for whether the individual ranks that social category highest, where estimated
coefficients are based on probit regressions.23
Figure 3.2’s top row shows the results for the native population. In the left column, it is
clear to see that the migrant social category is on average ranked lowest (2.0). Ethnicity and
village membership are ranked higher (respectively 2.6 and 2.7), and both the poverty and
Congolese social categories stand out at 3.8 and 4.0. I find similar results when focusing on
whether the identity was placed highest (right column), albeit with closer clustering of results
for migrant, village, and ethnicity results. The migrant, ethnicity and village membership
categories are ranked highest only 7.9%, 5.4% and 7.0% of the time, respectively. “I am poor”
and “I am Congolese”, on the other hand, are ranked highest 38.7% and 40.0% of the time.
Overall, I find no discernible difference in self-categorization between those individuals living
in control villages and those that were exposed for four years to the development intervention.
The only exception is that those individuals in villages that received development activity
associate less strongly with village membership: moving from 6.9% to 3.9% of natives placing
this social category first.
23As a robustness check I also analyzed the data using randomization inference (Fisher, 1935). In brief, I
first regressed the social category’s average rank (left column of Figure 3.2) or whether that social category
is ranked highest (right column), on the actual treatment status, obtaining the point estimate of the ‘true’
treatment. I then randomly re-assigned the study villages to the treatment 10,000 times, and for each of these
‘fake’ re-assignments I estimate a new point estimate. Put together these new point estimates constitute the
reference distribution. Comparing the estimate from the true assignment to this distribution makes it possible
to calculate the probability that I find the same estimate or stronger in the data. Similar results are obtained.
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Notes: E = ethnicity, V = village member, M = migrant, P = poverty, and C = Congolese.
Bold lines indicate differences that are statistically significant (p<0.10). Left column: Plots
the average rank of each social category by NGO status. Estimates are based on simple
linear regressions, with standard errors clustered at the village level. Right column: Plots
the proportion of individuals that rank that social category highest. Estimates are based on
probit regressions.
The bottom row plots the same data but for migrants, and paints a very different picture.
Three results stand out. First, compared to natives, migrants place significantly more weight
on their migrant social category: being ranked third after poverty and Congolese for both
the average rank (3.0) and the proportion of individuals that places this identity highest
(27.3%). The noteworthy aspect of this result is that it appears that the importance of this
social category for migrants seems to come largely at the cost of the Congolese and village
membership identities on which natives place statistically and substantively significantly more
weight.24 Second, NGO activity has a strong impact on how migrants associate with their
24This is confirmed by regressing the average rank of category choice on migration status (one if migrant,
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social categories. Those changes that are statistically significant (p<0.10) are indicated by
bold lines. I find that migrants living in villages that were exposed to the development
intervention for four years associate more strongly with their low economic status category.
Focusing on the right column, while migrants in control villages place this category highest
in only 21.9% of the cases, this increases to a full 36.1% in project villages (an increase of
64%). Development interventions thus make the poor ‘poorer’. This result is particularly
striking given that many development actors in Congo distribute resources explicitly to aid
migrants. Third, this results seems to go hand in hand with a decrease in the salience of
village membership and Congolese identities, falling respectively 55% (from 5.6% to 2.6%)
and 34% (from 39.0% to 25.6%). This finding could highlight a potentially harmful side-effect
of NGO activity for migrant integration, insofar as association with the categories of village
membership and being Congolese bind villagers together, overcoming cleavages of ethnicity
and migration. I will return to this point in Section 4.6.25
To conclude, this section offers causal evidence that individuals in villages that received
resources from a development project, paradoxically, associate themselves more strongly with
their ‘poverty’ social category — even after NGO activities have concluded. The next section
explores what might explain this result.
zero if native), and by regressing whether the category was placed highest on migration status. Ethnicity:
-0.17 (0.10) and 0.00 (0.01). Village membership: -0.49*** (0.05) and -0.01** (0.01). Migration: 1.02***
(0.11) and 0.19*** (0.02). Poverty: -0.04 (0.09) and -0.09*** (0.03). Congolese: -0.32*** (0.07), -0.09**
(0.03). Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the village level.
25There is little evidence that especially the poor are more likely to claim poverty in response to the
development intervention. I create a binary variable indicating whether the household is among the smallest
25% of households (household size is generally a good indicator of wealth). Note that it is not possible to
create such an indicator using other common indicators of wealth because most individuals are very poor:
69% of households own no chickens, 80% own no field in the village, 81% has only one wife. Regressing
whether poverty is ranked first on the NGO treatment status, whether the household is among the poorest
households and their interaction, gives the following effects: -0.01 (0.10); 0.09 (0.00); 0.03 (0.38). P-values in
parentheses. Similar results obtain when I distinguish by migration status. Furthermore, regressing all four
wealth indicators on the NGO treatment status — for the subset of people that ranked low economic status
highest — results in the following effects (p-values in parentheses): number of chickens owned: 0.03 (0.45);
land ownership: -0.06 (0.25); household size: -0.11 (0.43); number of wives of the head of the household: -0.10
(0.09). Overall, the results suggest it is unlikely that the development intervention binds the poor together.
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3.5 How Development Interventions Make the Poor ‘Poorer’
There are multiple reasons that could explain why participants, and in particular migrants,
are more likely to associate with their low economic status in response to development activity.
A first reason is that those in treatment villages, compared to those in control areas, are,
in fact, poorer. For example, poorer households might have self-selected into treatment
communities (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1988)). A second reason can be that although
individuals have not become poorer, the wealth of natives increased more compared to that
of migrants. This would explain why especially migrants associate more strongly with their
low economic status. The data finds no support for the first explanation, and only weak
support for the second.26 A third reason generating the observed differences could lie in the
implementing process of NGO activity. Many development actors, in order to know what type
of assistance is most beneficial, involve the target population to identify needs. This can take
numerous forms such as villager surveys, village meetings, scorecards, etc. By emphasizing
what populations lack, these activities have the potential to make individuals more aware
of their low economic status. This study is not able to test this third explanation. Instead,
the study explores a fourth rational: that individuals behave strategically to obtain access
to development resources. I will first introduce this argument, and the survey experiment
specifically designed to test this proposition, before providing empirical evidence.
3.5.1 The Strategic Use of Social Categories
Fearon and Laitin (2000) put forth three ways to explain changes in how individuals relate
to social categories. The first explanation argues that self-categorization is shaped by broad
structural forces such as economic development (Gellner (1983)) and ‘print capitalism’ (An-
26The top eight rows of Table 3.6 in the Appendix compares individuals from treatment and control commu-
nities across four wealth indicators: number of chickens owned, land ownership, household size, and number
of wives of the head of the household. The table shows that for five (out of the eight) variables measured,
the difference between means for NGO villages versus control villages is positive, suggesting that treatment
communities are actually richer, not poorer. However, of these five, only the difference in number of chickens
owned is statistically significant. Also, Humphreys et al. (2015) find no evidence that the NGO program
used in this study engendered migration flows. The bottom four rows of Table 3.6 compares the development
impact on the difference of wealth holdings between natives and migrants. While the magnitudes are large,
all but one fail to reach statistical significance.
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derson (1983)). The second posits that self-categorization is shaped by discursive formations
and symbolic or cultural systems (e.g. Geertz (1973)). A third explanation proposes that
self-categorization is a function of the actions of individuals seeking various ends: elites con-
struct and manipulate social categories in order to maintain or increase their political power,
or these categories are produced and reproduced through strategic action “on the ground”
by everyday actions of ordinary people. In line with this latter proposition, Posner (2004)
provides evidence that the salience of ethnicity responds to whether or not that category can
be useful as a vehicle for political competition. Laitin (1998) documents the emergence of a
Russian-speaking national social category among the post-Soviet republics’ diaspora popula-
tions in response to the introduction of language laws and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The argument that I present to explain the impact of development activity follows this third
mechanism closely.
In many developing countries, development actors play a key role in the provision of pub-
lic goods. They target basic livelihoods and undertake infrastructural projects such as the
construction of schools and health centers. The extent of underdevelopment in eastern Congo,
with many villagers living at subsistence levels, puts the resources provided by these actors
in high demand. This study argues that because of these resources villagers will emphasize
those social categories believed to improve their chances of gaining access to those economic
advantages offered by development actors. That is, in expectation of development activity,
villagers will activate the social category of low economic status, and choose to portray them-
selves as “in need”. The logic behind such strategic behavior is quite rational. Development
resources are limited and a development actor targets a limited number of villages, and within
these villages often only a subset of the villagers. In order to maximize the probability of
obtaining access to these resources, individuals choose to act as if in need towards the devel-
opment actors. This strategy increases both the chance that the village is targeted, as well as
the chance for an individual to obtain resources given the presence of a development actor.
The argument that individuals emphasize or play down their economic situation for strategic
reasons is not new. Baland et al. (2011), for example, find that individuals in Cameroon
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pretend to be poor (at a cost) in order to escape forced solidarity. Empirically this argu-
ment implies that individuals choose to present a different social category depending on the
identity of the information collector. For example, when asked for their social category by
a ‘university’, instead of an ‘NGO’, individuals are less likely to choose low economic status
because there is lower pay-off in doing so. The idea that individuals’ responses are sensitive
to the counterpart’s identity has been documented in previous studies. Corstange (2014), for
example, finds that surveys sponsored by western embassies, in contrast to western univer-
sities, suppresses survey participation and makes people more likely to report pro-western
policy positions.27
Importantly, this study argues that the social category that is temporarily emphasized
for strategic reasons can persist over time, reshaping how an individual relates to her menu
of social categories. This proposition builds on a well-development literature in social psy-
chology. Self-perception theory finds that self-perception follows behaviors: an individual’s
association with social categories is determined by interpreting the meaning of her own be-
havior (e.g. Bem (1967, 1972); Laird (2007)).28 Development actor-villager interactions can
thus be understood as a self-reinforcing system, in that villagers strategically choose low
economic status as their social category, which is an action that is optimal given their beliefs
about access to resources. At the same time, development actors target those villages and
villagers that are most in need and, as a result, the villagers’ signal is not disconfirmed.29
Such a self-reinforcing system of social categories can thus persist over time (e.g. (Laitin,
1998; Mackie, 1996; Fearon and Laitin, 1996)) and make Congolese associate with poverty
even when NGOs have concluded their activities.
27In line with this argument, Humphreys et al. (2006) show that the identity of discussion leaders influence
discussion outcomes. And Cilliers et al. (2014) provide evidence that in rural Sierra Leone generosity is
sensitive to the presence of a white foreigner.
28Cognitive dissonance theory is closely related and argues that such changes in association occur because
of efforts to reduce dissonance (e.g. Zanna and Cooper (1974); Fazio et al. (1977)).
29As Abdelal et al. (2005) rightly notes, “because identities are contested, we are well aware that identity
language can be used strategically. However, if language is used strategically it will only be effective if at least
some important portion of the population has internalized the identity cues and responds to their use (p.12).”
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3.5.2 Testing the Strategic Use of Social Categories
To test whether individuals use their menu of social categories strategically, I utilize a survey
experiment. Before respondents decided how to rank their five identities, they received a
prime about the identity of the enumerator. Specifically, each respondent was randomly
allocated to a ‘University’ or an ‘NGO’ prime. Before the respondent ranked the five social
category slips, the enumerator would read the prime aloud. The text related to each prime can
be found in Table 3.4.30 The NGO prime activates the possibility of access to development
resources, while this is absent in the university prime. I thus expect that, compared to
respondents that receive the university prime, those that receive the NGO prime are more
likely to associate with the low economic status category in order to increase the probability
that development actors will target their village.
Table 3.4: Survey Experiment
Prime Text
University “We are students. We work for Columbia University. We are not here
for a development project and we will not distribute anything. We are
here for scientific research.”
NGO “We are students. We work for Columbia University. You will not
directly benefit, but we will share the results of this research with several
large NGOs in Bukavu: for example, the IRC, UNHCR and UNOCHA.”
Notes: University and NGO prime. Used a total of 885 and 916 times, respectively. Randomly
assigned.
3.5.3 Results
Do Congolese villagers use their social categories strategically? The analysis in this section
relies on randomization of the university and NGO prime, which guarantees that both groups
30These primes are in addition to a general introduction at the start of each survey in which the enumerators
introduce themselves as follows: “I work for a project by Columbia University that investigates why people
cooperate with each other. I would like to ask you to participate in the data collection project ‘Migration
and Networks’. This project is part of the dissertation of Neelanjan Sircar and Peter van der Windt. Both
are doctoral candidates at Columbia University. The goal of this project — and their dissertation in general
— is not political and not for profit.” The survey assignment, and thus the prime, would follow around ten
minutes into the survey.
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will be similar in expectation. In practice, however, it is possible that both groups differ (by
virtue of unlucky randomization). Table 3.7 in the appendix checks for such a possibility;
it lists the average for a set of key characteristics by university and NGO prime, and the
difference between both. I find that there are no substantive nor statistically significant
differences between them.
The results are presented in Figure 3.3. The left column plots the average rank of each
social category choice, separated by those individuals that received the university prime and
those that received the NGO prime. Bold lines indicate differences that are statistically
significant (p<0.10), based on simple linear regressions where the dependent variable is the
average rank of the identity with standard errors clustered at the village level. The right
column plots this information for whether the individual ranks that social category highest,
where estimated coefficients are based on probit regressions.31
The top row in Figure 3.3 shows the results for the native population. In the left column
I find no discernible difference in self-categorization between those individuals that received
the university prime and those that received the NGO prime. Focusing on the right column,
however, I find that the possibility for access to NGO resources has an effect on natives.
While 35.9% of the native population ranks poverty highest under the university prime,
this increases to a full 42.0% under the NGO prime. The increase of 16.9% is statistically
significant (p=0.02). Moreover, this increase goes hand in hand with a decrease in the natives’
association with their Congolese social category, which decreases from being ranked highest
by 35.1% of the natives to 28.6% (p=0.07).
Results for the migrant population are presented in the bottom row of Figure 3.3. Two key
results stand out. First, while 23.7% of migrants rank poverty highest under the university
prime, this increases to a full 35.4% under the NGO prime. The increase of 49.4% is both
substantively and highly statistically significant (p=0.00). This result is corroborated in the
left column. Second, this increase for natives is almost three times as large as the increase in
31As a robustness check the data was also analyzed using randomization inference. Similar results are
obtained. See Footnote 23.
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Notes: E = ethnicity, V = village member, M = migrant, P = poverty, and C = Congolese.
Bold lines indicate differences that are statistically significant (p<0.10). Left column: Plots
the average rank of each social category by NGO status. Estimates are based on simple
linear regressions, with standard errors clustered at the village level. Right column: Plots
the proportion of individuals that rank that social category highest. Estimates are based on
probit regressions.
the same social category for natives.32 To conclude, this study finds that Congolese villagers
use their low economic status social category strategically. This result is fully in line with
the results found in Section 3.4, and is thus one reason that can explain why Congolese, and
in particular migrants, are more likely to associate with their low status social category in
response to development activity.
32I also conduct the same analysis separating out those villages that received the development project, and
those that did not. While the difference in effects are not statistical significance, they are — as expected —
stronger in the group of villages that has been exposed between 2007 and 2011 to the development intervention.
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3.6 External Validity
This study argues that exposure to development interventions leads individuals to strategi-
cally signal that they are poor. While the Buhavu chiefdom is similar to most parts of the
Congo and the developing world in that villagers live at subsistence level and NGOs are key
actors, a centrail question is whether the results hold beyond this study’s 20 villages.
To answer this question I make use of survey data collected in 806 villages that were
randomly selected throughout Eastern Congo — the larger rectangle in the left panel of Ta-
ble 3.1.33 To measure NGO exposure, data was collected on how often a motorbike from
a development organization was seen in the village the month preceding the survey.34 Fur-
thermore, in each village ten randomly selected villagers were asked the following question
about their current economic situation: The economic situation of your household is much
worse/worse/better/much better compared to [other households in the village]/ [your house-
hold in July 2006]?35 The response to these two questions are open to strategic manipulation
by Congolese villagers, and I thus expect a strong, positive correlation between NGO exposure
(motorbike sightings) and these two dependent variables.
Figure 3.4 presents the results, where the y-axis report estimated coefficients from probit
regressions. The dependent variable for the two economic situation questions (top lines)
is measured as the proportion of individuals stating that their economic situation is ‘much
worse’ or ‘worse’. The independent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether there
are more or less motorbikes sighted than x in the village the month preceding the interview,
where x ∈ {0, 20}. For example, if a motorbike is sighted more than once every two days in
the village (point 15 on the x-axis), the individual is around 5% more likely to indicate that
the household is worse off than other households — both compared to 2006 status and to
33The data was collected in 2012 as part of Humphreys et al. (2015), and is available upon request.
34Responses reflect the large presence of NGOs in Eastern Congo: only 42% of the villages reported to have
seen no motorbike the previous month, 15% saw a motorbike once, 11% twice, 19% three to ten times, 8%
eleven to twenty-nine times, and 5% of the villages saw a motorbike at least once per day. Note that this data
comes from the village chief, who might have strategic reasons to misrepresent this information. However,
an inspection of the location of the villages that report high numbers of motorbike sightings (GPS locations
were collected for all villages) correlates well with other accounts of high NGO exposure areas, including the
author’s knowledge of where NGOs are particularly active.
35Responses are: 11%/57%/31%/1% and 16%/50%/31%/3%, respectively.
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Notes: Reports the estimated coefficients from probit regressions. The dependent variable for
the economic situation questions (the top lines) is measured as the proportion of individuals
stating that their economic situation is ‘much worse’ or ‘worse’. The dependent variable for
the wall quality question (bottom lines) is the proportion of individuals with a wall made
from mud or plastic. The independent variable is a dummy variable: whether the village
had more or less motorbikes sighted than x in the village the month preceding the interview,
where x ∈ {0, 20}. Errors are clustered at the village level. Based on 6,746 observations. For
presentation purposes, the coefficient at x is the average of x, x − 1 and x + 1. Gray areas
indicates 90% confidence intervals.
other households. The coefficients presented in Figure 3.4 are three month moving averages
and thus only start from x = 3 onwards. The figure is capped at 20 because of the small
number of observations larger than 20. The gray areas indicate 90% confidence interval, with
errors clustered at the village level. I find that not only are all the estimates positive, they
are increasing in NGO exposure. These results are in line with the argument that exposure
to development interventions leads individuals to behave strategically.
One worry, however, which we discussed in detail in Section 3.2.3, is that this result can
simply reflect the fact that NGOs operate more in areas that are actually worse off. Figure
3.4 therefore presents a second set of results. In addition to asking questions, the surveyors
also reported the quality of the respondents’ walls — an indicator of wealth that cannot be
manipulated by the respondent. The bottom lines in Figure 3.4 present estimation results
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where the dependent variable is the proportion of individuals with a wall made from mud or
plastic. The results are the opposite of those found for the strategic behavior-prone questions:
exposure to NGO activity is related to better and increasing wall quality. In other words,
NGO presence is not associated with worse economic outcomes, which gives confidence that
the results presented are driven by strategic behavior, not NGO selection.
In summary, the empirical evidence presented in this section suggests that the key mech-
anism proposed in this study — individuals strategically signal to be poor in response to
development activity — holds not only for the study’s survey assignment in 20 villages in the
Buhavu chiefdom, but throughout Eastern Congo.
3.7 Conclusion
An aid worker in Congo — or anybody in a white jeep for that matter — will hear “Donnez-
moi! Donnez-moi!” (“Give me! Give me!”) several times a day by both children and adults
alike. This study shows that this is not an innocent expression, but the manifestation of a
worrisome externality of development interventions.
This paper argues that the poor prioritize certain social categories — specifically those
related to low economic status — in order to maximize access to development resources. This
proposition is supported by an original survey experiment conducted with 1,929 individuals
in the Buhavu chiefdom of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Following the logic of a self-
reinforcing system, I argue that the use of this strategically chosen social category, and the
consequent response by development actors, makes individuals internalize the social category
over time. To test this claim, this study exploits the randomly assigned presence of an NGO
program across the study’s research villages. I find causal evidence that even after the con-
clusion of the NGO program those Congolese in treatment communities associate themselves
more strongly with the low economic status category than those in control communities.
Apart from their own theoretical import for the literatures on resource windfalls and
identity, the arguments advanced in this paper have two additional implications.
First, NGOs that operate in the developing world often do so in areas characterized by
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limited information. As a result, in order to know where to work, whom to target and with
what, these organizations undertake so-called fields assessments — often taking the form of
face-to-face surveys in villages to learn about the needs of the villages and their inhabitants.
The results from this study’s survey experiment should raise warning to the quality of the
information collected. I find that even the relatively weak prime used in this study resulted
in significant strategic behavior among Congolese.
Second, in many developing countries NGOs play a central role in the provision of public
goods. While the guiding principle for development activity is to ‘do no harm’ (Anderson
(1999)), this study finds evidence of an unintended negative side-effect: development in-
terventions can make the poor ‘poorer’. Furthermore, in Section 3.4, I found that among
migrants this effect went hand in hand with a decrease in the salience of village member-
ship and Congolese identities — two identities that arguably benefit migrant integration.
Extensive qualitative work that is based upon in-depth interviews with dozens of natives,
migrants and village chiefs, undertaken in the Buhavu chiefdom in 2011 and 2012, supports
the proposition that resource distributions by NGOs can reinforce tensions between natives
and migrants. As one of the chiefs notes about the migrants in his villages: “We live to-
gether, but when distributions are done we do not.” This result is particularly striking given
that many development actors in Congo distribute resources explicitly in an attempt to aid
migrant integration.
That development activity can have unintended, negative effects has been discussed before
(e.g. De Waal (2009) and Polman (2011)). De Waal (2004) even notes that the “... side effects
commonly turn out to be worse than the problems it seeks to address. (p.158)” In this study
rare, causal evidence for these claims is offered.
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3.8 Appendix A: Sequence of Steps
Table 3.5: Sequence of Steps
Step Event
1 Record the time (hh:mm) on the record sheet.
2 If the recorded time’s last digit is odd, read out the ‘University’ prime. If the
last digit is even, read out the ‘NGO’ prime. Record the prime on the record
sheet.
3 Now explain the rules to the respondent. “Here are five slips of paper, each
with a different identity.” One by one, show and explain each of the five slips
of paper. “A person can have all these identities. These identities are likely
to have a different importance to you. Now it is up to you to place these five
identities in the order of how strongly you identity with them.
4 University Prime NGO Prime
“We are students. We work for
Columbia University. We are not here
for a development project and we will
not distribute anything. We are here
for scientific research.”
“We are students. We work for
Columbia University. You will not di-
rectly benefit, but we will share the re-
sults of this research with several large
NGOs in Bukavu: for example, the
IRC, UNHCR and UNOCHA.”
5 Now let the respondent rank the five slips of paper in the order of importance
to him/her.
6 Verify with the respondent that he/she understood the task, and correctly
ranked his/her identities.
7 Record the ranking on the record sheet.
Notes: Sequence of steps undertaken to learn about individuals’ identity choice.
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3.9 Appendix B: Difference in Wealth by NGO Status
Table 3.6: Difference in Wealth by NGO Status
NGO villages Control villages
Variable Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. Diff. St. Error
Natives
# Chickens 1.31 3.16 523 0.94 1.68 511 0.37* (0.21)
Owns field 0.45 0.50 527 0.55 0.50 512 -0.10 (0.11)
Household size 8.20 5.09 526 7.69 4.44 511 0.51 (0.56)
# Wives 1.25 0.71 481 1.22 0.68 478 0.02 (0.05)
Migrants
# Chickens 0.65 1.60 340 0.49 1.26 275 0.16 (0.20)
Owns field 0.07 0.25 341 0.13 0.34 345 -0.07 (0.06)
Household size 6.94 3.74 341 6.79 4.05 343 0.15 (0.44)
# Wives 1.14 0.41 320 1.17 0.49 317 -0.03 (0.03)
Natives minus migrants
Diff: # Chickens 0.58 0.57 10 0.25 0.35 10 0.33* (0.21)
Diff: Owns field 0.30 0.18 10 0.31 0.19 10 -0.01 (0.08)
Diff: Household size 1.65 1.42 10 1.37 1.15 10 0.28 (0.57)
Diff: # Wives 0.09 0.15 10 0.04 0.10 10 0.05 (0.06)
Notes: One, two or three asterisks indicate, respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level and reported in parentheses. Results in the
last four rows are based on randomization inference.
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3.10 Appendix C: Balance University and NGO Prime
Table 3.7: Balance University and NGO Prime
Univ. Prime NGO Prime
Variable Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. Diff. St. Error
Age (in 10) 3.86 1.53 846 3.87 1.55 881 0.01 (0.07)
Male 0.45 0.50 877 0.45 0.50 904 0.00 (0.02)
Havu 0.73 0.44 868 0.71 0.45 897 -0.02 (0.02)
Shi 0.11 0.31 868 0.09 0.29 897 -0.01 (0.01)
Tembo 0.05 0.22 868 0.07 0.26 897 0.02* (0.01)
Rwandan 0.07 0.25 868 0.08 0.27 897 0.01 (0.01)
Born 0.29 0.45 883 0.30 0.46 916 0.01 (0.02)
Last Entered 6.74 8.01 776 6.48 7.02 784 -0.26 (0.36)
# Chickens 0.87 1.74 834 0.99 2.43 861 0.12 (0.10)
Swahili 0.96 0.21 837 0.96 0.20 868 0.00 (0.01)
Owns field 0.33 0.47 885 0.34 0.47 916 0.01 (0.02)
Notes: One, two or three asterisks indicate, respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level and reported in parentheses.
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Abstract
Experimental games are a popular tool to measure discrimination. Ordinarily these
games are played between strangers, and players are given little information about the
population from which the other players are drawn. In much of the developing world,
however, behavior takes place among people that know each other well. This study
introduces a novel game to measure discrimination at this local level. We find that classic
experimental games do not directly translate to the local level in which basic individual
preferences are likely to be swamped by social considerations. We find that this finding
is due to an aggregation bias (moving from a known distribution of receivers to full
information about each individual receiver), and not a social distance bias (differences
in the distribution of the receiver population). We conduct our study in rural Sierra
Leone, a context characterized by discrimination based on social status—a factor widely
regarded as an important cause of the civil war.
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4.1 Introduction
In developed countries, many exchanges occur through impersonal interactions. In contrast,
a large literature on the political economy of development finds that in developing countries,
local characteristics such as reciprocity and network structure are important determinants
governing behavior (e.g. Udry (1994) and Fafchamps and Lund (2003)). This paper proposes
a framework and develops a novel method to understand and measure discrimination among
populations in which individuals know each other intimately. Second, we explore possible
biases implied by traditional methods to measure discrimination at this local level.
Starting with Becker (1957), economists have explored the causes and consequences of
discrimination. Because the measurement of discrimination is prone to issues such as social
desirability biases, recent empirical work has moved away from survey-based evidence in favor
of more behavioral based measures. Two strands of literature stand out.2 First, audit studies
and ‘kindred’ field experiments have evaluated if minorities are treated differently in job
application, housing search, vehicle purchases, etc. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004), randomize the applicant characteristics on resumes to study the impacts for job
applications (see also Riach and Rich (2002), List (2004) and Adida et al. (2010)). A second
strand has concentrated on laboratory experiments, predominatly relying on the attribute-
based dictator game (ADG). Discrimination in the ADG is measured as the difference in
allocation by a “dictator” (the sender) to different types of “receivers” that are differentiated
by an experimental cue on a particular attribute (for example ethnicity, gender, etc). A
central concern with these experiments is that they do not allow for the context in which
discriminatory behavior is embedded (e.g. Levitt and List (2007)). First, players do not know
anything about their counterparts except for that which is revealed by the experimenter.
Second, players are often strangers and do not know each other personally. An allocation
decision at the local level, however, also depends on other receiver’s attributes and factors
such as previous interaction and the social networks in which the individuals are embedded.
2Up to recently regression studies were also popular. These models attempt to interpret the implications of
say race or gender in an OLS framework, typically in wage models. These studies often use a Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition to interpret the magnitude of findings. See Neal and Johnson (1996) for one such study.
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This paper derives a formal and experimental framework to study discrimination based
upon differences in knowledge of the social context and the receiver.3 In particular, we focus
on how discrimination varies as a function of the distribution of the receiver population, and
how this discrimination changes when moving from a a setting where only the distribution
of receivers is known to a setting with full information about each receiver. Our framework
applies to discrimination in a wide array of settings, from situations where little is known
about participants (e.g. a rental market) to situations where participants know quite a bit
about each other (e.g. daily interaction in a rural village in Sierra Leone). We argue that the
classic ADG is a good measure of discrimination in the former setting but that an adjusted
ADG is necessary for empirical inferences about the latter. In this paper we introduce the
revealed-receiver attribute-based dictator game (RDG). This game extends the ADG in two
ways to capture behavior at the local level: 1) we reveal the identity of the receiver, and 2)
play with subjects who know each other well. To empirically illustrate our framework, we
conduct a set of RDG and ADG games at the local level. The latter is implemented with
three variations—each with a different level of social distance—which allows us to investigate
two mechanisms that might explain differences between the ADG and the RDG at the local
level: 1) social distance bias, and 2) aggregation bias. The first refers to differences in beliefs
about the overall distribution of relevant attributes in the population (e.g. playing with a
group of receivers from the village versus from the country). The second refers to the level of
uncertainty a dictator has about the relevant attributes of the receiver (playing with a group
of receivers versus playing with those same individuals one-by-one).
We implement the experimental games in a set of small and remote communities in rural
Sierra Leone where interactions are predominantly local. Because the reach of government is
limited, local elites have great authority to organize economic and social activity, including
the power to raise taxes, mobilize labor, settle disputes and allocate resources such as land,
labor and reproductive opportunities. It is argued that the exclusionary nature based upon
3Discrimination is defined as differential behavior based upon a particular attribute of the other. We
will define local discrimination as differential behavior based upon a particular attribute of the other among
individuals that know each other. In the next section we will discuss this in more detail.
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social status was an important contributing factor for the 1991-2002 civil war (e.g. Richards
(2005)). As a result, our experimental design leverages the importance of social status in rural
daily life and takes this as the cleavage for study to understand discriminatory behavior.
Three major results stand out. First, we find a significant difference between the RDG
and the ADG. Compared to the RDG, we find that in certain cases the ADG overestimates
levels of discriminating in the local context by a factor of almost ten. Second, we show that
the difference between both games is mainly driven by the aggregation bias, and not social
distance bias. What is important for discrimination in behavior is a dictator’s knowledge of
the receiver, not her knowledge about the distribution of receivers. Finally, a major benefit
of the RDG is that—in contrast to the ADG—we are able to investigate the importance of
characteristics other than only the attribute under study. In fact, the result that discrim-
ination is based upon social status largely disappears when the researcher also controls for
receiver and dyad characteristics.
We believe this study investigates a fundamental question concerning how to study hu-
man behavior across settings. While current methods allow researchers to isolate underlying
behavioral preferences without contamination by social considerations, this abstraction ig-
nores the social dimension of behavior that could easily swamp the importance of personal
preferences in highly socially connected societies. In real life, as Levitt and List (2007) rightly
argue, behavior also depends on other receiver’s attributes and factors such as previous in-
teraction and the social networks in which the individuals are embedded. Such factors we
expect to be particularly important determinants of discriminatory behavior at the local level;
that is, among individuals that know each other intimately and have regular interaction. In
this paper we introduce a new tool to the experimental literature that allows for a better
extrapolation of lab experimental results into real-world behavior at this local level.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present currently popular
methods to measure discrimination, and we discuss how they relate to behavior at the local
level. In section 4.3 we introduce the Sierra Leonean context and outline our experimental
design. Section 4.4 presents our results. We explore additional benefits of the RDG to learn
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about behavior at the local level in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Measuring Discrimination at the Local Level
4.2.1 Local Discrimination and a Novel Way to Measure It
We define local discrimination as differential behavior based upon a particular attribute of
the other among individuals that know each other. In this section we relate this concept to
the literature on discrimination and popular methods to measure it.
Statistical discrimination takes a prominent position in the literature on discrimination.4
A key feature of statistical discrimination is limited information. Firms, for example, have
limited information about the skills of job applicants, which gives them an incentive to use
easily observable characteristics correlated with productivity (such as skin color or gender) to
infer the expected productivity of applicants. It is thus not surprising that also the methods
used to measure discrimination are characterized by limited information. For example, in the
audit experiments discussed earlier, employers know little more about the job applicant than
what is revealed in the resume (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)). Limited information
also plays a key role in experimental games.5 Because these games are the focus of this paper,
we will discuss this in more detail.
Among experimental games the attribute-based dictator game (ADG) is the workhorse
model used to understand behaviors related to discrimination. The game takes a single player,
the sender, and asks her to split a fixed sum of money, the endowment, between herself and
another person, the receiver. The sender is under no obligation to donate any money to the
4Classic references are Aigner and Cain (1977), Phelps (1972), and Arrow (1973). The second type of
discrimination that has received attention in the literature, although to a much lesser extent, is taste-based
discrimination. Taste-based discrimination describes a situation in which individuals have an inherent preju-
dice towards a certain group of people. This prejudice is part of the utility function and may reflect dislike,
anger, or similar emotions (Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)). For example, in Becker (1957) employers have
a ‘taste for discrimination’, reflected in their disutility from employing workers that have a certain attribute
such as being black or women.
5Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) is one of the few studies that tries to isolate taste-based and statistical
motives for possible discrimination. Taste-based discrimination is measured using differential behavior by the
dictator in a dictator game. Statistical discrimination is measured using the trust game, where the statistical
discrimination reflects the players’ assessments of the differing reactions of members of groups to their actions.
Also these games are characterized by limited information. The two ethnic groups under study, Ashkenazic
Jews and Eastern Jews, are identifiable only via the name of unknown individuals (similarly to Ahmed (2010)).
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receiver.6 Before the allocation decision the sender is given some experimentally-controlled
“cue” regarding the receiver and no other information, and then plays the game at least
twice—each time with a different type of receiver. For example, a researcher interested in
discrimination based on social status would design an experiment in which the dictator would
have to split a fixed sum of money once between herself and a “high status individual”, and a
second time between herself and a “low status individual”. The difference in contribution is
then a measure of status-based discrimination. Limited information is a central characteristic
to these experimental games because the dictator knows little more about the receiver than
what the experimenter reveals, which is in most cases only the cue under study.7 The ADG
has been used to show discriminatory behavior based on various cleavages: gender (Holm,
2000), ethnicity (Whitt and Wilson (2007), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)), and partisanship
(Fowler and Kam, 2007).
This paper argues that neither the concept of statistical discrimination nor our current
methods to measure discrimination relate well to behavior at the local level. The principal
reason for this assertion is that social interaction at the local level is not characterized by
limited information about the other individuals in the population. The intuitive empirical
interpretation of the classic ADG, and other measures of discrimination such as the audit
studies, is that it measures the extent of discrimination between random strangers with no,
or very limited, information about the receivers’ attributes beyond those under study. These
studies therefore relate well to the concept of statistical discrimination, and to situations
where little is known about the other party beyond a limited amount of information, such
6Predictions based on standard Nash equilibria, assuming individuals are purely interested in personal
financial gain, are that the dictator will keep all of the money for herself. Empirically, however, one finds that
60% of dictators donate a positive amount of money towards the receiver, with a mean transfer of around 20%
of the endowment (Camerer (2003)). This suggests that people have more complex preferences than personal
financial gain, what is typically referred to as exhibiting “other-regarding preferences” (Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). For a critique of this interpretation see List (2007).
7The original setup of (attribute-based) dictator games entailed informing the dictator that the receiver
was behind a closed door so that no attributes of the receiver affected the decision of the dictator. The goal
of many early studies was simply to demonstrate the inadequacy of utility functions that only assume interest
in personal financial gain (e.g. Kahneman et al. (1986)). A set of more recent studies do reveal more about
the receiver than only the cleavage under study: e.g. (Habyarimana et al., 2007; Binzel and Fehr, 2013; Ligon
and Schechter, 2012; Leider et al., 2009; Burnham, 2003; Charness and Gneezy, 2008; Bohnet and Frey, 1999;
Croson, 1996). In most cases, however, these games do not mimic the local context with either the receiver
not fully revealed, or the subject pool being strangers. See Sircar et al. (2014a) for an overview.
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as the housing or the job market. In contrast, members of say a small village in rural Sierra
Leone, know much more about each other than only the experimenter’s attribute under study.
Furthermore, behavior between these villagers is guided by previous experiences with each
other. Finally, these villager’s behavior also depends on their position in the village’s social
network, and how they relate with other third villagers. Levitt and List (2007) argue how by
suppressing such factors, the measurement of discrimination by classic experimental games
is likely to result in different levels of discrimination than actually present in real life.8 We
argue that this is the case especially at the local level.
4.2.2 Differences in the Measurement of Local Discrimination
This paper proposes a novel experimental game to study discrimination at the local level.
Specifically, we introduce what we call the revealed-receiver attribute-based dictator game.
This game differs from the ADG in two ways: 1) the identity of the receiver is revealed to
the dictator, and 2) subjects know each other well. Second, we implement an experimental
framework in the field that allows us to investigate in detail the possible biases that may result
from using a classic ADG to measure discrimination at the local level. That is, in addition to
playing the RDG, all dictators also play a set of attribute-based games. The latter are classic
ADGs in that the dictator only knows the cue under study, in our case social status. Each
dictator played three variations of the ADG in which we differed the receiver population:
the dictator’s contributions towards a random individual from the chiefdom (ADG-C), the
village (ADG-V), or one of the other n − 1 participants that also play the game (ADG-P).
An overview of the experimental framework is given in Table 4.1, but we leave a detailed
discussion of each game to Section 4.3. By moving game-by-game from the ADG-C, what we
argue would be the classic measure of discrimination, to the RDG, our novel measure for local
level discrimination, we explore whether different game setups obtain different estimates of
discrimination. Furthermore, this experimental framework allows us to distinguish between
8Levitt and List (2007) propose that divergences may be caused by (i) the stakes of the game (ii) the
presence of moral and ethical considerations, (iii) the extent to which one’s actions are scrutinized by others
and the nature of such scrutiny, (iv) the subject pool of respondents and (v) the context in which the decision
is embedded.
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two mechanisms that might cause differences in behavior between the ADG-C and the RDG:
1) social distance bias, and 2) aggregation bias.





No ADG-C ADG-V ADG-P
Yes . . RDG
Notes: We implement two sets of games: the anonymous dictator game (ADG) and the
revealed-receiver dictator game (RDG). The ADG is conducted with three different receiver
populations: a randomly selected individual from the chiefdom (ADG-C), the village (ADG-
V) or the other n− 1 participants (ADG-P).
Social Distance Bias. Social distance bias refers to sensitivity of behavior to knowledge
about the distribution of receivers. Specifically, in this paper we consider this bias to be the
difference between the behavior of the dictator in the ADG with respect to a population
frame with which she is less familiar (ADG-C and ADG-V) compared to one from the local
context (ADG-P).9 To illustrate this bias, imagine the following thought experiment. An
experimenter interested in discrimination towards the homeless, might decide to conduct an
experiment in which the dictator is asked to split an allocation of 5 utils towards herself and
a “homeless”, and once again to herself and an individual that is not homeless (a “resident”).
A difference in contributions is interpreted as discrimination based upon homeless status.
First, assume that the dictator, a resident, lives in a neighborhood (the local level in this
example) that has two homeless and two residents. In this setting the dictator prefers to
contribute 2 utils to the homeless, because a small contribution makes it unnecessary for the
homeless to steal. On the other hand, she does not care about a hypothetical homeless at say
the national level; in this case she prefers to keep all 5 utils. Assume that in both cases the
dictator prefers to keep 5 utils when the receiver is a resident. This simple example illustrates
how the simple cue “homeless” might invite the social distance bias if the experimenter is
9Social distance bias has received considerable attention in the experimental literature: e.g. Etang et al.
(2011) and Charness and Gneezy (2008). Note that our description incorporates the definition by Hoffman
et al. (1996), p. 654, who define social distance “as the degree of reciprocity that subjects belief exist within
a social interaction.”
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interested in discrimination at the local level. The experimenter might conclude incorrectly
the absence of discrimination, while, in fact, at the local level residents discriminate strongly
in favor of the homeless (2 utils). In Table 4.1 this bias is reflected by moving along the top
row: comparing results from classic ADG games with different receiver populations.
Statistical discrimination is central to all three types of the ADG (top row of Table 4.1):
while the distribution of the receiver population is different in each game, all games have in
common that the dictator only learns about one attribute of the receiver. The two right-most
cells in Table 4.1 have the same population of receivers, but the RDG is not characterized by
statistical discrimination. Because dictators play with revealed counterparts that they know
intimately the game is no longer characterized by limited information. The dictator knows
more about the receivers than only the cleavage under study. Moreover, other factors that are
important for her allocation decision—such as previous experience with the receiver and their
relationship inside the social network—are all fully known to her. The RDG therefore gives
us the measure for local discrimination: the difference, by cleavage under study, in average
over all the individual contributions. If only statistical discrimination is at play, averaging
over the individual contributions in the RDG should give the same result as the ADG-P.
However, it is possible that there is a difference because of, what we will call, the aggregation
bias.
Aggregation Bias Given the same population of individuals about whom the dictator
knows all the attributes, the aggregation bias refers to the difference between moving from
playing against the group of individuals (ADG-P) to the average of playing against each
individual separately (RDG). Classic experimental games are played with a hypothetical
player from a group of potential receivers. For example, in the previous two games the
donation is to somebody from the group of homeless, and to the group of residents. Classic
games assume that each individual in each of these populations has an equal probability
to receive the dictator’s donation. At the heart of the aggregation bias is the fact that
a researcher cannot directly infer behavior towards an individual from behavior towards a
group of individuals. Again, consider our thought experiment. Assume the dictator—one of
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the two residents—plays the revealed-receiver dictator game. She therefore plays three times:
one time she has to split 5 utils between herself and homeless #1, a second time between
herself and homeless #2, and a third time between herself (resident #1) and resident #2. In
this setup the dictator plays one-on-one with receivers that are known to her (they are all
from the same neighborhood). Let’s explore her behavior towards the homeless. Assume that
homeless #1 has recently mugged the dictator. The contribution in the RDG might therefore
be: 0 utils to homeless #1, and 4 utils to homeless #2. If the dictator contributes 0 utils to
the resident, the level of local discrimination is 2. What is the dictator’s contribution if the
dictator had played an ADG with these two receivers, where randomly either homeless #1
or #2 receives the allocation? The answer is not necessarily 2 utils. For example, because
of the mugging the dictator may dislike contributing to homeless #1 to such an extent, that
she is willing to place a lot of weight on the 0 utils allocation, even at the cost of homeless
#2. That is, she prefers to punish homeless #1 more than to reward homeless #2. In this
case, the contribution to the homeless in the ADG will be less than 2 utils. Similarly, a
particularly positive relationship with one individual does not necessarily imply a positive
relationship towards the group of individuals with the same characteristic.
The aggregation bias therefore states that the inability of the experimenter to take into
account the dictator’s intensity of preferences over the receiver population, may lead to an
over or under estimation of discrimination at the local level by classic experimental games.10
In what follows we set out with two objectives. First, we test whether a traditional
attribute-based dictator game leads to different estimates in the measurement of discrim-
ination at the local level (comparing ADG-C and RDG). Second, we explore whether the
10A well developed literature in psychology has found that behavior towards an individual is different from
behavior towards a group (e.g. Hamilton and Sherman (1996)). A particularly prominent research agenda
is the “identified victim effect”, which find that individuals behave more generous towards identified victims
than towards unidentified or ‘statistical’ victims (Jenni and Lowenstein (1997)). Small (2003) and Kogut and
Ritov (2005), for example, find that when comparing dictator behavior when a) the receiver will be a randomly
chosen from a group of 20 unknown individuals with b) the receiver is a person that is already chosen (but still
unknown to the sender) from a group of 20 unknown individuals, contributions are significantly higher in the
latter case. Our empirical measurement of the aggregation bias (the difference between ADG-P and RDG) thus
also captures those motivations put forward by psychologists that drive differences in play towards a person
versus a group: i.e. individual’s expectation of unity, consistency, and coherence that lead to differences
in impression formation (Hamilton and Sherman (1996)). Importantly, and in contrast to our games, the
experimental games underlying these concepts are conducted among strangers.
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difference can be best explained by the social distance bias (comparing ADG-C, ADG-V and
ADG-P) or the aggregation bias (comparing ADG-P and RDG). In our pre-analysis plan we
posited the following hypothesis:
H: Compared to classic experimental games, measured discrimination (based on social
status) will be significantly different when revealing the local context.11
4.3 Context and Experimental Design
4.3.1 Context: Rural Sierra Leone and Social Status
To explore differences between the ADG and the RDG in estimating discrimination at the
local level we implement our framework in the seven chiefdoms surrounding Sierra Leone’s
Gola Rainforest National Park. In rural Sierra Leone interaction takes place at the local
level. Villages in our research area, as in most of rural Sierra Leone, are small with an
average population size of 222.2 individuals divided over an average of 28.4 houses.12 It is
thus not surprising that villagers know each other.13 To illustrate this fact we randomly
selected 16 individuals in 96 villages and asked each of them how they are related to the
other 15 individuals. We find that on average two randomly paired individuals have a full
25% chance to be family. In fact, only 14% of the individuals respond that none of the other
15 individuals are family. Not only do villagers know each other, in rural Sierra Leone the
11In our pre-analysis plan we conjectured neither a direction nor a magnitude. We posited that, compared
to the ADG-C, discrimination is either larger or smaller in the RDG (the negative and positive contact
hypothesis). Furthermore, we expected that within group interaction (high-high and high-low) can either be
competitive or cooperative, and across group interaction (high-low and low-high) can be either generous or
selfish. Finally, we put forth a village-based and an identity based discrimination hypothesis: conjecturing a
difference between ADG-C and ADG-V, and ADG-V and ADG-P, respectively. The latter two thus reference
to the social distance bias. Three notes are in order in so far as they relate to departures from the pre-analysis
document. First, the registered design did not make any claims related to aggregation bias. Second, for
statistical analysis we suggested to explicitly model the correlation structure in accordance with round-robin
social relations data. While not reported in this document — we report results from simple clustering in two-
dimensions — using this approach yields similar results. Finally, the document suggested to control for several
variables (gender, age, income, ethnicity, religion, migration status) in the analysis to reduce the variance of
our estimates. While not reported, doing so does not change the results.
12Based upon data collected in 2010 in 176 randomly selected villages from the seven chiefdoms surrounding
Gola Rainforest National Park. These numbers are in line with successive national censuses (1963, 1984, 2004).
13This has also been observed in areas characterized by high levels of population movement (Sircar and Van
der Windt (2015)).
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arena for social interaction is the village and governance takes place at the local level. One
important reason for this is that the weak central government apparatus runs in parallel to
a powerful local chieftaincy system. The latter has its origins in the system of indirect rule
created by the British. The country’s paramount chiefs serve for life once appointed or elected
(by a restricted electorate) and exert considerable control over resource allocation, including
land and labor; they operate the local court system that presides outside the capital; and
organize the provision of many local public goods (Acemoglu et al. (2014)). For example,
some of the most important determinants of rural Sierra Leoneans’ households’ well-being
such as basic public goods—road maintenance, communal labor, self-help groups, control of
crime and school infrastructure—are not provided by the government, but through collective
action at the local level (e.g. (Glennerster et al., 2013; Casey et al., 2013)).
The cleavage under investigation in this paper is social status.14 We choose this cleavage
because of the important role it plays in Sierra Leonean society. Specifically, society in rural
Sierra Leone is governed by an intricate system of patron-client relationships between high
and low status villagers, where villagers depend on a highly exclusionary set of traditional
institutions if they want to access property and gain political rights. The system has histor-
ically created a large class of excluded, low status individuals (mostly young men). These
individuals cannot access political rights by appealing to the modern state, for it is nearly
non-existent in rural areas. But they also cannot do so by appealing to traditional authorities
if they lack patronage by those higher up in the hierarchy (Fanthorpe (2001)). Many scholars
of Sierra Leone argue that the enforced community labor, harsh fines imposed by chiefs, and
the lack of opportunities that accompanied this system created feelings of disenfranchisement
and resentment among rural youth, which on its turn was a major contributing factor to the
outbreak of civil war (Richards, 2005, 1996; Fanthorpe, 2001; Fanthorpe and Maconachie,
2010; Sawyer, 2008). For example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) show that the Revo-
lutionary United Front (RUF) found much popular support under predominantly students
14We are not the first to investigate experimentally the role of social status for cooperation. For example,
Baldassarri and Grossman (2013), based upon a set of lab-in-the-field experiments in Uganda, find that people’s
social position is an important factor in explaining variation in levels of generosity.
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and farmers protesting against the recurrent marginalization and humiliation by rural elite.
There is evidence that these grievances have persisted in the post-war period (Mokuwa et al.
(2011)). Studying the presence and extent of social discrimination is thus of key importance
in the Sierra Leonean context.15
4.3.2 Experimental Design
During spring 2013, we conducted our experimental games with a total of 736 participants
from 46 villages in Sierra Leone.16 The villages in turn were randomly selected from a larger
set of villages located close to the Gola Rainforest National Park in southeastern Sierra Leone.
These villages have in common that they are remotely located and have seen little exposure to
markets. For individuals in these villages the social arena of interaction is local. We stratified
the selection of the 16 players by status in order to obtain the same number of high and low
status individuals. Specifically, we first selected the eight highest status individuals in the
village—we used the Mende term “Taa Gbakoi”, which typically includes the village chief,
town speaker, village imam, women’s and youth leader. From the “Nu Gbamei”—literally
“person of nothing’ in Mende—we randomly drew eight individuals.17
In private, each participant was interviewed by a research assistant and completed both
the experimental games and a short exit survey.18 The research activities were implemented
by multiple teams, each with one instructor and five research assistants. Much effort was
undertaken to make sure the participants understood the games. The research assistants
were extensively trained and we ran several pilot tests to ensure that our participants under-
stood the experiments. Also, each participants was informed, among other things, that upon
completion of the session they would receive a show-up fee of 1,000 Le (or US$0.25), plus a
15A set of experiments conducted by Cilliers et al. (2014) in Sierra Leone, find that the presence of white
foreigners has a positive impact on generosity, especially for players who have a lower social status in their
community.
16In all villages we randomly selected 16 players.
17Local elites are generally referred to as “Nu Muwa” in Mende (literally “big person”). However, it not
appropriate to ask for these individuals and we therefore choose to use the term “Taa Gbakoi” which is closer
in meaning to a town official. Both concepts are very close though, and there is a considerable overlap between
both. Based upon discussions with Paul Richards.
18The enumerators conducted multiple research activities. In this paper we only report the results of the
allocation games and individual surveys.
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payment based on a randomly selected allocation decisions by the player. The total set of
activities lasted about half an hour per participant, and on average participants received an
amount equal to about half a day’s wage.
Following Table 4.1, each participant partook in the four versions of the game—ADG-C,
ADG-V, ADG-P, and RDG. We randomized the order in which each version was played to
prevent contamination of the results by learning effects. For each allocation decision, we ask
participants to share part of an endowment of 25 tokens, each worth 100 Le. Related to the
ADG the dictator made a total of six allocations decision: one for each status type (high or
low status) and three types of prime about the receiver, where the receiver is asked to allocate
a share of their endowment to a random and anonymous person from 1) a randomly chosen
village in their chiefdom, 2) their village, and 3) the sample participating in the experiments.
The exact wording that the enumerators used verbatim per version is listed in Table 4.2. For
the RDG, each dictator made a total of n− 1 allocation decisions, each time with a different
receiver. Specifically, dictators were told the name of the receiver and, in order to distinguish
individuals with the same name, also the receiver’s parents’ names. The exact wording can
be found in the bottom row of Table 4.2. This design allows us to explore differences between
the ADG and the RDG. Comparing results from the ADG with different receiver populations
allows us to investigate the importance of the social distance bias, while comparing the RDG
with the ADG with the same receiver population (ADG-P) allows us to learn about the
aggregation bias.
Finally, our research assistants undertook an exit survey with each individual after their
allocation decisions. In this survey we collected additional data on participant characteristics
(age, gender, education, etc.). As a result, we thus have this data for both the senders and
the receivers. The exit survey also included an extensive set of questions related to dyadic
characteristics. Specifically, we asked each player about their relatedness to each of the other
players along a set of eight dimensions—family, friends, trust, production, social, etc. In
contrast to the ADG, the RDG allows an experimenter to investigate the importance of these
individual and network characteristics in explaining discriminatory behavior. We will do so
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Table 4.2: Text per Treatment
Game Message to the dictator before allocation decision
ADG-C “The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen [Taa Gbakoi (e.g. village
chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc)] / [Nu
Gbamei (e.g. farmer, youth, etc) not a Taa Gbakoi] from a randomly chosen
village in your chiefdom, not from your village.”
ADG-V “The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen [Taa Gbakoi (e.g., village
chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc)] / [Nu
Gbamei (e.g., farmer, youth, etc) not a Taa Gbakoi] from your village. He or
she may or may not be have come with you today from your village.”
ADG-P “The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen [Taa Gbakoi (e.g. village
chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc)] / [Nu
Gbamei (e.g. farmer, youth, etc) not a Taa Gbakoi] from the people from your
village that came with you today from your village.”
RDG “The person receiving the money is [Full Name]. His/her father is [Full Name],
and his/her mother is [Full Name].”
Notes: The classic dictator game (ADG) is played in three variations with each participant,
and the revealed-receiver dictator game (RDG) is played n − 1 times with each participant
(i.e. each time with a different receiver).
in Section 4.5.1.
4.4 Results
In this section we first introduce our participants, and then explore discrimination at the
local level. That is, the players’ behavior in the RDG. We then compare these results to
behavior by the same participants in the ADG-C, the classic attribute-based dictator game.
We find large differences across these two games. Leveraging our experimental framework—
i.e. comparing behavior between the three ADG games, and between the ADG-P and the
RDG games—we find that this difference is mainly driven by the aggregation bias.
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Local Discrimination in Sierra Leone
A total of 736 individuals played the classic and revealed-receiver games: half of them are
high status, and the other half low status. In Table 4.3 we compare both types of participants
on a set of key characteristics. Not surprisingly, we find that high status individuals are on
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average almost 16 years older, more likely to be male, and have larger farms.19 Unexpectedly,
but not statistically significant, we find that high status individuals are poorer (as measured
by the number of chickens) and are less likely to be literate.
Table 4.3: Summary Information by Social Status
High Status Low Status Difference
(sd) (sd) (se)
Age 50.26 34.70 15.57***
(15.57) (11.32) (1.06)
Gender 0.78 0.52 0.26***
(0.41) (0.50) (0.04)
Stranger 0.12 0.18 -0.06**
(0.33) (0.39) (0.03)
Farm Size 2.46 2.18 0.28**
(1.62) (1.80) (0.13)
Chickens 4.14 4.53 -0.39
(4.22) (7.82) (0.65)
Literate 0.19 0.22 -0.02
(0.39) (0.41) (0.04)
Notes: In the first two columns, standard deviations are provided in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors related to the difference tests are clustered at the village level and reported in
parentheses in the last column. Based on data for 736 participants.
Next, we provide an overview of the contributions in the revealed-receiver game by in-
dividuals’ social status. The top panel in Figure 4.1 presents a histogram of the amount
contributed by high status dictators to high and low status receivers. High (low) status
receivers are indicated by black (gray) bars. The RDG was implemented following a round-
robin design where each player makes an allocation decision towards each of the revealed n−1
other players. As a result, we have a total of 5,509 contributions by 368 high status dictators;
of which 2,565 to high status individuals and 2,944 to low status individuals.20 The average
contribution is 2.91 (11.6% of endowment) to high status individuals, and 2.62 (10.5%) to low
19Strangers is a widely used concept in Sierra Leonean society and refers to individuals born in another
chiefdom often lacking local land rights, except by marriage affiliation. Farm size is measures as the number
of bushels of upland rice planted the previous year.
20The number of dyads do not add up to 5,888 (16*368) because individuals do not contribute to themselves.
Moreover, in a few cases we miss an observation.
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status individuals.21 We will return to this difference below. The bottom panel presents the
same information but now for low status dictators. In total there are 5,511 contributions by
low status dictators; of which 2,936 to high status individuals and 2,575 to low status individ-
uals. The average contribution is 2.11 (8.4% of endowment) to high status individuals, and
2.01 (8.0%) to low status individuals.22 For both types of dictators the modal contribution
is zero: of the high status individuals 33% gives zero, and of the low status 40%.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Contributions for the RDG, by Dyad
High Status Dictator to







Low Status Dictator to







Notes: Contributions are between 0 and 25. Black (gray) bars indicate contribution to high
(low) status receivers. Top panel based on 2,565 (2,944) contributions to high (low) status
people; bottom panel based on 2,936 (2,575) contributions to high (low) status people. Solid
black (gray) point is the average contribution to high (low) status receivers.
21The standard deviations are respectively: 3.56 and 3.39.
22The standard deviations are respectively: 2.91 and 2.97.
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Next, we explore whether there is within dictator variation in contributions based on the
receivers’ social status. To do so the left panel in Figure 4.2 shows whether high status dicta-
tors, on average, contribute less, equal or more to other high status receivers compared to low
status receivers. The x-axis is measured as the average contribution to high status receivers
minus the average contribution to low status receivers.23 The right panel does the same for
low status dictators. From the left panel we see that high status dictators have a preference
to give more to fellow high status individuals. Overall, 51% of the high status dictators give,
on average, more to fellow high status players than to low status individuals, and only 26%
give more to low status receivers. Furthermore, not only do a larger number of high status
individuals give more to other high status individuals, the difference in contribution is also
larger: those that contribute more to high status individuals contribute 4.12% (1.03/25) of
the endowment more, while those that contribute more to low status individuals only con-
tribute 3.44% (0.86/25) more. Interestingly, we find similar results for low status individuals.
Low status dictators have a preference to contribute to high status individuals. While 32% of
the low status dictators contribute on average more to fellow low status receivers, 41% of low
status dictators contribute more, on average, to high status receivers. Moreover, although
the difference is small, those that contribute more to high status receivers contribute more
on average than those that contribute more to low level receivers: 3.76% (0.94/25) compared
to 3.52% (0.88/25).
We now move to the measurement of local discrimination in Sierra Leone. Table 4.4
presents individuals’ behavior in the four games, and a comparison between them. The
fourth column and the first four rows of Table 4.4 present average contributions in the RDG
separated out by dyad type. For example, the dyad HL indicates the contribution by a
high status to a low status individual. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and
reflect the test whether the average contribution is bounded away from zero. The fourth
column and the last two rows of Table 4.4 show the level of discrimination. We measure
discrimination as the difference in contribution between situations where the dictator and
23For presentation purposes we rounded this difference to its nearest integer.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Contributions in RDG Game
High Status Dictator













Notes: Based on a total of 736 dictators (half high status, half low status). X-axis is the
average contribution to high status receivers minus the average contribution to low status
receivers.
receiver are the same status and where they are from different status groups (Fershtman
and Gneezy (2001)). In other words—using the notation of this paper—we are interested in
the difference between HH and HL, and between LL and LH. Consequently, HH − HL
(LL − LH) is discrimination by a high (low) status dictator. To account for village main
effects, all analyses control for village level fixed effects. Moreover, in order to account for
correlation among the n − 1 allocations to different receivers by the same dictator and the
n− 1 donations to the same receiver by different dictators, the standard errors are clustered
in two dimensions—by sender and receiver.24
Focusing on the fourth column in Table 4.4 (the RDG game), three results stand out.
First, contributions in all four dyads are positive and significantly bounded away from zero.
Second, with an average contribution of around 11% of their endowment, high status individ-
uals contribute overall more than those with a low status who contribute on average around
8%. Third, we find evidence of local discrimination based on social status. High status in-
dividuals discriminate in favor of members of their own group: contributing 11.3% more to
high status than to low status individuals. As we can see from the penultimate row this result
is statistically significant (HH − LL = 1.14, p-value<0.01). Interestingly, we find a similar
24See: Petersen (2008), Thompson (2011), and Cameron et al. (2011).
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result for low status individuals who discriminate also in favor of high status individuals.
While the difference is smaller we still find that low status dictators contribute 3.4% more to
high status individuals than those of a low status (LL− LH = −0.27, p-value<0.05). These
results seem to relate well to more anthropological accounts of rural society in Sierra Leone,
which emphasize the importance of social status and patron client relations. We will return
to this result in Section 4.5.1.
4.4.2 Estimating Discrimination at the Local Level
The principal argument made in this paper is that in contrast to the RDG, the current
techniques to measure discrimination (the ADG) are not well-suited for the local level. In
this section, we test whether there is indeed a difference between both types of games, and
leverage our experimental design to explore whether this difference can be attributed to the
social distance or the aggregation bias (Section 4.2).
We first investigate behavior as measured by the classic ADG and compare that to the
RDG. The first column of Table 4.4 shows results for the ADG-C: the ADG in which the
dictator is told that she is matched with a high/low status individual from her chiefdom. Av-
erage contributions in all four dyads are positive and significantly bounded away from zero:
contributions are 15.30%, 12.59%, 11.26%, and 13.89% of the endowment for respectively
the HH, HL, LL and LH dyad. The eighth column tests the difference in contribution
between the ADG-C and the RDG directly. We find differences in contributions between the
two games, with players contributing systematically more in the ADG-C for all four types
of dyads. Moving to discrimination, we find strong differences between the RDG and the
ADG. The bottom two rows of the eighth column suggest that discrimination is system-
atically overestimated in the ADG-C. The true level of local discrimination by high status
individuals—as measured by the RDG—is 1.14; i.e. high status individuals contribute 1.14%
of their endowment more to fellow high status individuals than to those of low social status.
An experimenter trying to measure local discrimination with a classic ADG (the ADG-C),
however, would conclude incorrectly that local discrimination by high status dictators is a
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2.72% of their endowment. Low status individuals contribute 0.27% more of their endow-
ment to high status individuals in the RDG, which increases to a 2.63% in the ADG-C.
These difference are thus not only statistically but also substantially large, with the ADG-C
overestimating levels of discrimination at a factor of 2.4 and 9.7 for respectively high and low
status individuals.
Table 4.4: Participant Behavior in the Experimental Games
Results by Game Comparison ADGs Comparison ADG vs RDG
ADG-C ADG-C ADG-V ADG-C ADG-V ADG-P
ADG-C ADG-V ADG-P RDG ADG-V ADG-P ADG-P RDG RDG RDG
Contribution by dyad
HH 15.30*** 15.17*** 14.09*** 11.61*** 0.13 1.22 1.09 3.63*** 3.56*** 2.43***
(0.82) (0.45) (0.43) (0.69) (0.81) (0.75) (0.73) (0.72) (0.67) (0.62)
HL 12.59*** 12.17*** 12.32*** 10.54*** 0.41 0.3 -0.17 2.03*** 1.63** 1.78***
(0.71) (0.42) (0.40) (0.67) (0.53) (0.57) (0.64) (0.62) (0.68) (0.58)
LL 11.26*** 10.73*** 10.38*** 8.04*** 0.55 0.88 0.33 3.26*** 2.71*** 2.37***
(0.74) (0.39) (0.38) (0.53) (0.63) (0.57) (0.56) (0.63) (0.56) (0.53)
LH 13.89*** 12.55*** 12.12*** 8.29*** 1.34** 1.81** 0.47 5.56*** 4.23*** 3.80***
(0.81) (0.44) (0.42) (0.52) (0.67) (0.75) (0.67) (0.69) (0.63) (0.59)
Measure of discrimination
HH −HL 2.72*** 3.00*** 1.74*** 1.14*** -0.28 0.93 1.27 1.55** 1.87*** 0.61
(0.69) (0.74) (0.60) (0.06) (0.96) (0.85) (0.90) (0.67) (0.71) (0.57)
LL− LH -2.63*** -1.82*** -1.75*** -0.27** -0.79 -0.93 -0.14 -2.30*** -1.54** -1.42**
(0.66) (0.61) (0.60) (0.12) (0.86) (0.84) (0.81) (0.65) (0.60) (0.60)
N 1,472 1,472 1,472 11,776 1,472 1,472 1,472 11,776 11,776 11,776
Notes: E.g. HL indicates the contribution by a high status dictator to a low status receiver.
HH − HL is discrimination by a high status dictator. Left four columns report average
contributions by dyad, and levels of discrimination. Center (right) three columns report
differences in play between ADG games (between the ADGs and the RDG). Standard errors
reported in parentheses. Contributions are reported as share of endowment. One, two or
three asterisks indicate, respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels.
The difference we find between the RDG and the classic attribute-based dictator game
(ADG-C) can be due to two types of biases: social distance and omitted attribute bias.
Our experimental setup in Sierra Leone—illustrated in Table 4.1—allows us to disentangle
both. The social distance bias states that differences between the ADG-C and the RDG are
due to the sensitivity of behavior to knowledge about the distribution of receivers (Section
4.2). Following our design, in Sierra Leone each participant played three anonymous games
where we only changed the dictator’s beliefs about the distribution of relevant attributes
in the population. That is, we systematically varied the level of social distance from the
ADG-C (respondent is from the chiefdom) to ADG-V (respondent is from the village) to
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ADG-P (respondent is a fellow participant). Differences in game play can then therefore
be interpreted as a measure of social distance bias (e.g. Hoffman et al. (1996)). Focusing
on Table 4.4 two results stand out as they relate to the social distance bias. First, in the
first four columns we find that by decreasing the level of social distance—that is, moving
from the chiefdom prime (ADG-C) to the village prime (ADG-V) to the fellow player prime
(ADG-P)—decreases the average dyad contribution in the direction of the RDG. The same
holds for the measures of discrimination by the high and low status dictators presented in
the bottom two rows. Second, the contributions between the three games, however, do not
seem to be discernible different from each other. In fact, moving from the ADG-C to the
ADG-V only the contributions in the LH dyad become statistically smaller.25 The change in
average contributions when moving from the ADG-V to ADG-P are statistically insignificant
for all four dyads. Furthermore, also none of the changes in the measure of discrimination is
statistically different across the three anonymous games.26
Next, we investigate the import of the aggregation bias. Given the same population of
individuals about whom the dictator knows all the attributes, the aggregation bias refers to
the difference between moving from playing against the group of individuals to the average of
playing against each individual separately (Section 4.2). We operationalize this by comparing
donations in the RDG with those in the ADG-P. The latter column in Table 4.4 tests this
difference directly. Focusing on the HH dyad, for example, the difference between the ADG-
P and RDG considerable: 2.43% of the endowment. That is, average contributions in the
ADG-P are on average 21% higher than those in the RDG (p-value<0.01). We find similar
results for the other three dyads. Moving to the measurement of discrimination we find that
discrimination by high status individuals in the ADG-P is not statistically different from that
as measured in the RDG. The ADG-P, however, does overestimate levels of discrimination
with a factor of 1.5. Discrimination in the RDG by low status individuals is significantly
different from the ADG-P. Compared to the RDG, the ADG-P overestimates local discrim-
25On average, contributions in the ADG-P are 1.34% of the endowment lower than in the ADG-C (p-
value<0.05).
26Direct tests are provided in the fifth to seventh column in Table 4.4.
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ination with a factor of 6.5 (-0.27 of the endowment compared to -1.75%, p-value<0.05). A
second result is noteworthy. Say that a researcher interested in discrimination at the local
level implements an ADG-P. The researcher would incorrectly conclude that the magnitude
of discrimination by high and low status individuals is similar: with high (low) status indi-
viduals contributing 1.74% (1.75%) more of their endowment to high status players. In fact,
discrimination at the local level in Sierra Leone does is not characterized by such symmetry:
while high status individuals contribute 1.14% of their endowment more, this is only 0.27%
for low status individuals.
To conclude, we find weak evidence that the difference between the ADG-C and the RDG
is driven by the social distance bias. In contrast, we find strong evidence in favor of the
aggregation bias. That is, the difference between the attribute-dictator game (ADG-C) and
the RDG is explained not so much by differences in the receiver population, but, given a
receiver population, by the difference between playing with a group of individuals and the
average of playing against these participants separately.
4.5 The Value of the RDG to Understand Discrimination at
the Local Level
This paper introduced a novel tool (the RDG) to measure discrimination among populations
in which individuals know each other intimately. We also showed how using traditional
techniques to understand behavior at this level (the ADG) can provide an experimenter with
incorrect estimates. In this final section we illustrate the full use of the RDG when it comes
to understanding behavior at the local level. In contrast to the ADG, the receiver is revealed
in the RDG, which allows the researcher to explore the role played by receiver characteristics
and dyadic relationships. In this section, we will show that these characteristics are important
to understand discriminatory behavior at the local level.
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4.5.1 Another Look at Status-Based Discrimination in Sierra Leone
If obtained, the classic ADG is able to explore the role of the dictator’s characteristics and
whatever extra receiver information the experimenter provides to the dictator (e.g. the
cleavage under study). However, at the local level individuals know much about each other,
have had previous experience and are able to position each other in the social network. As
a result, receiver and dyadic characteristics are likely to play an important role in shaping
discriminatory behavior. A major benefit of the RDG is that we are able to investigate the
importance of these factors.
Before moving there, Figure 4.3 illustrates within dictator variation in contributions based
on whether the individual plays the ADG-P or RDG. The x-axis is measured as the aver-
age contribution in the RDG minus the contribution in the ADG-P. Three results stand
out. First, we find that for each dyad type around 80% of dictators change their behavior
depending on the game. Although the majority of dyads only change their contributions min-
imally.27 Second, across the four dyads the number of dictators that give less/equal/more
is very consistent. Between 40-50% of dictators give on average more in the ADG-P, while
only around 30% of the dictators give more in the RDG. Finally, the average difference in
contribution is higher for those dictators that give more in the ADG-P (ADG-P>RDG),
compared to those that give less (ADG-P<RDG). This result is particularly strong for low
status dictators. Low status individuals that give less in the ADG-P give only slightly less:
on average 1.45% (1.33%) of the endowment when the receiver is high (low) status. In con-
trast, those that give more in the ADG-P give much more: on average 2.73% (2.53%) when
the receiver is high (low) status. We can now add a few additional nuanced points as to why
we find differential behavior between the ADG and the RDG (Section 4.4.2), even when the
population of receivers is the same. First, the results are not driven by outliers. Second, the
difference in average contribution is driven by the fact that more dictators give more in the
ADG-P compared to the RDG. Third, the change in contribution is larger for those dictators
that give more in the ADG-P, than those that give less.
27For presentation purposes, in Figure 4.3 differences are rounded to their nearest integer.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison ADG-P and RDG
H → H























Notes: Comparison of individuals’ play in ADG-P and RDG. X-axis is the average contribu-
tion in the RDG minus the contribution in the ADG-P. In the ADG-P each dictator plays
once against an anonymous high and low status. In the RDG each dictator plays n−1 times.
For each dictator, we average contributions by type of receiver. The left two panels add up
to 736 dictators, and so do the two right panels.
In Section 4.4.2 we found that the level of discrimination in favor of high status individuals
is over-estimated in the classic ADG. However, from Figure 4.3 we know that not all dictators
discriminate in favor of high status individuals. Moreover, from Table 4.3 we know that high
and low status individuals differ in many respects other than their social status. We now
investigate what other characteristics may explain contribution behavior. To do so we regress
sender allocations by high and low status individuals on a range of sender, receiver and dyad
characteristics. Table 4.5 present the results.
Columns ADG-P 1 and RDG 1 report contributions by high and low status dictators
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for respectively the ADG-P and the RDG. We replicate the result that both high and low
status individuals discriminate in favor of high status receivers: the magnitudes are the same
as those in Table 4.4. ADG-P 2 and RDG 2 also take into account a number of dictator
characteristics (those presented in Table 4.3). We find that in the ADG both high and low
status men contribute more than women. Also richer low status and illiterate high status
individuals contribute more. These results, however, are not corroborated in the RDG. Most
importantly, however, we find that the main results related to discriminatory behavior—
both the magnitudes and the significance levels—do not change when controlling for dictator
characteristics.
Table 4.5: Exploring the Importance of Receiver and Dyad Characteristics
ADG-P 1 ADG-P 2 RDG 1 RDG 2 RDG 3 RDG 4
H→ L→ H→ L→ H→ L→ H→ L→ H→ L→ H→ L→
HighStatus R 1.74* 1.75* 1.74* 1.75* 1.14*** 0.27** 1.15*** 0.27** 0.57** -0.23 0.61** -0.17
(0.92) (0.91) (0.91) (0.91) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27)
Age S -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gender S 3.55*** 2.15** 1.59 1.52 1.6 1.54 1.42 1.52
(1.24) (1.04) (1.37) (0.93) (1.38) (0.94) (1.37) (0.93)
Stranger S 0.21 -1.06 0.23 -1.87 0.24 -1.88 -0.62 -1.65
(0.91) (1.33) (0.64) (1.30) (0.64) (1.30) (0.68) (1.28)
Farmsize S -0.04 -0.09 0.56* -0.10* 0.56* -0.11* 0.59* -0.11*
(0.32) (0.10) (0.32) (0.06) (0.32) (0.06) (0.32) (0.06)
Chickens S -0.06* 0.07** -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Literate S -0.75** 0.17 -0.25 -0.40* -0.25 -0.42* -0.23 -0.42*
(0.37) (0.30) (0.44) (0.22) (0.44) (0.22) (0.44) (0.21)
Age R 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender R 0.18 0.34 0.15 0.32
(0.25) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22)
Stranger R 0.14 -0.05 0.14 -0.06
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Farmsize R -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Chickens R 0 0 0 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Literate R -0.03 -0.16** -0.05 -0.16**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Family 0.37 -1.37***
(0.55) (0.46)








N 735 735 735 735 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888
Notes: One, two or three asterisks indicate, respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels.
Regressions control for village fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by sender and receiver
for the RDG regressions, are reported in parentheses.
A key benefit of the RDG is that it allows the researcher to investigate the importance of
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factors beyond dictator characteristics. Column RDG 3 in Table 4.5 adds receiver character-
istics. The age of the receiver seems to be a particularly important attribute for contribution,
with both high and low status individuals contributing significantly more to older individuals
(age is in years). Importantly, we find that not only does the inclusion of receiver charac-
teristic drives down the substantial importance of social status of the receiver (the attribute
under study), but controlling for receiver characteristics the importance of the receiver’s
social status is no longer statistically significant for low status dictators.
These result carry over to RDG 4 where we also add dyad characteristics. The age of
the sender is still statistically and substantially significant. Moreover, and this should not
be surprising, several dyadic characteristics are very important for cooperation. High status
dictators contribute more to those individuals with whom they have been displaced. Low
status individuals, on the other hand, contribute substantially less to those receivers that are
family. The result that stands out, though, is that for low status individuals the social status
of the receiver is no longer important for cooperation.
These results illustrate a major benefit of the RDG when it comes to measuring behavior
at the local level. At this level we expect individuals to know their partner’s attribute such as
age. However, age is not, and very likely will never be, an attribute that the researcher would
take into account when designing an attribute-based dictator game. That is, an experimenter
interested in discrimination by social status is unlikely to tell a random set of dictators “You
play with a high/low status individual of age X”, and to another set of dictators “You play
with a high/low status individual of age Y”, etc. However, we find that discrimination in
Sierra Leone is not driven by social status per se, but by age. At the local level individuals are
very well informed about characteristics such as age. By not taking this attribute into account
when measuring discrimination at the local level, the ADG would have falsely concluded that
discrimination in Sierra Leone by low status individuals is driven by social status.
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4.6 Conclusion
Discrimination matters for a wide range of development outcomes including public goods
provision (e.g. Alesina et al. (1999)), conflict (e.g. Esteban et al. (2012a)) and political
decisions (Chandra (2004)).
Recent empirical work that measures discrimination behaviorally have largely relied on
audit studies and laboratory experiments. A key characteristic of both approaches is limited
information: individuals are often strangers with limited information about each other—often
little more than the cleavage under study. The intuitive interpretation of these approaches is
therefore that they measure the extent of discrimination between (random) strangers. Such
measures thus relate well to situations such as the housing and job market.
This study is motivated by the recognition that many of our interactions take place among
individuals that are not strangers. This is particularly the case in developing societies—most
farmers sell their crops to middlemen from their village, women obtain the majority of health
care from local midwifes, villages rely on the local imam to educate their children, and families
turn to neighbors for loans, assistance, etc. When interaction takes place at the local level,
factors such as reciprocity, knowledge of others’ attributes, and the position of individuals
within a social network all affect behavior. This study conjectures that classic experimental
measures to learn about discrimination may not relate well to a local setting since it fails to
account for these factors.
This paper introduces a novel experimental method to measure local level discrimination.
Specifically, we move beyond the classic attribute-based dictator game (ADG) and introduce
what we call the revealed-receiver attribute-based dictator game (RDG). This game differs
from the ADG in two ways: 1) the identity of the receiver is revealed to the dictator, and 2)
subjects know each other well.
To explore difference between the ADG and the RDG, we conduct both games with 736
players in a set of rural villages in Sierra Leone. We leverage the importance of an individual’s
social status in a village— an important cleavage in Sierra Leone that determines access to
resources and reproduction (e.g. Richards (1990)). By having both high and low status
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players participate in both the ADG and the RDG we are able to test for differences in
estimation of discrimination at the local level. Moreover, to explain differences between the
ADG and the RDG, we allocate our players to three different versions of the ADG in which
we differ the social distance between the dictator and the receiver population: the dictator
contributes towards a random individual from the chiefdom (ADG-C), the village (ADG-
V), or the other n − 1 participants that also play the game (ADG-P). This experimental
framework allows us to distinguish whether a difference between the ADG and the RDG is
explained by differences in the receiver population (social distance bias: moving from ADG-C
to ADG-P), or, given a receiver population, by the difference between playing with a group
of individuals and the average of playing against these participants separately (aggregation
bias: ADG-P versus RDG).
We report three main findings. First, our experimental framework illustrates how using
traditional techniques to understand behavior at the local level (the ADG) can provide an
experimenter with incorrect estimates. Compared to the RDG, we find that the ADG can
overestimate levels of discrimination in the local context by a factor of almost ten. Second, we
show that the difference between both games is mainly driven by aggregation bias, and not
social distance bias: what is important for discriminatory behavior is a dictator’s knowledge
of the receiver, not her knowledge about the distribution of receivers. Finally, a major benefit
of the RDG is that—in contrast to the ADG—we are able to investigate the importance of
characteristics other than the attribute under study (in our case social status). In Sierra
Leone, we find that receiver and dyad characteristics beyond social status play an important
role in explaining discriminatory behavior at the local level.
This study makes two key contributions. First, we introduce a novel tool to measure
discriminatory behavior at the local level: among populations that know each other well
and have regular interaction. Our results support our interest in incorporating context into
lab-in-the-field experiments that aim to measure behavior at the local level. The relative
importance of basic individual preferences versus socially determined preferences, and the
necessary conditions for individual preferences to swamp or be swamped by social consider-
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ations, has received only limited attention in experimental economics. This paper tries to
make one step in this direction. Second, currently the literature reports high levels of dis-
crimination in cooperative behaviors—whether based on ethnicity, gender, residential area,
etc. In so far as these studies are based upon the classic ADG to measure behavior at the




In this final chapter, I reflect on the main findings of this dissertation. Because the focus
of the dissertation is the local level, and the data was collected in only a small area of the
Congo and Sierra Leone, I focus the discussion on the external validity of my findings and
how they relate to other academic studies. In addition, I provide some suggestions for future
research and policy.
The level of analysis of this dissertation is the community, which is the arena of social
interaction in much of the developing world. Heterogeneity at this local level, combined
with a weak state and economic underdevelopment, has been found to make communities
particularly receptive to conflict. We know little about cooperation between members of
different groups in such communities, and we know even less about the influence of actors
— such as the village chief and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) — that substitute
for the state at this level. This dissertation set out with five goals. Within heterogeneous
communities, the dissertation aimed to understand 1) cooperative behaviors among groups,
2) the role of local institutions for cooperation, 3) the role of NGOs for cooperation, 4) the
impact of external interventions on local institutions, and 5) in how far ordinary measurement
tools can be applied in this setting. I will now reflect on the main findings of this dissertation.
Local institutions are resilient to external intervention and can play a positive
role in heterogeneous communities
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The important role for formal state institutions in heterogeneous societies is widely recog-
nized. For example, institutions that foster stability involve countering majoritarian elements
with more consensual modes of decision making: either in the way representatives are se-
lected (Lijphart (1977)’s consociationalism), or in the relative autonomy of subnational units
(Horowitz (1992)). At the local level other institutions may play a more prominent role:
local networks of civic engagement with ties that cut across groups (e.g. Varshney (2001))
and within group policing (e.g. Fearon and Laitin (1996)) have been found to be important
for cooperation. Yet, despite the prominent role for institutions, one institutional actor that
occupies a key role at the local level in most developing countries has thus far received little
attention: the village chief. Largely because the state is absent, in many developing countries
— including the Congo and Sierra Leone — these chiefs manage local conflict, raise taxes,
control the judicial system, and allocate property rights over land. An important argument
underlying many development interventions that operate at this local, community level is that
these chiefs are unaccountable despots. This view is confirmed in some academic accounts of
local authority (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Murphy, 1990). A particularly popular vehicle for aid
distribution in post-conflict areas that reflects this view are Community-Driven Development
(CDD) programs.1 These programs work with the villagers directly, and often sideline the
village chiefs or even undertake activities to change their role in local social processes.
This dissertation (essay one) has two major results related to local institutions.
First, this dissertation questions the assumption that chiefs act as unaccountable despots.
The lab-in-the-field experiments conducted in Eastern Congo suggest that local institutions
play a central role in sustaining high levels of contributions between natives and migrants.
In conjunction, Humphreys et al. (2015) find no evidence that local leaders act as despots
in a larger sample of villages. Instead, they find high level of general participation, public
information, and equity in decision making across communities. These more positive accounts
of local institutions are echoed by recent empirical evidence pointing out that chiefs command
the respect of rural people (Logan (2013)) and that they might be well placed as development
1It is estimated that in the last decade the World Bank alone spent $85 billion on these type of programs
(Mansuri and Rao (2013)).
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project managers (Turley et al. (2014)).
Second, local institutions are resilient to interventions by external agencies. The disserta-
tion leverages a large CDD program, implemented in 1,250 villages in Eastern Congo between
2007 and 2011, which actively sought to change the role of traditional governance structures
at the community level. I conducted a set of experimental games in 24 villages to assess the
impact of the village chief on native-migrant interactions. I find no empirical evidence that
the CDD program weakened the position of the village chief. This result mirrors the findings
in Humphreys et al. (2015).
These results thus directly challenge both the usefulness and the basis of current inter-
national interventions. At the same time, results from the third essay — which finds that
rural elites in Sierra Leone discriminate against lower status individuals — are more in line
with the chief-as-despot view. Future research should assess the conditions under which local
institutions are more or less good; investigate the possible differential impact based on the
type of local institution; and seek to understand when development actors should sideline or
rather work through local institutions.
NGOs activity can be harmful in heterogeneous communities
In many post-conflict areas, including the Congo and Sierra Leone, NGOs are a prominent
actor when it comes to governance at the local level: they build infrastructure, provide aid,
etc. This dissertation (essay one and two) explores the role of NGOs in communities that
have recently experienced an influx of migrants. The external resources introduced by NGOs
are often substantial compared to the resources a community can raise internally. One aim
of these resources is to boost development, and by doing so reduce risks of conflict.2 In
areas with high levels of population movements, for example, such external resources can aid
migrants directly, and have the potential to provide the village with the means to absorb
incoming migrants and alleviate pressures on local systems of cooperation.
This dissertation, however, puts forth two mechanisms that explain how NGO resources
2Miguel et al. (2004), for example, find that economic growth is strongly negatively related to civil conflict.
And De Ree and Nillesen (2009) argue that foreign aid is found to have a direct negative impact on the
probability of an ongoing civil conflict to continue. See also Collier (2003) and Bates (2009).
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can be harmful in heterogeneous societies.
First, NGOs often target specific social groups for the distribution of resources within a
community (e.g. Alatas et al. (2012),Paler and Strauss-Kahn (2014)). Targeting can increase
resentment from individuals that do not benefit from these resources. The lab-in-the-field
experiment in Eastern Congo finds that in an area where NGO resources are targeted at
migrants, natives respond by discriminating against migrants. Extensive qualitative evidence
suggests that this result can best be explained by resentment of natives towards migrants.
This negative impact of external resources relates closely to a literature on development aid
and conflict (e.g. (Nunn and Qian, 2013; Anderson, 1999; De Waal, 2009; Polman, 2011)),
and more specifically to a very active research agenda that tries to understand the possible
negative effects of resource windfalls (e.g. (Sachs and Warner, 2001; Djankov et al., 2008)).
The latter — often called the resource curse literature — has put forward several mechanisms
to explain why resource windfalls lead to worse outcomes, which include rent-seeking activities
generated by windfalls ((Svensson, 2000; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004)) and the reduced need
for taxes and thus weak governance (Rajan and Subramanian (2007)). Increased resentment,
as this dissertation suggests, adds another. Furthermore, this literature is largely based on
evidence from the macro level. This dissertation joins a very limited number of studies (e.g.
Paler (2013)) that investigates the resource curse at the micro level.
The dissertation adds a second mechanism to the resource curse literature: NGO resources
can shape individuals’ identities. More specifically, this dissertation (second essay) shows how
villagers in Eastern Congo strategically choose to associate with certain identities over others
in order to maximize the probability of obtaining access to NGO resources. In addition, I
find empirical evidence that for migrants those identities temporarily chosen for strategic
reasons can persist over time. By solidifying identities among migrants that benefit access to
resources (“I am poor”, “I am a migrant”) at the cost of those that benefit cohesion in and
integration into heterogeneous communities (“I am Congolese” and “I am a member of the
village”), the long run consequences of resource distributions by NGOs can be harmful. This
result is an illustrative example for a large constructivist literature in political science that
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argues that identity is malleable and can be formed instrumentally in response to changing
social opportunities (e.g. Laitin (1998)).
In conclusion, this dissertation suggests that NGOs need a much better understanding of
local social processes before introducing resources into heterogeneous communities. Moreover,
taking into consideration the positive role of local institutions for native-migrant cooperation,
future research should aim to understand under what conditions it is best to work more closely
with local institutions — who are likely better informed than external actors about the needs
of the community’s inhabitants.
Methods to measure behavior at the community level have to take into account
the local context
This dissertation aims to understand social interactions in heterogeneous communities. A
major concern when it comes to measuring social outcomes — such as cooperation, social
cohesion, good governance, etc. — is that results may be contaminated by social desir-
ability bias. Individuals may respond in ways that would please outsiders.3 To minimize
such bias empirical work has increasingly moved away from survey-based methods in favor
of more behavioral experimental methods. A particularly popular tool are lab-in-the-field
experiments (see Camerer (2003) for an overview). These games ordinarily have two charac-
teristics: players do not know anything about their counterparts except that what is revealed
by the experimenter, and players do not know each other personally.4 These assumptions
allow the researcher to isolate underlying individual preferences without contamination by
social considerations. The intuitive empirical interpretation of such games is that they mea-
sure interaction between random strangers that only know the attribute under study. This
dissertation (essay three) finds that while results from these studies might do well for interac-
tion in the job or housing market in the developed world, the insights from such games do not
directly travel to communities in the developing world. The reason is that at the local level,
individuals are not random strangers with limited information. Villagers in rural Congo and
3See e.g. Cilliers et al. (2014) and Humphreys et al. (2015) for evidence of social desirability bias.
4See Sircar et al. (2014a) for an overview of the studies that depart from this.
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rural Sierra Leone know each other well: they know each others’ attributes, have had previ-
ous interactions, and are aware of the social networks in which they are embedded. In other
words, social interactions in this setting are more likely to be driven by social considerations
than by individual preferences. Future research should investigate the relative importance of
basic individual preferences versus socially determined preferences across settings, and based
upon this use the appropriate measurement tool.
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Appendix: Instruments for Data
Collection
The next pages present the instruments used to collect data in the Congo and Sierra Leone.
The pre-analysis plans can be found at www.egap.org.
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A.1 The Congo: Protocol for Data Collection
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PROTOCOL ET LIVRE DE CODE 
 
Avant de partir  au village 
Etape 1 
Chaque fois vous allez travailler dans trois villages. Savoir les trois villages avant votre départ. Une liste avec des 
villages et leur ordre d'exécution sera fournie par Peter. 
Etape 2 
Amener quatre copies de AL (ou DL) pour ce village. Ces formulaires ont été créés pour l'évaluation de 
TUUNGANE et la liste présente les ménages dans un village. Trois copies sont pour les membres d’équipe pour 
utilisation pendant le travail. L’autre c’est pour créer la liste « ensemble ». 
Etape 3 
Amener 3*18 fois une copie de « ENQUETE JOUER » – une pour chaque participant (9 migrants et 9 
autochtones) et pour trois villages. 
Etape 4 Amener trois « FICHE CHEF D’EQUIPE », donc one pour chaque village. 
Etape 5 Amener les fiches « ENQUETE CARTHOGRAPHIE » : 250 pour chaque village, donc 750 en total. 
Etape 6 
Equipement. Pour chaque membre de l'équipe : Appareil photo, GPS, chargeur solaire, et les pilles réserves. Le 
chef d'équipe a aussi : Les deux Polariod Pogo imprimantes, la batterie réserve pour l’imprimant, les papiers 
nécessaires pour imprimer les photos, et les câbles pour charger les imprimantes. 
Etape 7 Envoyez une SMS a Peter indique que vous allez sur terrain dans  les villages X, Y et Z. 
 
Jours des cartographies (2-4 jours) 
Etape 1 
Rencontre avec le chef : expliquer le projet, obtenir l'approbation, trouver trois personnes  (aides de chef) qui vont 
vous aider a faire la cartographie, expliquer au  chef que vous allez rester dans le village quelques jours, obtenir 
un endroit pour dormir, et demandez un lieu où les jeux peuvent avoir lieu.  
Etape 2 
Faites « FICHE CHEF D’EQUIPE ». C’est important pour la cartographie parce que vous devez savoir quels 
projets a eu lieu dans ce village !  
Etape 3 
Partagez les axes avec les aides de chef en trois. N’oubliez pas : Chaque aide va recevoir 2,000 CFR à la fin du 
jour. 
Etape 4 
Commencez la cartographie. Voyez le « GUIDE DE CARTHOGRAPHIE » pour plus d’information. La cartographie 
dans quelques villages besoin 2 jours, dans les autres 3 ou quatre. 
Etape 5 
Chaque jour a le fin de journée être ensemble et vérifier les données collectionné par les autres membres 
d’équipe. Cette a dire, chaque membre va vérifier les données d’un autre membre d’équipe. 
 
Jour de AL/DL et enquête joueur (1 jour) 
Etape 1 
S’il n’y a pas de liste AL/DL : 
Pendant la cartographie vous devez rempli r le nom de chef du ménage sur le fiche. Maintenant créer « LA 
LISTE » avec 2 colonnes : les chiffre (1, 2, 3, etc.) et les noms des chefs du ménage. Maintenant nous avons une 
fiche comme la liste AL ou DL. La Guide de Capture c’est pas utile pour ce village parce que ce village n’ a pas 
crée la liste AL ou DL (ne fait pas parite de projet RAPID). 
S’il y a de liste AL : 
 
GUIDE DE CAPTURE 
 
Il y a 3 possibilités pour faire capture avec les listes: 
 
1. [capture possibilité 1] Pas écrire les noms des ménages qui ne sont pas des familles/ amis/ etc. de 
chef ou nyumba kumi sur la liste AL ;  
2. [capture possibilité 2] Ecrire les noms des ménages qui sont famille/ amis/ etc. de chef ou nyumba 
kumi plus d’une fois sur la liste AL ; 
3. [capture possibilité 3] Ecrire les noms des ménages sur la liste AL qui actuellement n’existe pas dans 
le village. 
 
NOTRE STRATEGIE PENDANT LA CARTOGRAPHIE 
1. Nous allons faire la cartographie et chaque enquêteur aura la liste AL. Pendant la cartographie 
l’enquêteur remplit le chiffre AL sur la fiche. 
2. Si un ménage se trouve plus d’une fois sur le liste AL, remplissez tous les chiffres (de liste AL) sur la 
fiche de cartographie. 
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3. Aussi faire une « X » a cote de chiffre sur la liste AL pour indiquer que vous avez trouve le ménage.  
4. Si le ménage ne se retrouve pas sur la liste AL, ajoutez ce ménage (avec nom complet !) à la fin de liste 
AL (avec votre lettre avant le chiffre). Aussi remplissez le chiffre AL sur la fiche avec votre lettre avant ce 
chiffre. Par exemple, pour Desire « D203 ». La raison pour ajouter votre lettre c’est pour séparer les 
ménages originaux de liste AL, est les ménages que vous avez ajouté. 
 
NOTRE STRATEGIE APRES LA CARTOGRAPHIE 
5. Avec le chef essayer de trouver tous les nouveaux ménages (que vous avez ajoutés) sur la liste AL 
originale. C’est possible qu’un ménage a sur le liste AL originale  un nom de ménage une petit peu 
différent. Si il y a des ménages que vous avez ajoute mais qui sont actuellement sur la liste AL vous 
devez : trouvez le fiche pour ce ménage et effacer votre code que vous avez écrit (le chiffre qui 
commence avec votre premier lettre) et remplissez le code original sur la liste AL. Attention : Pour les 
ménages que vous avez trouvé mais qui ne se trouve pas sur le liste AL il y a de [capture possibilité 
1]. 
6. Maintenant s’il y a toujours les ménagés sur la liste AL que vous n’avez pas trouvé (très probable), il y a 
quatre options : 
a. Le ménage existe sur la liste AL  mais vous n’avez pas encore visite ce ménage ; 
b. Le ménage a quitté ce village âpres la création de liste AL et avant votre arrive ; 
c. Un ménage est sur la liste originale plus d’une fois mais avec quelques noms différents 
[capture possibilité 2] ; 
d. Il y a des ménages qui actuellement  n’existent pas dans le village mais qui se trouve sur la 
liste AL [capture possibilité 3]. 
7. Donc maintenant faites attention ! Si le chef a l’idée qui vous êtes en train de trouver sa capture il va dire 
que tout le monde a quitté son village. Dans les mots différents : il ne va pas vous donner la vérité parce 
qu’il ne voudrait pas que nous trouvions sa capture. 
a. Si le ménage existe dans le ménage mais vous n’avez pas encore visite ce ménage, visiter le 
ménage. 
b. Si le ménage a quitté le village : remplissez une lettre « C » a cote de ce ménage sur la liste 
AL et au verso écrire le chiffre de ce ménage et que ce ménage a quitté le village. Et aussi la 
raison, la date, l’endroit, et la langue maternelle de ce ménage. 
c. Si le ménage a été sur la liste AL plus d’une fois : remplissez une lettre « C » a cote des ces 
noms sur la liste AL et au verso écrire les chiffres de cette ménage. Par exemple : « 21, 34 et 
102 sont le même ménage ». IMPORTANT : Trouver la fiche de ce ménage et remplissez 
toute ses chiffres sur la fiche de cartographie. Donc pour l’exemple : « 21, 34, 102 ».  
d. Pour les ménages que se trouvent sur le liste AL mais qui actuellement n’existent pas dans le 
village, remplissez une lettre « C » à cote de ménage sur la liste AL et au verso écrire le chiffre 
de ce ménage et « le ménage existe pas dans ce village » et aussi essayez de trouver la 
cause pourquoi le ménage n’existé plus dans le village et l’endroit ou se trouve ménage. 
 
Finalement, posez la question au chef si la liste AL a été créée avec une liste de village, ou sans une liste de 
village. Pourquoi, c’est important ? Par exemple, si notre équipe à copier seulement la liste de village d’un chef et 
cette liste est ancienne il manque beaucoup de nouveaux ménages. Donc, pas de capture mais simplement une 
ancienne liste. Ecrivez la réponse sur la fiche « FICHE CHEF D’EQUIPE ». 
 
Pour votre information : Peut être ce n’est pas nécessairement capture que nous allons trouver. Peut-être le chef 
et nyumba kumi a une définition différente d’ un ménage comme nous (par exemple un ménage polygame avec 2 
femme c’est peut être deux ménages pour lui). 
 
Si nous trouverons qu’il y avait capture nous devons savoir exactement qui a fait la capture. Donc, nous devons 
savoir qui a créé la liste AL. C’est pourquoi, il y a sur la « FICHE CHEF D’EQUIPE »  un endroit ou nous allons 
remplir qui a été présent pendant la création de la liste AL. Nous allons remplir cette information ensemble avec 
les personnes qui a cette information. Nous obtenons aussi l’info sur ces gens position dans le village et  position 
dans le comite RAPID (si le village est un village RAPID). Nous obtenons aussi le chiffre AL de ces gens donc 
nous pouvons trouver leur information de cartographie avec l’information de leur connexion avec le chef du village, 
groupe ethnique, etc. (tous probable important pour capture). 
Etape 2 Maintenant sélectionnez 18 personnes pour les jeux, et leur remplacements. (Voir ci-dessous SELECTIONEZ 18 
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MENAGES pour plus de détails). Ecrivez les noms et les chiffre AL/DL/LISTE sur « FICHE DE JOUR ». n’Oubliez 
pas : joueur 1-9 sont des déplaces et joueur 10-18 sont des autochtones. 
Etape 3 
Rencontrez les 18 chefs des ménages. Expliquer le projet. Obtenir leur consentement. Remplissez la première 
partie de l'enquête. Prenez une photo de chaque participant. Informez le participant d'être à l'endroit X le 
lendemain a 6h00. 
Etape 4 
Etre sur que le lieu pour les jeux sont prêts et que il y aura déjeune pour les jouer pendant les jeux. Plus ou moins 
a 13h00. 
Etape 5 Invitez le chef du village et deux nyumba kumi pour le jeu 3B. Ca va commencer plus ou moins a 10h00. 
Etape 6 
Imprimez les photos. Parce que les pilles sont pas trop fort nous devons charger les pilles au moment d’imprimer. 
Donc, c’est a vous d’être sur que vous avez trouve un groupe pour charger pendant le soir ou la nuit. Vous devez 
trouver et payer pour le pétrole nécessaire.  
Etape 7 
Oubliez pas : Pendant les jours des cartographie retournez aux ménages qui n’étaient pas présent. Pour être sur 
que nous allons obtenir toute les informations de tout le monde dans ce village. Si le ménage n’est vraimant pas 
présent pendant notre temps dans ce village obtenir les coordinat GPS de maison, remplir le nom de personne sur 
la « FICHE DE CARTHOGRAPIHE »  et la chiffre AL/DL et écrivez pourquoi la personne n’ est pas la et si possible 
les autres détails : peut être l’ aide de chef ou les voisins peuvent aider. 
 
Jour des jeux (1 jour) 
Etape 1 
Réveille à 5h00. Un membre d’équipe va préparer le lieu des jeux : créer trois endroits isoles, être sur nous avons 
les 18 « FICHE DE JOUER » présent et dans l’ordre, les jetons pour la sélection au hasard, etc. Un membre va 
imprimer les dernières photos. Et un membre d’équipe va attendre pour les joueurs et être sur que toute les 18 
vont arriver. Si les gens ne sont pas encore la a 6h30 envoyer des enfants ou les nyumba kumi. Parce que : nous 
DEVONS travailler avec 18 joueurs. Si il y a moins de 18 joueur  nous devons trouver (au hasard) les 
replacements avant de commencer. 
Etape 2 Remplissez les chiffres (1-18) et le nom de joueurs de l’autre cote de photo. Utiliser vos « FICHE DE JOUER ». 
Etape 3 Le chef d’équipe va mettre au dos toutes les photos est verifier que nous avons les chiffres 1 jusqu’a 18. 
Etape 4 
Le chef d’équipe va prendre les photos, crier le nom de personne et verifier si : 1. Le personne et présent (mètre 
une « V » sur le dos de photo) et 2. Si la photo correspond à le nom. 
Etape 5 
Prenez une photo de toutes les 54 photos. C’est une vérification pour Peter que vous avez imprime vraiment toute 
les photos. 
Etape 6 Introduisez le jour : donnez l’histoire de doctorat de Peter, etc. 
Etape 6 
Chaque membre d’équipe va sélectionne un joueur (1-18) au hasard par utiliser les jetons 1-18. Maintenant jouez 
les jeux 1, 2 et faites la séance pour jeux 1. Trois participants jouent en même temps dans un endroit isole 
(chacune avec un membre présent). 
Information avant les jeux : 
« Maintenant nous allons jouer quelques jeux. Tout est confidentiel et complètement anonyme. Donc, d’autres 
villageois et même d’autres joueurs ne doivent pas savoir votre comportement et votre décision pendant les jeux. 
Celle ci est une pièce fantastique et très importante pour vous. Chaque pièce vaut 1 point. Vous allez jouer 
quelques jeux et pendant ces jeux votre but est d’obtenir beaucoup de points. Si vous jouez attentivement avec 
votre pièce fantastique vous  pouvez obtenir beaucoup de  points. Et pour vous, c’est mieux d’avoir beaucoup de 
points. La raison est que demain il y aura une loterie et c’est seulement une  personne qui gagnera le cadeau. Plus 
avez beaucoup de points plus  vous aurez la chance de gagner ce cadeau. Donc, une autre fois, c’est votre but 
d’obtenir le plus de points que possible en faisant les choix attentivement avec votre pièce fantastique. » 
 
« Kwa sasa tunataka fanya micezo. Yote itafanyika kwa siri kabisa. Wakaaji wengine na hata wengine wacezaji 
hawapashwe juwa ginsi uliceza na msimamo wako wakati wa mucezo. Hiki ni kitu kizuri na  cha lazma sana 
kwako. Kila kitu cha namna hiki kina alama moja. Utafanya micezo, na wakati ya micizo, shabaha yako ni kupata 
alama mingi kabisa. Ukiceza kwa makini na hiki kitu kizuri, unaweza pata alama mingi. Ni ya lazma kwako upate 
alama mingi. Sababu ni kwani kesho kutakuwa mucezo wa tombola na niule mutu mwenye atapata alama migi 
zaidi ndiye atapewa matabishi. Kadiri unaalama mingi, kadiri una bahati yakupata ilematabishi. Mara tena, ni 
shabaha yako, upate alama mingi iwezekanovyo ukitumiya vizuri  kabisa hiki kitu. » 
Règles jeu 1 : 
« Maintenant vous êtes en train de jouer. Souvenez vous que d’autres personnes vont jouer comme vous. Je vais 
chaque fois vous présenter une photo. Au total, il y a 17 photos et 1 photo pour chaque joueur. Pour chaque photo, 
nous allons vous donner une « pièce fantastique » pour jouer. Vous avez 2 options : garder la pièce ou contribuer 
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la pièce pour la personne sur la photo. Si vous gardez cette pièce vous obtenez 1 point. Si vous contribuez pour la 
personne sur la photo il y aura 2 possibilités. Souvenez vous que d’autres personnes sur ces photos vont aussi 
jouer comme vous. Si l’autre personne contribue pour vous votre contribution va doubler. Donc, vous aurez 2 
points. Mais si l’autre personne décide de ne pas contribuer pour vous vous perdez votre contribution et donc vous 
aurez 0 point. Vous allez contribuer pour une personne  si vous avez confiance que elle aussi va contribuer pour 
vous. Si vous pensez que l’autre personne va garder sa pièce vous pouvez aussi garder la vôtre. » 
 
« Sasa unaanza ceza. Ujuwe kama wengine watu nao watacheza vilevile kama wewe. Kila mara ndakuonyesha 
picha moja. Kwa jumla kutakuwa picha kumi na kenda. Kila mucezaji atakuwa na yake picha. Kwa kila picha 
tutakupa kitu hiki kimoja kwa kuceza. Uko  na namna mbili yakuceza: Unaweza weka hiki kitu, wala kukitoleya kwa 
mutu anaye kuwa ku picha. Uki weka hiki kitu unapata alama moja. Uki kitoleya kwa mutu anaye patikana ku picha 
kutakuwa namna mbili: Ukumbuke tena kama watu wengine wenyi kuwa ku hizi picha watacheza vilevilekama na 
weye,  mutu mwengine akikutoleye kitu kile, alama zako zita zidishwa mara pili, maana yake utapata alama mbili. 
Alakini mutu mwengine akikatala kukutoleya, unapoteza alama zako, maana yake utapata sufuri. Nikusema 
utatoleya kwa mutu Fulani kama una uhakika kama naye atakutoleya. Ukiwaza kama mutu mwengine hatakutoleya 
kitu kile kizuri, anaweza bakiyana chako. » 
Règles jeu 2 : 
« Maintenant vous voyez les 17 photos au même  moment. Tous ces joueurs vont aussi jouer le même jeu. Cette 
fois vous avez les 5 pièces supers. Chaque pièce super compte 3points. Pour chaque pièce vous avez 2 options : 
Garder ces pièces ou contribuer ces pièces aux autres joueurs. Mais par ce que vous avez 5 pièces vous pouvez 
contribuer au maximum a 5 joueurs. Si vous gardez cette pièce vous allez obtenir 3 points ;si vous contribuez a 
une personne sur les photos il y aura deux possibilités.  Si l’autre personne contribue pour vous nous allons 
doubler votre contribution et vous allez avoir 6 points. Mais si la personne décide de contribuer pour d’autres 
personnes que vous ; vous allez perdre votre contribution et recevoir 0 point. Maintenant, vous allez faire votre 
décision différemment au jeu précédent, ou vous avez fait votre décision photo par photo ; ici, vous allez faire votre 
décision au même moment. Souvenez vous que les autres personnes sur les photos vont aussi jouer le même jeu 
avec 19 photos y compris la votre et peuvent contribuer seulement a un maximum de 5 personnes. Pour être clair, 
vous devez contribuer pour des personnes pour qui vous avez plus de confiance que elles aussi vont contribuer 
pour vous. Souvenez vous que si vous n’avez pas suffisamment confiance que les 5 autres personnes vont 
contribuer pour vous ;vous pouvez toujours garder le reste de vos pieces. »  
 
« Sasa ,angaliya hizi picha kumi na saba kwa limoja. wacezaji hawa wataceza nao mucezo uleule. Marahaba iko 
na vitu tano viziri sana. Kila kitu kina alama tatu. Kwa kila kitu uko na namna mbili: Kucunga kile kitu ao kukitoleya 
kwa wacezazi wengine. Alakini hivi uko na vitu tano tuu, unaweza vitoleya kwa zaidi wacezaji tano. Kama unaweka  
kitu kimoja utakuwa na alama tatu. Kama unatoleya kitu hiki kwa mumoja kati ya hawa wanaopatikana ku hizi 
picha kutakuwa namna mbili:  kama mutu mwengine anakutoleya tuna zidisha alama zako,na utapata alama sita. 
Alakini, kama mutu mwengine ana amuwa kutokutoya na kutoleya wengine utapoteza alama zako na utapata 
sufuri. Sasa utaamuwa umbalimbali na micezo ya mbele kwenyi ulifanya uamuzi picha kwa picha, hapa utaamuwa 
kwa limoja. Ukumbuke kama hawa wengine watu kwa hizi picha nao watacheza mucezo huu na picha kumi na 
kenda nayako ikiwa ndani na wana weza kutoleya tuu kwa zaidi, watu tano. Kwa  mwangaza zaidi, una pashwa 
toleya kwa watu wenye una uhakika kabisa kama nao watakutoleya. Ukumbuke, kama hauna uhakika kabisa ya 
kama wale watu tano wengine watakutoleya, unaweza weka  bitu byenye bilibaki. » 
Etape 7 
Apres les jeux 1 et 2, mettre en l’ordre les 18 fiches est nous allons commencer avec jeux 3A et 3B. Le joueur et 
l’ordre des deux jeux doivent être au hasard. Donc utilisez les jetons 1-18 et les jetons A-B pour sélectionnez 
votre : 1. Jouer et 2. Premier jeux (3A ou 3B).  Donc, par exemple vous avez sélectionnez « 4 » et « A » vous allez 
jouer les jeux avec le jouer 4 et les jeux dans l’ordre : 3A, 3B et la séance d’information. La séance est toujours a 
la fin. Aussi la séance est seulement au niveau de comportement de jouer au jeu 3A. Le jeu 3B est public. Donc 
ensemble avec le chef du village et des autres notables. Etre sur que les autres joueurs sont pas présents! C’est 
important parce que si les autres jouer déjà vu les règles des jeux ca peux influencer sont comportement pendant 
les jeux. 
Règles pour jeu 3A et 3B : 
« Maintenant nous allons jouer un autre jeu. Cette fois-ci, ce n’est pas nécessaire de penser aux comportements et 
a la décision d’autres joueurs pendant le jeu. Nous allons vous présenter chaque fois une photo. Pour chaque 
photo nous allons vous donner 5 pièces fantastiques.  Chaque pièce vaut 1 point. Pour chaque photo vous pouvez 
garder autant que vous voulez de ces 5 pièces, ou contribuer le reste aux autres personnes qui sont sur ces 
photos. Vous aurez les points correspondants aux nombres des pièces fantastiques que vous aurez. Le joueur qui 
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est sur ces photos aura des points correspondants au nombre des pièces obtenues. » 
 
« Sasa tanataka ceza mara ingine. Marahaba, si lazma kuwaza  kuhusu namna yakuceza ya wengine. Kila mara 
tutakuonyesha picha moja. Kwa kila picha tuta kupa vitu tano vizuri . Kila kitu ni alama moja. Kwa kila picha 
unaweza  weka kadiri upendavyo, bya kubaki unaweza vitoleya kwa watu wenye kupatikana ku hizi picha. Utapata  
alama kufwatana na hesabu yabitu ulivyo weka. Mucezaji  anaye kuwa kwa hii picha atapata alama kufwatana na 
hesabu ya vitu vizuri uliyo mutoleya. » 
 
N’Oubliez pas : si vous avez déjà jouer le jeu 3A ou 3B, la deuxième fois que vous jouez le jeu (donc 3B ou 3A) 
placez quelque chose sur les réponses déjà données par l’ enquêté. Raison ? Pour ne pas influencer le 
comportement de jouer.  
 
N’oubliez pas : Avant de commencer jeu 3A soulignez une autre fois que ce jeu est complètement anonyme et 
isole. Aussi, pendant jeu 3B être sur que le joueur va s’ introduire chez les notables et que pendant le jeux les 
notables font attention. 
Etape 8 
Apres les derniers jeux il reste seulement l’enquête sur la parente avec les autres joueurs : la grande enquête. 
Faites ca colonne par colonne, donc  photo par photo. 
Etape 9 
Manger ensemble avec les joueurs. Pendant ce temps le chef de équipe va calculer les point pour chaque jouer. 
Utiliser le « FICHE CHEF D’EQUIPE ». Les autres deux va distribuer le payement pour chaque joueur (2,000 CFR 
pour chacune) et remercier les joueurs pour s leur participation. 
Etape 10 
Expliquer pourquoi la loterie est importante et pourquoi nous ne donnons pas les points pour chaque personne. 
Faites la loterie et un joueur va gagner  un extra 2,000 CFR et un stylo de l’Université Columbia. 
Etape 11 Dire « au revoir » a tous les joueurs et nettoyer le endroit.  
 
Après retour du terrain 
Etape 1 
Etre ensemble est garder les fiches dans les enveloppes brunes : village par village. Etre sur que vous avoir toute 
les fiches : AL/DL (si applicable) quatre fois, toutes les fiches de la cartographie, les 18 fiches des joueurs et le 
fiche chef d’équipe. Faire ca trois fois : une fois pour chaque village.  
Etape 2 
Le chef d’équipe va envoyer un email a Peter avec : 1. Sommaire de travaille dans le trois village, 2. Demande 
pour l’argent pour les trois villages suivants. Peter va envoyer l’argent via Western Union. 
Etape 3 Prenez deux jours de repos. 
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SELECTIONEZ 18 MENAGES 
 
Un exemple d’AL ou DL (ou « LISTE » si vous êtes en train de travailler dans un village sans une liste AL ou DL et vous avez 
créer la liste) est donné comme le tableau blanc ci-dessous. Maintenant, ajoutez une colonne sur les deux faces d'indiquer pour 
chaque ménage si ce ménage est un ménage migrant (« M ») ou un ménage autochtone (« T »). Remplir le «M» s et le "T" dans 
ces colonnes que vous faites ensemble avec le chef et autres personnes. Ajouter une colonne supplémentaire et écrivez les 
numéros de membre de différents groupes. Pour illustrer cela, les colonnes grises ont été ajoutées ci-dessous.  
 
# Migrants (M) ou 
autochtone (T)? 
    
Migrants (M) ou 
autochtone (T)? 
# 
1 M 1 Nom du Ménage 1 37 Nom du Ménage 37 T 26 
1 T 2 Nom du Ménage 2 38 Nom du Ménage 38 T 27 
2 T 3 Nom du Ménage 3 39 Nom du Ménage 39 T 28 
3 T 4 Nom du Ménage 4 40 Nom du Ménage 40 T 29 
2 M 5 Nom du Ménage 5 41 Nom du Ménage 41 M 12 
3 M 6 Nom du Ménage 6 42 Nom du Ménage 42 T 30 
4 T 7 Nom du Ménage 7 43 Nom du Ménage 43 T 31 
 
En bas de la page écrivez le nombre total de ménages migrants et le nombre total de ménages autochtones. Par exemple: 
M=41 
T=90 
Maintenant, nous devons sélectionner 9 ménages  migrants et  9 ménages autochtones au hasard. Utilisez le tableau à la page 
suivante pour sélectionner ces 9 ménages pour chaque groupe.1 La colonne à gauche indique les différentes tailles des types 
possibles. S'il vous plaît choisissez la ligne qui correspond au nombre des personnes dans le groupe (vous avez déjà compté 
cela et  écrit sur le bas de la page). Lorsque vous avez identifié la ligne correcte, s'il vous plaît regardez la colonne suivante dans 
la même ligne. Il ya 10 colonnes avec chacune un numéro. Ce chiffre indique le numéro du type de ménage à choisir. 
 
Par exemple, il ya 41 migrants et 90 ménages autochtones dans le village. La ligne 41 donne les chiffres suivants: 6, 9, 15, 16, 
27, 28, etc. Dépasser la liste AL/DL (ou LISTE), vous encerclez les ménages qui ont un «M» et ces chiffres. Pour les ménages 
autochtones, vous allez faire la même chose. Encercler les ménages qui ont un "T" et le numéro suivant (voir la ligne 90 du 
tableau): 2, 7, 16, 23, 37, 48, 75, 83, 90. Ecrivez le nom des personnes sélectionnees et son chiffre AL/DL/LISTE 
immédiatement sur les « FICHE DE JOUER ». 
 
Le remplacement  
 
Prenez le type de ménage le plus proche suivant sur la liste AL/DL est pas encore sélectionne. Et aussi écrivez le nom de 
personne sélectionne et son chiffre AL/DL/LISTE immédiatement sur les « FICHE DE JOUER » .  
                                                      
1
 random.table = function(n,  max.pop,  seed=0, intervals=F, min.pop=n, fine=1){ 
    get.n.randm=function(j) {sort(sample(1:j, n, replace=F))} 
    get.n.fixed=function(j) {sort(round(j*runif(1)+(1:n)*(j/n))%%j+1)} 
    if(seed>0){set.seed(seed)} 
    s<-seq(min.pop, max.pop, fine) 
    ifelse(intervals, x <- t(sapply(s, get.n.fixed)), x <- t(sapply(s, get.n.randm))) 
    data<- as.data.frame(cbind(s, x)) 
    names(data) <- c("Size", 1:n) 
    View(data) 
 write.csv(data, "C:/Users/Peter van der 
Windt/Dropbox/drc_network_project/04_protocol/tableforselectionhh_9_9.csv") 
} 
random.table(9,400, seed=20120223, intervals=F) 
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TABLEAU NOMBRES ALEATOIRES POUR SELECTIONNER 9 MENAGES POUR CHAQUE TYPE (MÉNAGES MIGRANTS 
OU AUTOCHTONES) 
 
Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
51 3 7 22 28 34 37 39 48 51 
10 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 
 
52 4 5 6 19 26 36 37 39 44 
11 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 
 
53 7 12 16 17 37 38 40 52 53 
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 
 
54 6 11 20 23 26 31 33 49 50 
13 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 13 
 
55 7 14 16 19 20 33 44 49 51 
14 1 2 5 6 8 10 11 13 14 
 
56 5 21 23 24 34 43 48 50 54 
15 1 4 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
 
57 6 11 16 23 29 34 38 39 42 
16 1 2 3 5 6 8 9 11 13 
 
58 11 15 17 21 22 23 41 52 58 
17 3 5 6 9 11 12 13 14 16 
 
59 4 9 13 14 34 35 51 58 59 
18 1 4 6 8 9 13 14 17 18 
 
60 2 3 8 20 34 40 41 44 49 
19 2 4 5 6 9 11 14 17 19 
 
61 7 9 20 30 42 47 48 60 61 
20 3 6 7 8 12 14 16 19 20 
 
62 10 13 18 36 39 43 46 51 61 
21 2 3 6 7 8 14 15 20 21 
 
63 29 31 37 51 52 54 55 57 60 
22 1 6 7 8 9 10 13 16 19 
 
64 2 13 15 22 27 38 40 45 61 
23 4 5 6 9 15 16 19 21 23 
 
65 1 2 14 15 19 40 45 55 59 
24 4 5 10 14 15 16 18 19 20 
 
66 4 20 21 35 44 47 51 63 65 
25 1 7 9 11 12 15 19 23 25 
 
67 2 7 8 9 17 21 22 58 60 
26 2 6 10 11 14 16 17 23 25 
 
68 4 6 20 21 23 33 34 45 51 
27 1 2 7 8 9 11 13 22 25 
 
69 3 15 27 29 33 41 47 54 64 
28 1 3 4 12 13 16 21 24 27 
 
70 1 4 8 10 19 32 49 66 69 
29 2 6 8 9 14 16 19 20 28 
 
71 4 10 12 13 17 36 42 50 58 
30 5 8 13 14 23 24 25 28 29 
 
72 2 9 47 48 54 57 64 67 70 
31 1 5 7 8 9 10 16 18 20 
 
73 18 21 26 31 33 35 38 50 65 
32 1 7 10 18 19 23 24 28 31 
 
74 14 16 25 36 38 42 51 67 68 
33 2 5 10 11 13 20 29 30 32 
 
75 15 26 28 34 36 42 46 47 54 
34 1 4 5 7 10 11 19 22 29 
 
76 8 12 19 20 28 31 43 54 64 
35 1 4 5 13 18 20 24 30 33 
 
77 12 19 37 42 51 61 67 68 69 
36 2 17 19 20 29 30 31 35 36 
 
78 11 35 44 56 65 69 70 72 73 
37 2 6 7 9 11 12 13 31 34 
 
79 5 7 10 11 18 29 34 43 58 
38 4 7 9 11 15 16 26 30 35 
 
80 11 17 34 35 54 57 68 73 76 
39 1 7 16 17 20 21 24 27 35 
 
81 16 18 22 27 54 56 57 63 81 
40 5 8 16 19 21 26 34 36 37 
 
82 3 6 34 36 39 50 55 59 64 
41 6 9 15 16 27 28 35 36 38 
 
83 2 17 19 29 48 52 54 55 75 
42 2 14 19 20 22 28 36 38 41 
 
84 1 3 19 21 31 38 45 49 80 
43 1 3 11 19 20 21 23 24 43 
 
85 4 5 16 30 47 48 52 65 78 
44 5 8 13 14 22 23 33 37 39 
 
86 6 16 32 37 43 51 61 67 80 
45 3 10 14 16 20 22 28 40 44 
 
87 2 7 21 26 32 40 42 44 76 
46 4 15 17 23 25 27 36 42 45 
 
88 12 15 36 42 73 76 78 81 84 
47 4 6 15 17 19 32 34 37 38 
 
89 2 6 25 30 37 46 52 60 65 
48 3 4 6 15 21 28 35 36 42 
 
90 2 7 16 23 37 48 75 83 90 
49 6 11 23 31 36 38 40 43 45 
 
91 6 31 59 68 72 76 83 86 90 
50 4 18 19 25 33 36 37 40 45 
 
92 16 27 29 61 65 73 79 89 90 
           
93 11 13 20 49 58 63 66 68 70 
           
94 17 23 27 29 49 55 71 81 92 
           
95 8 38 40 50 60 65 77 80 86 
           
96 12 20 32 47 56 77 78 90 95 
           
97 10 30 44 55 57 63 66 75 77 
           
98 3 6 10 13 19 46 65 73 96 
           
99 2 10 43 45 52 54 57 63 94 
           
100 9 20 29 30 47 63 74 79 92 
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Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
101 12 22 26 28 39 44 63 78 97 
 
151 19 20 24 30 53 60 76 95 143 
102 9 17 19 34 55 59 61 79 87 
 
152 7 17 74 79 87 110 116 127 151 
103 23 42 48 53 59 66 70 86 87 
 
153 15 19 21 39 41 98 123 145 151 
104 29 31 33 40 44 46 50 62 101 
 
154 39 42 58 80 87 105 110 131 147 
105 7 21 31 37 54 56 61 64 99 
 
155 5 40 60 76 95 97 111 124 143 
106 4 13 20 23 36 67 78 83 88 
 
156 13 25 30 32 37 79 94 127 145 
107 8 14 38 45 51 84 87 92 99 
 
157 62 67 72 103 115 128 132 135 156 
108 3 17 21 26 61 69 71 75 90 
 
158 2 9 33 70 88 95 96 104 136 
109 3 9 28 40 54 62 68 73 107 
 
159 2 16 24 35 38 73 98 105 157 
110 17 22 32 46 53 55 72 86 97 
 
160 27 36 46 97 118 123 135 139 145 
111 3 12 27 33 59 69 71 94 111 
 
161 11 14 52 62 72 79 91 119 143 
112 24 32 35 40 46 65 71 92 99 
 
162 5 41 51 74 98 100 130 156 161 
113 10 13 21 45 47 71 91 94 113 
 
163 6 27 43 68 85 95 134 136 159 
114 6 26 38 43 47 52 81 85 103 
 
164 59 97 103 105 112 113 117 130 156 
115 14 20 33 41 42 56 76 99 101 
 
165 10 22 39 58 60 70 83 149 154 
116 3 16 17 41 70 72 91 98 100 
 
166 20 40 46 52 57 92 120 141 150 
117 1 2 20 22 25 42 50 72 73 
 
167 13 28 49 73 82 90 111 121 144 
118 2 22 29 34 41 46 81 93 117 
 
168 20 24 42 50 61 86 112 148 154 
119 1 14 18 23 32 38 40 76 78 
 
169 16 55 61 80 84 89 130 132 157 
120 24 26 29 37 38 43 71 81 84 
 
170 3 14 23 26 39 57 64 68 164 
121 17 41 52 65 66 97 100 104 115 
 
171 32 35 42 57 65 77 116 118 157 
122 3 7 19 63 65 105 109 111 119 
 
172 14 25 48 57 94 121 142 147 156 
123 6 37 65 67 71 91 107 108 121 
 
173 18 21 39 69 121 154 167 170 172 
124 1 7 22 29 69 72 76 90 120 
 
174 7 25 62 93 109 118 126 150 157 
125 14 19 23 55 56 68 79 81 82 
 
175 23 26 53 57 93 102 130 132 138 
126 48 65 77 99 100 105 113 116 118 
 
176 10 31 32 44 78 80 95 130 140 
127 1 12 26 43 62 80 96 114 121 
 
177 15 44 59 63 64 80 90 140 154 
128 16 34 40 43 60 72 73 78 107 
 
178 40 42 49 53 92 107 129 138 174 
129 2 31 35 57 73 76 80 105 123 
 
179 54 71 81 110 117 124 150 155 158 
130 27 45 53 55 60 65 80 112 125 
 
180 22 96 106 122 129 131 143 162 166 
131 12 17 33 41 70 82 84 123 127 
 
181 5 7 46 69 70 100 136 142 167 
132 3 12 37 39 41 48 64 85 122 
 
182 2 22 57 59 87 96 100 105 141 
133 5 33 35 39 44 68 87 90 119 
 
183 5 27 56 63 68 76 123 141 162 
134 53 77 85 86 94 97 99 126 132 
 
184 4 61 105 124 132 162 163 173 181 
135 12 26 48 71 72 75 77 81 88 
 
185 7 10 20 21 25 115 131 160 174 
136 7 14 53 59 61 68 74 97 107 
 
186 12 26 71 99 117 174 176 183 185 
137 7 9 32 50 55 59 83 91 136 
 
187 11 31 45 47 57 61 113 167 183 
138 17 39 55 58 61 84 91 122 132 
 
188 44 86 88 90 102 160 170 172 185 
139 4 23 31 59 86 87 105 130 133 
 
189 16 42 76 93 117 119 144 180 185 
140 15 21 53 56 57 98 115 119 130 
 
190 7 48 55 65 76 112 139 154 169 
141 24 39 50 63 66 82 94 103 137 
 
191 8 57 64 102 132 147 166 173 184 
142 4 11 26 60 61 96 113 120 138 
 
192 48 62 64 75 80 110 129 167 191 
143 17 41 56 98 101 112 132 137 141 
 
193 12 48 79 101 132 156 158 166 168 
144 6 17 40 67 73 83 84 137 143 
 
194 44 72 78 94 97 101 118 167 185 
145 27 42 49 81 82 88 92 100 101 
 
195 9 23 47 54 100 112 137 179 192 
146 10 20 44 50 109 120 126 139 142 
 
196 93 106 115 124 141 188 192 193 195 
147 37 47 52 53 54 66 97 113 130 
 
197 18 26 61 73 74 92 103 121 196 
148 4 18 30 50 75 86 105 147 148 
 
198 1 14 20 43 44 92 114 136 177 
149 11 23 46 54 56 65 108 142 146 
 
199 78 94 95 104 129 154 155 164 187 
150 21 51 90 114 118 125 139 142 143 
 




Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
201 25 32 45 74 86 95 135 149 173 
 
251 28 69 73 94 128 141 156 187 191 
202 36 50 77 101 116 120 128 155 193 
 
252 3 22 42 53 66 82 172 207 251 
203 14 21 30 100 140 141 151 178 191 
 
253 14 17 124 164 169 214 237 239 249 
204 40 57 110 118 128 132 146 171 188 
 
254 21 41 42 78 86 92 188 195 224 
205 54 69 71 91 98 102 137 150 151 
 
255 30 51 59 99 102 112 114 160 190 
206 54 60 72 74 89 92 166 177 199 
 
256 9 62 93 109 206 218 235 238 244 
207 7 15 24 34 51 59 95 102 118 
 
257 1 2 13 63 82 131 143 154 249 
208 14 39 43 59 73 87 119 176 202 
 
258 40 42 52 58 148 163 166 179 238 
209 5 14 89 94 102 122 155 187 188 
 
259 5 7 81 115 153 175 196 221 231 
210 5 13 21 23 40 193 198 206 208 
 
260 40 80 90 98 124 158 180 238 250 
211 5 40 98 115 136 159 167 187 211 
 
261 6 70 84 101 108 152 185 229 241 
212 11 31 94 96 100 123 158 178 212 
 
262 7 12 33 54 102 103 156 210 228 
213 11 121 144 163 165 176 183 192 200 
 
263 10 22 46 97 127 153 171 172 212 
214 9 15 32 74 108 184 199 205 206 
 
264 4 35 108 124 127 223 232 239 264 
215 33 107 126 130 154 169 171 178 186 
 
265 14 155 165 190 195 197 228 240 250 
216 14 53 58 68 71 101 118 177 204 
 
266 26 35 54 65 103 175 180 211 222 
217 14 19 22 51 56 68 97 106 187 
 
267 13 47 58 82 195 200 232 258 266 
218 25 44 55 89 106 110 115 122 180 
 
268 20 80 123 141 149 176 218 259 262 
219 26 80 92 119 127 139 156 157 197 
 
269 16 65 74 114 128 148 203 220 249 
220 75 94 128 169 173 175 183 198 204 
 
270 38 45 98 104 117 127 149 194 236 
221 20 45 71 117 180 184 195 200 204 
 
271 53 111 118 130 145 215 228 266 271 
222 13 44 72 74 89 92 125 165 199 
 
272 54 91 138 152 186 221 226 245 251 
223 7 46 63 79 95 109 131 137 142 
 
273 3 27 30 39 50 59 100 161 168 
224 10 45 46 87 89 91 95 127 137 
 
274 14 52 57 98 127 173 232 243 257 
225 30 37 102 109 123 148 195 196 220 
 
275 26 48 55 77 122 126 141 213 217 
226 15 72 94 124 143 149 185 199 200 
 
276 32 35 42 122 148 158 241 251 271 
227 16 27 53 66 97 199 204 219 222 
 
277 16 25 52 99 109 137 160 192 275 
228 4 22 86 101 115 122 150 180 216 
 
278 39 68 88 104 129 167 225 245 269 
229 14 29 86 95 98 116 174 204 212 
 
279 36 54 68 119 182 183 238 239 244 
230 7 43 45 83 115 125 165 172 184 
 
280 3 30 39 53 128 131 147 166 245 
231 88 102 110 122 139 156 185 190 196 
 
281 35 44 69 70 72 220 235 255 264 
232 21 44 50 72 86 148 186 191 213 
 
282 16 31 44 75 88 142 154 167 278 
233 32 36 45 57 79 94 166 169 205 
 
283 3 41 119 126 170 171 210 214 225 
234 3 22 37 74 110 119 141 189 195 
 
284 21 42 46 107 122 133 215 246 272 
235 17 41 65 72 87 91 93 190 232 
 
285 118 119 188 193 210 231 237 242 273 
236 17 19 27 43 45 57 137 149 221 
 
286 54 94 114 130 140 186 203 236 248 
237 67 78 96 110 137 172 185 213 222 
 
287 12 41 46 58 62 143 185 265 267 
238 57 64 110 130 133 150 162 219 225 
 
288 23 63 78 84 86 87 91 92 136 
239 14 19 39 99 101 172 195 199 202 
 
289 27 37 71 101 108 151 168 175 275 
240 1 17 21 48 67 94 104 138 178 
 
290 37 116 146 189 191 219 221 223 265 
241 80 85 97 99 100 102 160 202 214 
 
291 57 73 141 173 195 219 225 238 285 
242 52 53 75 87 100 147 168 202 228 
 
292 36 90 100 130 185 191 256 263 275 
243 16 20 27 59 63 71 117 178 237 
 
293 19 89 93 116 168 180 192 217 285 
244 16 44 48 137 151 202 214 215 230 
 
294 125 129 133 153 159 169 219 253 268 
245 32 51 84 117 138 143 183 205 230 
 
295 7 38 95 184 247 257 265 270 290 
246 64 67 76 112 127 131 199 203 206 
 
296 3 7 55 59 94 107 152 183 220 
247 20 61 68 74 113 186 201 232 245 
 
297 53 76 132 172 178 212 217 232 239 
248 32 40 55 78 95 104 170 190 195 
 
298 8 29 96 100 170 172 196 255 281 
249 12 49 90 106 117 119 122 178 222 
 
299 79 91 169 189 210 218 240 264 272 
250 7 8 92 105 126 177 180 207 218 
 




LIVRE DE CODE 
 
 
Codes Généraux  Les codes utilisés pour cette enquête sont les mêmes que les 
codes utilisés pour l'évaluation TUUNGANE. Seulement les codes 
X, T, U et V sont nouveaux et sont donnés immédiatement ci-
dessous. Les autres codes peuvent être trouvés soit dans le livre 
de code que vous utilisez déjà pour l'évaluation TUUNGANE, ou 
dans les pages ci-dessous. 
Ne sait pas -9  
Non applicable -8  
Refus de répondre -7  
 
Code X. Pourquoi pas d’enquête?  Code U. Motivation pour aller a ce village. 
Pas de temps A  J'ai de la famille dans ce village A 
Pas de confiance B  Je me suis marié a quelqu’un ici B 
A besoin de l’argent ou autre chose C  Il est proche de mes champs C 
Autre D  Il y a moins de conflit dans ce village  D 
   Ce village a beaucoup d'ONGs  E 
  Il y a une école ici F 
   Il y a un centre de santé ici G 
   Ce village est plus riche H 
   Il y a du travail dans ce village I 
   Il y a une mine proche J 
   la vie est moins chère ici K 
   Il y a un puits ici (source d’eau) L 
   Je suis venu pour suivre l’église M 
   Faire du commerce N 
Assistance Q  Passer les vacances O 
Autre R  Pour la cérémonie (enterrement, mariage, etc.)  P 
Achète parcelle (pour maison) S    
 
Code A: Activité  Code C. Contribution au bien publique 
< 5 Ans 00  J'ai été payé 1 
Agriculteur 05  j'ai été forcé 2 
Elève ou Etudiant 01  Les gens m'ont dit de le faire 3 
Retraité 02  Beaucoup de gens participent 4 
Chômeur ou sans occupation 03  Le projet bénéficie du village 5 
Ménager(e) 04  Il me donne des avantages 6 
Eleveur 06  Il bénéficie mon église / mosquée groupe 7 
Agriculteur et Eleveur 07  Il bénéficie mon groupe ethnique 8 
Pêcheur 08  Salongo 9 
Commerçant 09  Autre 50 
Fonctionnaire d’Etat 10    
Salarié dans le secteur privé 11  Code B. Religions 
Enseignant 12  Catholique 1 
Religieux 13  Protestant 2 
Militaire/Combattant 14  Musulmane 3 
Creuseur 15  Témoins de Jehova 4 
Travailleur du sexe 16  Kimbanguiste 5 
Autre travail qualifié  17  Anglican 6 
Autre travail non qualifié  18  Sans Religion 7 




Code Z. Raison pour contribuer 
POURQUOI CONTRIBUER POURQUOI NE PAS CONTRIBUER 
J’attends que lui / elle va contribuer pour 1 Je ne m'attends pas que lui / elle contribue à pour moi 18 
Nous sommes amis 2 On n’est pas ami 19 
Nous sommes de même famille 3 J'ai une dispute avec lui / elle 20 
Nous sommes des voisins 4 Quelqu'un de ma famille a une dispute avec lui / elle 21 
Nous sommes membres de même église 5 Il/elle n’est pas un membre de notre église 22 
Il/elle est beaux/belle 6 Je ne le/la connais pas 23 
Il/elle est riche 7 Cette personne n’est  pas de notre groupe ethnique 24 
Nous faisons des affaires ensemble 8 Il/elle est un sorcier 25 
Il/elle est une ami/ famille de chef 9 Il/elle est/était un soldat/militaire 26 
Il/ elle est important dans le village 10 Il/elle est migrant 27 
Je le/la connais  11 Il/elle est contre le chef 28 
La personne en a besoin 12 Il/elle est problématique 29 
Nous sommes membres de même groupe ethnique 13  
 Il/elle est un migrant 14 AUTRE  
Et donnez plus d’information 50 Il/elle est un autochtone  15 
Nous avons étudie ensemble 16 
Nous avons été ensemble dans le même endroit pendant la 
violence dans le village 
17 
 
Code L. Langues Maternelles 
Aushi (K)  1 Chokwe (K)  9 Kaonde (K)  17 Ruund (K)  25 
Bangubangu  (M) 2 Fuliru (S)  10 Lal-bisa (K)  18 Sanga (K)  26 
Banyamulenge (S)  3 Havu (S)  11 Lamba (K)  19 Shi  (S)  27 
Bemba (k)  4 Hemba (K)  12 Lega (S,M)  20 Taabwa (K)  28 
Bembe  (S)  5 Holoholo (K)  13 Luba-Kasai (K)  21 Tembo (S)  29 
Buwa (K)  6 Joba (k)  14 Luba-Katanga (K)  22 Tetela (M)  30 
Buyu (K) 7 Kabwari (K) 15 Lunda (K) 23 Vira (S)  31 
Bwile (K) 8 Kanu 16 Nyindu 24 Kikusu 32 








Swahili 100 Chinoise 110 
  
Kinyabuisha 35 
Français  101 Autre Congolais 111   Kirwanda 36 




Code R. Location. 
      
Pays  Codes Préfères! 
Burundi P1  Tanzanie P6  Ce village A1 
Cameroun  P2  Uganda P7  Un autre village dans cette chefferie A2 
Kenya P3  Zambie P8  Un autre village hors de cette chefferie mais dans ce territoire A3 
R de Congo P4  Autre Afrique P10  “La brousse” /foret dans cette chefferie A4 
Rwanda P5  Orient P11  “La brousse” /foret hors de cette chefferie mais dans ce territoire A5 
  
 Occident P12  
   
District Territoire CODE  District Territoire CODE  District Territoire CODE 
           
Kinshasa  10  Equateur  40  Orientale  50 
Kinshasa Rural 
Communes de 





Kinshasa Urba 1020  Equateur Bolomba 4022  Tshopo Banalia 5021 
    Equateur Ingende 4023  Tshopo Bafwasende 5022 
Bas Congo  20  Equateur Bikoro 4024  Tshopo Ubundu 5023 
Bas Fleuve Tshela 2031  Equateur Lukolela 4025  Tshopo Opala 5024 
Bas Fleuve Seke-Banza 2032  Equateur Makanza 4026  Tshopo Isangi 5025 
Bas Fleuve Lukula 2033  Equateur Bomongo 4027  Tshopo Yahuma 5026 
Bas Fleuve Muanda 2034  Sud Ubangi Gemena 4031  Tshopo Basoko 5027 
Cataractes Mbanza Ngungu 2041  Sud Ubangi Budjala 4032  Bas Uele Buta 5031 
Cataractes Songololo 2042  Sud Ubangi Kungu 4033  Bas Uele Aketi 5032 
Cataractes Luozi 2043  Sud Ubangi Libenge 4034  Bas Uele Bondo 5033 
Lukaya Madimba 2051  Nord Ubangi Mobayi Mbongo 4051  Bas Uele Ango 5034 
Lukaya Kasangulu 2052  Nord Ubangi Yakoma 4052  Bas Uele Bambesa 5035 
Lukaya Kimvula 2053  Nord Ubangi Businga 4053  Bas Uele Poko 5036 
    Nord Ubangi Bosobolo 4054  Haut Uele Rungu 5041 
Bandundu  30  Mongala Lisala 4061  Haut Uele Niangara 5042 
Mai Ndombe Inongo 3021  Mongala Bumba 4062  Haut Uele Dungu 5043 
Mai Ndombe Kiri 3022  Mongala Bongandanga 4063  Haut Uele Faradje 5044 
Mai Ndombe Oshwe 3023  Tshuapa Boende 4071  Haut Uele Watsha 5045 
Mai Ndombe Kutu 3024  Tshuapa Befale 4072  Haut Uele Wamba 5046 
Kwilu Bulungu 3031  Tshuapa Djolu 4073  Ituri Irumu 5051 
Kwilu Masi Manimba 3032  Tshuapa Ikela 4074  Ituri Mambasa 5052 
Kwilu Bagata 3033  Tshuapa Bokungu 4075  Ituri Djugu 5053 
Kwilu Idiofa 3034  Tshuapa Monkoto 4076  Ituri Mahagi 5054 
Kwilu Gungu 3035      Ituri Aru 5055 
Kwango Kenge 3051         
Kwango Feshi 3052         
Kwango Kahemba 3053         
Kwango Kasongo Lunda 3054         
Kwango Popokabaka 3055         
Plateaux Bolobo 3061         
Plateaux Kwamouth 3062         
Plateaux Mushie 3063         
Plateaux Yumbie 3064         
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District Territoire CODE  District Territoire CODE  District Territoire CODE 
           
Nord Kivu   61  Katanga  70  Kasai Oriental  80 
Nord Kivu Nyiragongo 6121  
Lubumbashi 
Communes de 
Lubumbashi 7010  
Mbuji Mayi 
Communes de 
Mbuji Mayi 8010 




Likasi 7020  
Tshilenge Miabi 
8021 Nord Kivu Lubero 6123 






Nord Kivu Rutshuru 6125  Lualaba Sandoa 7042  Tshilenge Lupatapata 8023 
Nord Kivu Masisi 6126  Lualaba Kapanga 7043  Tshilenge Katanda 8024 
Nord Kivu Commune de Goma 6127  Haut Lomami Kamina 7051  Tshilenge Tshilenge 8025 
    Haut Lomami Kaniama 7052  Sankuru Lusambo 8031 
Maniema  62  Haut Lomami Kabongo 7053  Sankuru Kole 8032 
Maniema Kabambare 6221  Haut Lomami Malemba Nkulu 7054  Sankuru Lomela 8033 
Maniema Kibombo 6222  Haut Lomami Bukama 7055  Sankuru Katako Kombe 8034 
Maniema Lubutu 6223     Sankuru Lubefu 8035 
Maniema Pangi 6224  Tanganika Kalemie 7061  Sankuru Lodja 8036 
Maniema Kasongo 6225  Tanganika Moba 7062  Kabinda Mwene Ditu 8041 
Maniema Punia 6226  Tanganika Manono 7063  Kabinda Kamiji 8042 
Maniema Kindu 6227  Tanganika Kabalo 7064  Kabinda Ngandajika 8043 
Maniema Kailo 6228  Tanganika Kongolo 7065  Kabinda Kabinda 8044 
    Tanganika Nyunzu 7066  Kabinda Lubao 8045 
Sud Kivu  63        
Sud Kivu Walungu 6321        
Sud Kivu Uvira 6322  Haut Katanga Kipushi 7071  Kasai Occidental  90 
Sud Kivu Fizi 
6323  





Sud Kivu Mwenga 6324  Haut Katanga Kasenga 7073  Lulua Dibaya 9021 
Sud Kivu Shabunda 6325  Haut Katanga Mitwaba 7074  Lulua Luiza 9022 
Sud Kivu Kalehe 6326  Haut Katanga Pweto 7075  Lulua Kazumba 9023 
Sud Kivu Idjwi 6327  Haut Katanga Kambove 7076  Lulua Demba 9024 
Sud Kivu Kabare 6328     Lulua Dibelenge 9025 









    Kolwezi Rural Mutshatsha 7093  Kasai Tshikapa 9032 
    Kolwezi Rural Lubudi 7094  Kasai Ilebo 9033 
        Kasai Mweka 9034 




P   PARENTE AVEC LE CHEF DE MENAGE P   UNIQUEMENT SI AUCUN LIEN DE PARENTE(LE 
PLUS FORT) 
Chef de ménage 1 Deplace / Refugié avec aucun lien de parenté 75 
Père/ Mère  2 Oncle «Africain » 15 
Grand parent 3 Neveu « Africain » 16 
Epoux / relation religieuse 4 Ami 20 
Enfant (incl. adoption)  5 Ami de la Famille 25 
Frère ou sœur  6 Est dans la meme organisation professionnelle 30 
Oncle ou tante  7 Ils font du commerce ensemble régulièrement 40 
Nièce ou Neveu 8 Voisin 55 
Petit fils / Petite-fille 9 Meme organisation Religieuse 45 
Beaux-parents 10 Deplace, non de la famille 75 
Beau-frère/sœur 11 Autre -10 
Cousin 12   
Autre parent de la famille 13   
Beau fils / Belle fille 14   
 
I : CODE NIVEAU SCOLAIRE 
Ecole Maternelle/Aucun 00 
Ecole primaire  
Année 1 1.1 
Année 2 1.2 
… .. 
Année 6 1.6 
Ecole secondaire  
Année 1 2.1 
Année 2 2.2 
… … 
Année 6 2.6 






DOC 3 3.6 
DOC 4 3.7 
Enseignement Professionnel 4.1 
Enseignement Technique 4.2 
Refuse de Repondre -7 
Non Applicable -8 









GUIDE DE CARTHOGRAPHIE 
 
QUESTIONS EN HAUT : 
 
Chiffre AL: 
Posez la question pour le nom de chef du ménage et trouver ce nom sur la liste AL/DL. Si le nom n’est 
pas la, augmentez le nom sur la liste AL/DL avec  votre premier lettre du nom (de chercheur) avant le 
chiffre. 
 
# Dans ménage: 
Combien des personnes habitent dans ce ménage : incluez les déplaces ! 
 
# Maisons (AV, AP): 
Le nombre des maisons qui existent avant l’arrivée de déplacées dans le ménage, et le nombre de 
maisons après. Donc, si le ménage n’est pas une famille d’accueil, les deux sont le même. Si le ménage n 
a pas construit les maisons pour les déplace les deux chiffres sont aussi le même. 
 
# FEM. : 
Nombre des femmes de chef de ménage. Si monogame c’est une, si polygame c’est plus d’une. 
 
# Poule. : 
Nombre des poules/ canards/ dindons dans ce ménage.  
 
# Déplacé : 
Nombre des déplaces dans le ménage. Si pas une famille d’accueil c’est zéro. Si la famille est une famille 
d’accueils vous devez remplir l’information sur les déplaces dans ce ménages a l’autre cote. Et pour le 
boite à droite : les déplaces reste dans combien des maisons ? Si les déplaces restent dans la même 
maison de famille d’accueil c’est « zéro ». 
 
 [A]: 
Occupation et utiliser le code [A]. 
 
[L] : 
Langue maternelle et utiliser le code [L]. 
 
Swah. : 





Homme [H], Femme [F] 
 
5ys ici : 
Croyez vous que vous habiterez dans ce village d’ici cinq ans ? 
 
Ch. vo : 




Ch. pep : 
Si vous avez le moyen, est-ce que possible pour vous d’acheter un champ dans ce village ? Pour 
l’enquêteur : Peut être quelques gens sont interdits (par exemple par le chef ou mwami) d’acheter les 
champs dans ce village. 
 
02 :  
Latitude en Décimal Dégrées. 
 
028 : 
Longitude en Décimal Dégrées. 
 
Mètre : 
Altitude en mètres. 
 
Nom NK et chiffre AL : 
Nom de la nyumba Kumi est trouvez sont chiffre AL/DL sur la liste AL/DL.  
 
D, E, F : 
Cocher votre première lettre.  
 
QUESTION D’IDENTITE : 
 
___h___ : 
L’heure d actuelle  
 
UNIV / ONG : 
Encerclez l’histoire que vous allez donner a l’enquête. Si le dernier chiffre de minute est impair donnez 





Voici cinq jetons comprenant cinq identités différentes. Une personne peut avoir toute ces 
identités. Ces identités ont des importances différentes pour vous. Cette a vous de placer 
ces identités celons des importances  de la plus important jusqu’a les moins importants.  
Etape 2 Donnez l’histoire « UNIV » ou l’histoire « NGO » : 
« UNIV » « Nous sommes des étudiants. Nous travaillons avec l’université Columbia. Nous ne 
sommes pas ici  pour les projets et nous n’allons rien distribuer. C’est juste pour une 
recherche scientifique. » 
« ONG » « Nous sommes des étudiants. Nous travaillons avec l’Université de Columbia. Vous n’avez 
pas des bénéfices directs. Mais nous allons partager les résultats des cette recherche avec 
des grandes organisations de Bukavu. Par exemple, IRC, UNHCR et UNOCHA. » 
Etape 3 Maintenant travaillez ensemble avec l’enquête et arrangez les cinq jetons des identités 




Maintenant c’est à l’enquête de donner  son histoire de migration. Pendant ce temps vous remplissez 
les histoires de votre enquête. Créer les carrés. Est chaque carré indique un endroit ou l’enquête a été 




l’enquête a été dans plusieurs endroits (donc plus d’un carré) c’est à vous de créer les flèches entre les 
carrés : chaque flèche indique un déplacement. Pour chaque flèche vous devez remplir trois chois : 
1. Le motif de déplacement et utiliser code [U]. Creuser un petit peu. C’est possible que il y a plus 
d’une lettre de code [U] qui est applicable. Si le motif est pour le travaille (« I » pour code [U]) 
posez une extra question : « C’est quel type de travail ? ». Si la personne dit que c’est pour le 
travail de minerais c’est a vous d’ajouter un astérisque chez le « I » donc « I* » est aussi préciser 
dans le « Remarque » c’est quelle type de minérais, rôle, etc. 
2. Nombre des personnes qui ce sont déplace avec l’enquête. Premièrement le nombre qui a 
quitté le village précédent ensemble avec l’enquête. Et aussi le nombre qui est arrive avec 
l’enquête  dans le village. Par exemple, la personne a quitté Kasheke avec 100 personnes et est 
arrive à Mweha avec 40 personne. Donc vous devez remplir « 100/40 ». 
3. L’année de déplacement 
Faites ca pour chaque déplacement (donc chez chaque flash) ! 
 
Nous ne sommes pas encore prêts !  Aussi ajoutez l’information sur les champs. Posez la question ou la 
personne a les champs. Créer un rectangle qui indice un champ et place ca dans le village ou ce trouve 
les champs. Si le champ est dans un village pas encore créé, créez un nouveau carré avec le nom de 
village et chefferie dedans et puis aussi le rectangle pour les champs. Dans tous les rectangles écrivez le 
nombre de champs et l’année d’obtention pour chaque champ. 
 
Maintenant les maisons. Faire la même chose comme les champs, mais pas créer un rectangle mais 
déssinez une case. Ecrivez l’année de construction de chaque maison. Si le ménage a reconstruit la 
maison plus d’une fois remplissez l’année de la première construction de maison ! Par exemple, si 
l’enquête a construit une maison en 1980 mais la pluie a détruit cette maison et l’enquêté a construit 
une nouvelle maison en 2010. Ca c’est une maison et cette maison a été construit a 1980. Vérifier que 
les nombre de maisons sont les mêmes comme vous avez déjà rempli a la question en haut.  
 
Aussi – si applicable – ajoutez les lettres « N », «M » et « D ». « N » indique le village de naissance, donc 
vous devez remplir ca pour chaque personne. « M » indique le village ou ce passe le mariage et aussi 
écrivez l’année ! Finalement, le « D » indique le lieu de décès. Bien sur c’est seulement pour les gens qui 
sont morts : aussi écrivez l’année de décès et l’année de naissance. 
 
Et faites ca pour le chef de ménage et toutes les femmes de ce chef de ménage. Par exemple, si le chef 
de ménage n’est pas présent faire l’enquête avec la femme de chef du ménage. L’information sur le chef 
du ménage est toujours dans le premier endroit ! Aussi si vous êtes en train de faire l’enquête avec son 
épouse. Obtenir ;’information sur toute les femmes de chef du ménagé. C’est très probable que la 
femme de chef de ménage ne connaît pas l’histoire de migration des autres femmes. Dans ce cas vous 
signalez dans Remarques.  
 
Finalement, à la fin, mettre la lettre « E » dans la rubrique de la personne enquêtée. 
 
QUESTIONS EN BAS : 
 
Remarque : 
Toujours être très complet. Si il y a quelque chose intéressante ou relevant de notre recherche c’est a 
vous de remplir ca ici. 
 




Reste chez (historique !) : 
La première page est toujours pour le ménage propre. Mais aussi le ménage propre peut avoir été dans 
une famille d’accueil. Par exemple, le ménagé X a été arrive en 1980 et reste pour deux mois dans le 
ménage Y. Mais âpres les deux mois le ménage X a construit sa propre maison. Maintenant vous êtes 
chez le ménage X – qui est un propre ménagé. Mais la famille d’accueil pour le ménagé X c’est le 
ménage Y. Maintenant remplissez l’information sur le ménage Y. 
 
Nom : 
C’est le nom de chef du ménage Y. 
 
Al : 
C’est le chiffre AL/DL sur la liste AL/DL. Si la personne n’est pas sur la liste AL/DL il y a deux options : 1. 
Le ménage Y est dans le village mais pas sur la liste. Maintenant vous devez ajouter ce ménage sur le 
liste AL/DL (oubliez pas votre première lettre). 2. Le ménage n’existe pas dans le village. Par exemple, le 
ménage a été déménage ou le chef de ménage est mort. Maintenant, signaler le lieu ou il se trouve 
ménage Y maintenant.  
 
Langue [L]: 
Langue de chef de ménage Y. 
 
Pourquoi ménage [P]: 
Pourquoi il a choisi ce ménage Y pour accueil. Et très important écrivez la relation de ménage X avec le 
ménage Y  (utiliser le code [P])!  
 
PARENTE AVEC LES CHEFS: 
 
Loc. : 
Remplissez la parente entre le chef du ménage et le chef de localité. 
 
Chef : 
Remplissez la parente entre le chef du ménage et le chef de LLU ou vous êtes en train de travailler. 
 
NK : 
Remplissez la parente entre le chef du ménage et le nyumba kumi. 
 
INFORMATION SUR LES PROJETS : 
 
Projets : 
Ici sont les projets que l’enquête vous a donne qui ont eu lieu dans ce village pendant les derniers 6 
mois. Important, le premier jour vous êtes ensemble avec le chef et obtenir une liste avec tous les 




Pour les projets qui a été donne par l’enquête vous complétez « 1 ». Pour les autres c’est « 0». 






Qui de votre ménage a participe pour ce projet. Par exemple, si le homme, 2 femme est 3 enfants ont 
aide vous devez remplir : « H, F2, E3 ». 
 
C.O : 
Est-ce que vous avez contribué en main d’œuvre ?  
 
C.$ : 
Est-ce que vous avez contribué en argent?  
 
C. Mat: 
Est-ce que vous avez contribué le matériel?  
 
Sal.: 
Ce projet a été un salongo ? 
 
ONG: 
C’est un projet d’une ONG ? 
 
Reçu $ : 
Est-ce que votre ménage a reçu l’argent pour votre participation. Si oui, spécifier. 
 
M/Ann. : 
Depuis quand le projet a commence ? 
 
[C]: 
La raison pour la contribution et utiliser le code [C]. 
 
Score: 
Estimation de l’importance de ce projet pour le ménage. Entre 0 et 10. Très important, aussi replissez 
cette information pour les projets que l’enquête ne connais pas. C’est possible que âpres, vous posez la 
question pour un projet ou nous avons sais= « 0 », l’enquête va dire « Ah, je connais ce projet. 
Maintenant, PAS CHANGER votre information. C’est toujours sais= « 0 ». 
 
ONG PAUVRE : 
« Croyez vous qu’une ONG va intervenir dans ce village dans le cadre de développent et pour les pauvre 
d’ici une année ? » La réponse doit être présentée sous forme de score entre 0 et 10. 
 
ONG DEPLACE : 
« Croyez vous qu’une ONG va intervenir dans ce village dans le cadre de déplaces d’ici une année ? ». La 
réponse doit être présente sous forme de score entre 0 et 10. 
 
CHECKLIST :  








Si la personne n’est pas ne dans ce village, nous voudrions savoir avec un petit peu de détails pourquoi 
le ménage a  choisi ce village. 
 
AUTRE COTE : 
 
Ici il y a toute l’information pour les déplaces. Donc ici il y a seulement quelque chose si le ménagé 
propre est aussi un ménage d’accueil. Ici remplir la même information comme a l’autre cote. Donc, 
n’oubliez pas l’information sur les projets et aussi pas les questions sur l’identité. Important, pour le 
dernier voyez votre montre pour une deuxième fois pour savoir si c’est l’histoire « UNIV » ou l’histoire 
« ONG ». 
 
 
QUESTION ET REPONSE 
 
Q1 :  Si il y a une veuve et l’homme (donc l’homme est mort) de cette veuve avait 3 femmes ? 
R1 :  C’est trois ménages différents. Mais pour chaque veuve écrivez l’histoire de migration pour 
l’homme. 
Q2 : Si la personne a déjà construit plus d’une maison dans le même endroit ? 
R2 : Ecrivez l’année de la première construction.  
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028. 
Nom NK et chiffre AL :   D O E O F O mètres 
  
 
___h___ UNIV / ONG 
 Groupe ethnique 












Sexe Langue Age  





Sexe Langue Age  







 ONG PAUVRE :  
ONG DEPLACE:  
Reste chez (historique!):  [P] : Projets : Sais Qui C.O C.$ C.Mat Sal. ONG Reçu $ M/Ann. [C] Score 
Nom : Loc. : 1.            
AL : Chef : 2.            
Langue [L] : NK : 3.            
Pourquoi ce ménage [P] : 
Pourquoi ce village : 
Vill. O ; Chefferies O ; Raison déplacement O ; Année O ; Nombre A/B O ; N, M, et D O ; Champs/maison  et année O; Info sur les minerais O.  
Autre cote (les déplacés qui reste dans famille accueil) : Info au haut O, histoire migr. O, projets O, identité O, pourquoi choisie ménage O. 
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 CODE AA:  
 Vous :  
 
Q 1 Joueur  (1-18) 









Q 3 Déplace ou 
autochtone? O D O A 
Q 4 Nom du 




SELECTIONNEZ CHEF DE MENAGE 
 
Sélectionnez chef de ménage 
Q 5 Chiffre du fiche AL ou 
DL (ou votre nouvelle 
code. E123, D237, F132, 
etc.) 
   
Q 6 Participation O Volonté de participer 
O HH ne peut être trouvé 
O HHH pas présent 
O Refuse de participer 
(Remplissez Q 7 à Q 9) 
O Volonté de participer 
O HH ne peut être trouvé 
O HHH pas présent 
O refuse de participer 
(Remplissez Q 7 à Q 9) 
O Volonté de participer 
O HH ne peut être trouvé 
O HHH pas présent 
O refuse de participer 
(Remplissez Q 7 à Q 9) 
Q 7 Age [années]    
Q 8 Sexe O H O F O H OF O H O F 
Q 9 Pourquoi ne pas 
disposé à participer à 
l'enquête? [Code X. 
opinion enquêteur] 
   
Consent 
"Je travaille pour un projet de l'Université de Columbia qui recherche comment et pourquoi les gens coopèrent entre eux. Je voudrais vous 
demander de participer à la collection de données «Migration et Connexion dans l’Est du Congo « Ce projet fait partie des thèses du Neelanjan 
SIRCAR et Peter VAN DER WINDT. Les deux sont candidats au doctorat à l'Université Columbia. Le but de ce projet - et de leur thèse en 
général - est ni politique ni lucratif. La recherche est menée pour comprendre pourquoi les gens coopèrent et avec qui. Pour ce faire, nous 
aimerions jouer à un jeu de bien public. Le jeu prendra un jour de votre temps. Après les jeux, nous tenons également à mener une enquête. 
Vous serez indemnisé pour participer à l'étude de 2,000 CFR. En outre, plus vous jouez, plus vous avez la chance de gagner cette somme. Il 
n'y a aucun avantage direct pour vous. Les avantages de ce projet seront pour la société en général. Comprendre qui et pourquoi les gens 
coopèrent est important pour le développement. Les données qui seront recueillies ne seront pas connectées à votre nom. Votre participation à 
cette étude ne comporte aucun risque. Prendre part à ces jeux et a cette enquête est votre choix. Vous pouvez décider de ne pas prendre part 
ou arrêter à tout moment. En outre, pour les jeux aimeriez-vous prendre une photo. Nous allons également prendre une photo des 17 autres 
joueurs. Demain pendant les jeux vous pourrez alors voir leurs photos. Les 17 autres participants verront  votre photo quand ils joueront.  
Apres les jeux vous pouvez garder votre photo. êtes-vous d'accord de participer?” 
Q 10 Le HHH comprend et accepte: jouer aux jeux, 
l'enquête, et nous de prendre une photo? 
O 1 
[Si « non », trouver une HH remplacement et faire Q 6] 
O Prendre une photo de HHH et imprimez le numéro et nom de cette personne sur l'image. 
O Donner au HHH une « Invitation»” 
O Remerciez le répondant et lui dire d'être présent au jour X, temps Y, à Z. 
 
Q 11 Description Jouer  







 Vous :  
L’enquête 
Q 12 Occupation [CODE A]  
 
 
Q 13 Position dans village  
Q 14 Sait il lire et écrire? O 1 O 0 
Q 15 Education ? [CODE I]  
Q 16 Religion ? [CODE B]  















Q 17 Croyez-vous que vous habiterez 
dans ce village d’ici cinq ans? 
O 1 O 0 
Q 18 Préfériez-vous  habiter dans ce 
village d’ici dans cinq ans? 
O 1 O 0 
Q 19 Quels groupes ou type de personne bénéficie le plus des 
ONGs (les migrants, l’autre groupe ethnique, le chef)? 
[FAITES DISCUSSION ET ECRIVEZ L’HISTOIRE] 











Q 20 Qui aide les ONG à implémenter les projets (les sages, 
l’autre groupe ethnique, le chef)? Faites discussion ! 
 
Q 21 MARIAGE. Type : Sœur (S), Fille (F). Et 
localisation [CODE R]. 
    
    
Q 22 Combien de fois chaque mois vous 
quittez votre village? 
 Q 23 Le ménage possède combien 
de moutons ou chèvres? 
 
Q 24 Le chef du village est de votre famille 
biologique?  
O 1 O 0 
Q 25 Combien d'années avez-vous vécu 
dans ce village? 
 
Q 26 Combien de fois par semaine vous 
rencontrez le chef du village ? 
 Q 27 Etes-vous membre d'un comité ou 
une association du village 
(développement, eau, éducation, etc.)? 
O 1 O 0 




Q 29 Ne dans ce village ?  Q 30 Lange maternelle ?  
Q 31 Quand arrive ?    
 




 CODE BB  
 Vous :  
 
JEUX ET SÉANCE D’INFORMATION 
 
Ci-dessous: Rayez l’endroit de réponse pour le nombre correspondant au joueur. Répondez avec "0" (ne contribue 
pas) ou "1" (contribue). "Pourquoi?" Peut contenir des réponses multiples. Donner plus d'informations que seuls 
CODE Z si nécessaire ! 
 
JEU 1 : 
Q 32 Début: ____h____; Q 33 Expliquer ___ fois. Q 34 Fin: ____h____ ; Q 35 Participant a compris le jeu: O 1, O 0. 
Q 36 
JEU 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
 
                 
 
JEU 2 : 
Q 37 Début: ____h____; Q 38 Expliquer ___ fois. Q 39 Fin: ____h____ ; Q 40 Participant a compris le jeu: O 1, O 0. 
Q 41 
JEU 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
 
                 
 
SÉANCE D’INFORMATION JEU 1 : 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Pourquoi? 
CODE Z 
Pour JEU 1 !! 
                  





















 CODE BB  
 Vous :  
 
JEUX 3A :  
Q 43 Début: ____h____; Q 44 Expliquer ___ fois. Q 45 Fin: ____h____ ; Q 46 Participant a compris le jeu: O 1, O 0. 
Q 47 
JEU 3A 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
 
                 
 
JEUX 3B :  
Q 48 Début: ____h____; Q 49 Expliquer ___ fois. Q 50 Fin: ____h____ ; Q 51 Participant a compris le jeu: O 1, O 0. 
Q 52 
JEU 3B 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
 
                 




Qui (nom complet)? Parente avec jouer ? [P] Qui (nom complet)? Parente avec jouer ? [P] 
CHEF    
    
    
 
SÉANCE D’INFORMATION JEUX 3A:  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Pourquoi? 
CODE Z 
Pour 3A !! 
                  










(Si vous avez besoin plus d’espace continuez de l’autre cote) 
 
Q 55  
« Chère jouer, Jeux 3A et 
3B sont différent. Qu’a été la 
différence ? Et dans quelle 
façon à la présence des 
notables influencé votre 
comportement pendant le 












 Vous :  
 
Image: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Q 56. Vous la 
connaissez 
                  
Q 57. Fois par semaine 
                  
Q 58. Famille biologique 
et type [CODE P] 
                  
Q 59. Famille Africaine 
                  
Q 60. Né dans ce 
village? 
                  
Q 61. Déplacer à cause 
de violence? 
                  
Q 62. Récolé/déplacé 
dans le même endroit ? 
                  
Q 63. Ami? 
                  
Q 64. Aller a marche 
pour vous ? 
                  
Q 65. Avez emploie pour 
votre champs 
                  
Q 66. Eté emploie pour 
son champs 
                  
Q 67. Travaille 
ensemble sur champs 
                  
Q 68. Voisin? 
                  
Q 69. Vote pour le 
même parti politique ? 
                  
Q 70. Parente avec chef 
[CODE P]: 
                  
Q 71. Ami du chef: 
                  
Q 72. Ami notables 
présent pendant 3B: 
                  
Q 73. Langue 
maternelle? CODE L: 
                  
Q 74. Religion? 
CODE B: 





FICHE CHEF D’EQUIPE [UN PAR VILLAGE] 
 




Les nyumba kumis dans le village [Ensemble avec le chef du village. S’il y a plus de 8 nyumba kumis, remplissez à l’autre cote] : 
Nom complet de nyumba kumi : Nyumba kumi depuis : Chiffre sur la liste AL : 
Q 2 :  
 
 
Q 3 :  
 
 
Q 4 :  
 
 
Q 5 :  
 
 
Q 6 :  
 
 
Q 7 :  
 
 
Q 8 :  
 
 




Les projets publics les plus récents  au village [Ensemble avec le chef du village]: 
Projet : 
Latitude (E/W) in 
DD : 
Longitude (N/S) in 
DD : 
Altitude : Salongo (0/1) : $ (0/1) : ONG (0/1) : Mois/ Année 

























Qui a été présent pendant la création de la liste AL [Ensemble avec les personnes qui a l’info. Si plus de 8, remplissez à l’autre cote] :  
Nom complet : Chiffre sur la liste AL : Position dans village : Position dans RAPID : 
Q 14   
 
 
Q 15   
 
 
Q 16   
 
 
Q 17   
 
 
Q 18   
 
 
Q 19   
 
 
Q 20   
 
 







Q 22 Liste AL/ DL a été crée  avec une liste du village [cocher]: O 0 ou O 1 
Q 23 Date travaille dans ce village ?  
 
Les infrastructures publiques localisent dans village [Remplissez les données pendant la cartographie ! Si plus de 15, remplissez à 
l’autre cote]: 
Infrastructure (type): Latitude (E/W) : Longitude (N/S): Altitude : Construire? (année) Construire par : 




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




















Comment est-ce que les déplaces sont arrivé dans ce village (écrivez une histoire !) ? Il y a une groupe déplacés ensemble proche de 













Les quatre interventions par les ONGs plus récemment [Ensemble avec le chef du village]: 
NGO : Type du projet ? Qui a bénéficie ? Mois/Année : 





















Compter les points des joueurs pour la loterie 
 
 
JEUX 1 : 
A : 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
DE : 
1                 
2                 
3                 
4                 
5                 
6                 
7                 
8                 
9                 
10                 
11                 
12                 
13                 
14                 
15                 
16                 
 
 
JEUX 2 : 
A : 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
DE : 
1                 
2                 
3                 
4                 
5                 
6                 
7                 
8                 
9                 
10                 
11                 
12                 
13                 
14                 
15                 
















JEUX 3A : 
A : 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
DE : 
1                 
2                 
3                 
4                 
5                 
6                 
7                 
8                 
9                 
10                 
11                 
12                 
13                 
14                 
15                 
16                 
 
 
JEUX 3B : 
A : 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
DE : 
1                 
2                 
3                 
4                 
5                 
6                 
7                 
8                 
9                 
10                 
11                 
12                 
13                 
14                 
15                 
16                 
 
Personnes présente pendant jeu 3B (nous allons la connectez avec les fiches rempli pendant les jeux) 
Q 43 Nom 
Complete 
Q 44 Position dans 
ce village ? 
Q 45 Ne dans ce 
village ? 
Q 46 Quand 
arrive ? 
Q 47 Lange 
maternelle ? 
Q 48 Occupation 
[CODE A] 
      
      
      
      
      






Compter les points: 
 




























1  + + + - + - + +170  
2  + + + - + - + +170  
3  + + + - + - + +170  
4  + + + - + - + +170  
5  + + + - + - + +170  
6  + + + - + - + +170  
7  + + + - + - + +170  
8  + + + - + - + +170  
9  + + + - + - + +170  
10  + + + - + - + +170  
11  + + + - + - + +170  
12  + + + - + - + +170  
13  + + + - + - + +170  
14  + + + - + - + +170  
15  + + + - + - + +170  
16  + + + - + - + +170  
 
[1] Pour chaque joueur (une ligne) ajoutez les « 0 ». Donc si un joueur a cinq fois un « 0 » c’est une indication que le joueur a garde les 
pièces fantastiques dans son pochette. Donc 5 points. 
[2] Voyez le tableau pour jeu 1. Si il y a un « 1 » dans 2 endroits  inverses (par exemple, pour personne 1 : [1,2] et [2,1] ; [1,3] et [3,1], 
etc.) le personne obtenir 2 points. Parce que c’est une indication que personne 1 a donnez a personne 2, et personne a donnez a 
personne 1. Et le même pour personne 1 et 3, etc. En total un joueur peux gagner un maximum de 34 points ici (17 *2). 
[3] Pour chaque joueur (une ligne) ajoutez les « 0 » et multiple par trois. Raison ? Si il y a une « 0 » c’est l’ indication que le joueur a 
garde la super pièce : une pièce de 3 points. Au maximum il y a 54 (3*17) 
[4] Le même comme les jeux 1, mais maintenant le joueur peux contribuer au maximum 5 autres personnes. Donc si pour une 
personne il y a des endroits inverses ou les deux endroits a un « 1 » dans les deux endroits, le joueur gagne 3 points chaque fois.  
[5] Pendant jeu 3 le jouer peux contribuer chaque fois au maximum 5. Donc ajouter toute le chiffres dans la ligne de jouer. Maintenant 
vous avec toute le dépense de cette jouer. C’est pourquoi il y a une « moins » dans le tableau. Parce que le joueur a perdu ces points. 
[6] Pendant jeu 3 les gens peuvent aussi donner les pièces fantastique a vous. Maintenant, ajoutez tous le chiffres dans la colonne de 
jouer. Maintenant vous avez le totale de points que les autre jouer a donne a ce jouer. 
[7] Le même comme [5]. 
[8] Le même comme [6]. 
[9] A la fin nous ajoutons 150 points parce que pour jeu 3A et pour jeu 3B le jouer a reçu 85 point (17*5) 
 
MAINTENANT LA LOTERIE : 
Vous devez créer les jetons pour chaque personne pour la loterie. Si une personne a plus des points, le personne a plus de jetons  
dans le façon suivent: 
















Master Instructions for Attribute-Based 
Allocation Game 
March 2013 
Schedule of Activities before a Visit 
1. A week before the visit 
• Packing list 
i. Invitation letter (Njala University) 
ii. Pens  
iii. 10 white buttons 
iv. 40 black buttons 
v. Bikers signing sheet 
vi. Financial overview sheet 
vii. Light 
viii. Phone credit 
ix. Time table 
x. Map 
• A research assistant is sent to each village with a letter from Njala University 
explaining the activity. The letter includes an invitation to participate in the activity 
and invites 18 villagers.  
i. Ensure that potential participants understand they must be available the 
whole day and will not be paid until the end of the day before proceeding 
with participant selection.  
• The RA obtains permission from the Town Chief to conduct the activities. We will 
only proceed with permission from the chief. 
• The RA proceeds to select the participants. The RA ensures that in each village: 
i. Select the nine most important village big men or Taa Gbakoi: the chief, 
assistant chief, division heads, religious leader (imam), societal head, 
women’s leader or elders. 
1. To make the selection, ask all High status [Taa Bakoi] to form a social 
status line up. Select the nine highest ranking individuals that are 
willing and able to attend. As a priority the Town Chief, Town 
Speaker, and Imam should all be in the participant list (even if the 
imam is not in the highest 9, by default they are invited) 
ii. Randomly select nine villagers/farmers  
1. For the randomization, please invite all villagers that are not big 
men, so farmers and youth. It may be the case that there are some 
high status individuals who were not selected as one of the nine in 
the previous exercise. They should NOT be included in the pool of 




of the nine most important people in the village simply have no 
chance of being invited. 
2. Put nine white buttons in a (non-see through) bag and as many black 
buttons as there are people remaining. 
3. Explain that they come forward one by one to draw a button. If they 
get a white button this implies they can participate. 
• The RA writes down the names of all 18 people, their gender, father’s name, 
mother’s name, and social status on the Participants List – Make sure to collect the 
white buttons once the name is written down. 
• The RA invites all 18 people to be present at the school in location X and time Y (see 
time table). 
• The RA tells the participants not to send a representative and that they will be 
compensated for their time and will receive a small snack as well as a token of 
appreciation.  
• Ask control questions 
i. When is the activity? What time? 
ii. Where is the activity? 
iii. How much time will you spend there? 
2. A day before the visit 
• Wherever coverage is available, call the contact person listed on the forerunner’s 
Treatment Village Checklist Sheet as a reminder that they should be present at the 
Site Town the following morning to participate in the activities.  
Schedule of Activities during a Visit 
1. Packing list 
• Tape and markers 
• Buttons 
• Pens 
• Participants List 
• Record sheets: 
i. Exit survey 
ii. Allocation game record sheet 
iii. Status Order Record Sheet.  
iv. Payment sheet 
v. Randomized Allocation Game pairs for pay-outs 
2. When groups arrive, the team leader will again explain the purpose to the Town Chief (or highest 
ranking representative) of each group and obtain his permission to conduct the activities. We will 
only proceed with permission from the chief. 
3. For the villages where all invited people showed up, check if you have at least 8 Taa Gbakoi and 8 
Nu Gbamei. 
4. Ask all present villagers to separate themselves into High status [Taa Bakoi] and Low status [Nu 
Gbamei]. If there are more then 8 in each group: 
• For High status [Taa Bakoi] ask them to form a social status line up. The 9th person in 
line is thanked for coming, paid 5,000, and returns home. **If the 9
th




Imam (and no other Imam remains in the group) then the Imam remains and the 
next lowest individual in the line returns home. 
• For the Low status [Nu Gbamei]:  If all 9 low status [Nu Gbamei] are present, let all 
remain and partake in the assignment of ID numbers in order to determine which 
participant returns home. 
5. Randomly assign ID numbers to each of the two groups:  
• Place wood cubes numbered 1-8 into a non-see through bag. Invite each high status 
[Taa Gbakoi] one by one to draw a cube. Whatever number is on the cube drawn is 
that participant’s ID number 
• Record the participant’s name, parents’ names, gender, and status in the 
corresponding row of the Participants List. 
• When all high status [Taa Gbakoi] have been given an ID, repeat the process with low 
status [Nu Gbamei] with cubes numbered 9-16 plus one blank cube if 9 low status 
[Nu Gbamei] showed up 
• The participant who drew a blank cube are thanked and told they will not be 
participating in the day’s activities but will receive LE 5,000 as compensation for 
coming to the Site Town. 
6. For each group complete the Participants List, write down each person’s name as well as the 
name of their father and mother for their respective ID. Each RA team assigned to a group copies 
the Participants List so that each research assistant has a copy. 
7. Have every participant wear a sticker with their ID code. 
8. When all participants of the group have arrived give a brief introduction to the participants 
9. Explain the procedures of the day and what they can expect  
10. Implement Survey and Allocation Game. 
• Conduct Individual Exit Survey with all participants.  
11. Debriefing for Allocation Game: 
• Ask if players truly understood the game, record on scale of 1 – 10 how well you feel 
they understood the game. Remind the participant to keep their actions secret. 
12. Social line up:  
• Tell the participants: Thank you for your great patience and cooperation.  We have 
enjoyed working with you. Please line up in order of who is the most influential, 
second most influential, etc. in your village. The order you line up in is the order in 
which we will pay you privately the money you won today.  
• Record a brief note about how they decide the queue order on the Status Order 
Record Sheet.  
• Record the order in which they line up on the Status Order Record Sheet. 
13. Throughout, use the Notes section of each record sheet to record general observations of 
interest to the research team. 
14. Pay the participants using the Payment sheet and the Randomized Allocation Game Pair pay-
out sheet, add show-up fee of Le 1000 and if appropriate the silence tokens and thank them for 
their participation. Ensure that no participant receives less then Le 8,000 for the day. 
Allocation Game and Survey Instructions  




i. We will give you tokens; each token is worth 1 block. There are 25 tokens, so all together 
the tokens are 2,500 Leones. 
ii. This is your money and there is no obligation to share.  
iii. We will ask questions about sharing. 
iv. Ask practice questions: 
• How much is each token worth? 
• How much money are the tokens worth all together? 
v. Sometimes we will tell you the name of who you are sending the money to. Sometimes 
we don’t tell you the name of who you are sending the money to. 
vi. We will never tell the receiver or anybody what you send.  
vii. If you send everything, send nothing, send some, we won’t tell the receiver. 
viii. Ask practice questions:  
• Will you always know who you are sharing with? 
• Will the receiver know how much you sent? 
• Do you have to send money to the receiver? Can you send all your money to 
the receiver? 
ix. Do not tell anybody what you send or do not send. 
x. You are given a silence token worth 10 block (1,000 Leone). At the end of the day you 
can get 10 block if you still have your silence token. 
xi. If you talk about the game we take away your silence token. 
xii. You will be paid based on one of your choices and a show-up fee.   
2. Make sure you stress: 
• that their choices are anonymous and private  
• that they do not have to share equally, they can give as much or as little as they like 
• that for each question the game starts again 
3. Each research assistant takes a participant to an isolated area and conducts the Allocation Game 
using a completed Participant List 
4. There are two parts in the game:  
• Part A Questions with 6 questions and Part B Questions with 15 questions 
• The questions should be asked in a random order. See Allocation Game Question 
Order Box on record sheet  
5. For Part A Questions tell the participant: 
• We will give you tokens, each token is worth 1 block. There are 25 tokens, so all 
together the tokens are 2,500 Leones. 
• This is your money and there is no obligation to send [Kwekwe]. 
• You will be paid based on one of your choices. This could be any of the choices you 
make, so pay attention to all questions. For which choice you will be paid depends on 
chance. 
• For Questions A1 – A6 tell the participant:  
i. Here are 25 tokens. 
ii. For Question A1 say:   
a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa Gbakoi 




speaker, etc.) from a randomly chosen village in your chiefdom, not 
from your village.   
b. We will not tell you who the Taa Gbakoi is, and they do not know 
who is kwekwe the money or how much you kwekwe.  
c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you? 
iii. For Question A2 say:  
a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei  
(e.g. farmer, youth, etc.) from a randomly chosen village in your 
chiefdom, not from your village.      
b. We will not tell you who the person is, and they do not know who is 
kwekwe the money or how much you kwekwe.  
c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you? 
iv. For Question A3 say:   
a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa Gbakoi 
(e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town 
speaker, etc.) from your village. He or she may or may not have 
come with you today from your village.      
b. We will not tell the other person who is kwekwe the money or how 
much you kwekwe. You will not know who that other person is.  
c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you? 
v. For Question A4 say:   
a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei  
(e.g. farmer, youth, etc.) from your village. He or she may or may not 
have come with you today from your village.      
b. We will not tell the other person who is  kwekwe the money or how 
much you kwekwe. You will not know who that other person is.  
c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you? 
vi. For Question A5 say:   
a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa Gbakoi 
(e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town 
speaker, etc.) from the people from your village that came with you 
today from your village.  
b. We will not tell the other person who is kwekwe the money or how 
much you kwekwe. You will not know who that other person is.  
c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you? 
vii. For Question A6 say:   
a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei  
(e.g. farmer, youth, etc.) from the people from your village that 
came with you today from your village. 
b. We will not tell the other person who is sending [kwekwe] the 
money or how much you send [kwekwe]. You will not know who that 
other person is.  
c. How much do you want to send [kwekwe] from this money given to 
you. 




• We will give you tokens; each token is worth 1 block (or Le 100). There are 25 tokens, 
so all together the tokens are 2,500 Leones. 
• This is your money and there is no obligation to share [kwekwe].  
• I have a list of names here with people from your village. To help identify the person 
I will also read out the have the name of the person’s father and mother.  
• I will ask you for each of them how much of the 25 tokens you are willing to send 
[kwekwe] to that person. 
• For each person you are sharing [kwekwe] a new set of 25 tokens.  
• The other person will never know who you are.  
• We will never tell that person how much you send [kwekwe].  
7. After the Allocation Game is complete the research assistant completes the Individual Survey 
with the participant.   
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JOHN LIST, Principle Investigator 
Give the informed consent form to the participant and talk it through with them. 
 
My name is _______________.  I am a research associate hired by Njala University. I am here to conduct a study that will 
look at livelihoods and trading in villages around Gola Forest.  
 
Before we begin, I would like to take a minute to explain why I am inviting you to participate and what I will be doing 
with the information you provide to me. Please stop me at any time if you have any questions. After I’ve told you a bit 
more about our project, you can decide whether or not you would like to participate.  
 
This research is being conducted by researchers from Njala University in collaboration with Wageningen University and 
the University of Chicago. We will be interviewing about 1600 households in 100 villages near Gola Forest.  The 
researchers will use the information we collect in articles that might be published, as well as in academic presentations.   
 
Participation should take about one day.  Participation in both the activities and the survey are on a purely voluntary 
basis. I will ask you some questions about yourself and your family.  There are minimal risks to you from answering these 
questions.  The information we collect today is private and confidential.  We will not share any details from the survey 
about your friends or family with anyone besides the research team from Njala University and Wageningen University.  
These surveys will go to a secure location at Wageningen University.   
 
If at any time and for any reason, you would prefer not to answer any questions, please feel free not to. If at any time 
you would like to stop participating, please tell me. We can take a break, stop and continue at a later date, or stop 
altogether. You will not be penalized in any way for deciding to stop participation at any time. 
 
If you have questions, you are free to ask them now. If you have questions later, you may contact me by calling the 
research supervisor, Esther Richards, at 079-837708.  You may also contact the researchers at the University of Chicago.  
Ty Turley is the student researcher responsible for this project, and he can be reached in the following ways: 
 
Ty Turley 
Department of Economics, 1126 







If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, you can contact the following office at the 
University of Chicago: 
 
Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board 
University of Chicago 
5835 South Kimbark - Judd 333, Chicago, IL 60637  

















SITE TOWN : 
 
CODE: └──┴──┴──┘ 
ENUMERATOR : CODE: └──┴──┘ 












Name Function Phone number 
 School xxxxxxxxxx 
 Headmaster  
 Key holder  
   





Sent Bikes ahead to Treatment Villages to alert them of your arrival? Yes / No 
Got permission to use the school Yes  / No 
Made sure drinking water for the villagers is available Yes  / No 
Made sure the keys of the school will be handed over to the research 
team 
Yes  / No 
Made sure that the school has 6 rooms. IF NOT: call us Yes  / No 
  
Is there signal? IF YES: phone number headmaster:   Yes  / No 
Made sure that the village can host 16 RA’s for 1 night Yes / No 
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ENUMERATOR : CODE: └──┴──┘ 












Name Function Phone number 
   
   
   
 




Received permission from chief Yes  / No 
Wrote  9 Taa Bakwi  on the Participant List Yes  / No 
Wrote 9 ordinary people on the Participant List Yes  / No 
Gave the invitation letter to the chief in front of the Participants List Yes  / No 
Asked the test questions Yes  / No 
All participants can answer the test question correctly Yes  / No 
Made a copy of the participant list and has given it to the chief Yes  / No 







Date:                                        Name enumerator__________________________  
Name bike rider: ____________________________________________________ 
License number bike rider: _____________________________________________ 
I hereby declare that I’m responsible for my passenger in case of any accident.  
 
Signature bike rider:__________________________________________________ 
Bike ride from _____________________to ______________________________ 
Money paid: Le ________________ 
License number driver: _____________________________________________ 
 
Signature that he received the money: __________________________________ 
 
Date:                                        Name enumerator__________________________  
Name bike rider: ____________________________________________________ 
License number bike rider: _____________________________________________ 
I hereby declare that I’m responsible for my passenger in case of any accident.  
 
Signature bike rider:__________________________________________________ 
Bike ride from _____________________to ______________________________ 
Money paid: Le ________________ 
License number driver: _____________________________________________ 
 
Signature that he received the money: __________________________________ 
 
Date:                                        Name enumerator__________________________  
Name bike rider: ____________________________________________________ 
License number bike rider: _____________________________________________ 
I hereby declare that I’m responsible for my passenger in case of any accident.  
 
Signature bike rider:__________________________________________________ 
Bike ride from _____________________to ______________________________ 
Money paid: Le ________________ 
License number driver: _____________________________________________ 
 
Signature that he received the money: __________________________________ 
 
Date:                                        Name enumerator__________________________  
Name bike rider: ____________________________________________________ 
License number bike rider: _____________________________________________ 
I hereby declare that I’m responsible for my passenger in case of any accident.  
 
Signature bike rider:__________________________________________________ 
Bike ride from _____________________to ______________________________ 
Money paid: Le ________________ 
License number driver: _____________________________________________ 
 




Date:                                                                                 Name enumerator:______________________________ 
Site Town:                                                                       Village Name (if applicable): 





Date:                                                                                 Name enumerator:______________________________ 
Site Town:                                                                       Village Name (if applicable): 





Date:                                                                                 Name enumerator:______________________________ 
Site Town:                                                                       Village Name (if applicable): 





Date:                                                                                 Name enumerator:______________________________ 
Site Town:                                                                       Village Name (if applicable): 





Date:                                                                                 Name enumerator:______________________________ 
Site Town:                                                                       Village Name (if applicable): 





Date:                                                                                 Name enumerator:______________________________ 
Site Town:                                                                       Village Name (if applicable): 





Date:                                                                                 Name enumerator:______________________________ 
Site Town:                                                                       Village Name (if applicable): 











DATE:     ___/____/2013 
Site Town 
name: 
 Site Town code:    
Group ID:  
Village 
name: 
 Village code:    
    
Participant 
ID 
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003 
     
004 
     
005 
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007 
     
008 
     
009 
     
010 
     
011 
     
012 
     
013 
     
014 
     
015 
     
016 
     
017 
     
018 





Status Order Record Sheet 
 
Date of Visit (DD/MM/YY): /        / 2013 Treatment: 1&5  2&6  3&ADG  4&ADG 
Location:  Location Code:  
Chiefdom:  Chiefdom Code:  
Village Name:  Village Code:    
Enumerator Name:  Enumerator ID  
 
Status # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
HH ID #         
 
 
Status # 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 




1. Was there significant disagreement? Yes     No 
2. Did people lobby for a higher spot in the social order? Yes     No 
3. Did the chief and other high status people organize the order? Yes     No 










DATE:  ___/____/2013 Site Town Name:  
Site Town 
Code: 
   
Group ID:  Village name:  
Village 
code: 
   
    
Participant 
ID 










001    1000  =   
002    1000  =   
003    1000  =   
004    1000  =   
005    1000  =   
006    1000  =   
007    1000  =   
008    1000  =   
009    1000  =   
010    1000  =   
011    1000  =   
012    1000  =   
013    1000  =   
014    1000  =   
015    1000  =   
016    1000  =   
017    1000  =   
018    1000  =   
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Allocation game Record sheet 
Date of Visit 
(DD/MM/YY): 
/        /   
Site Town Name:  Site Town Code:  
Respondent name:  Respondent ID:   
Chiefdom:  Chiefdom Code:  
Village Name:  Village Code:    
Enumerator Name:  Enumerator ID  
 
Use Allocation Game Order Box below to see the order in which you should ask the questions for each ID 
For Questions B the table lists the staring-point of the questions. 
Allocation Game Question Order Box 
ID Question Order ID Question Order ID Question Order ID Question Order 
1 A4, B[start at #2], A6, A5, 
A1, A3, A2 
5 A4, A2, A6, A1, A3, B 
[start at #9], A5 
9 A4, B[start at #2], A6, A5, 
A1, A3, A2 
13 A4, A2, A6, A1, A3, B 
[start at #9], A5 
2 A5, A6, A1, A4, A3, B 
[start at #3], A2 
6 A3, B [start at #11], A2, 
A5, A4, A6, A1 
10 A5, A6, A1, A4, A3, B 
[start at #3], A2 
14 A3, B [start at #11], A2, 
A5, A4, A6, A1 
3 A1, A3, A6, A4, A5, A2, B 
[start at #5] 
7 A3, A2, A6, A5, A1, B 
[start at #13], A4 
11 A1, A3, A6, A4, A5, A2, B 
[start at #5] 
15 A3, A2, A6, A5, A1, B 
[start at #13], A4 
4 B [start at #7], A6, A1, 
A5, A2, A3, A4  
8 A4, A5, B [start at #15], 
A3, A6, A2, A1 
12 B [start at #7], A6, A1, 
A5, A2, A3, A4  
16 A4, A5, B [start at #15], 
A3, A6, A2, A1 
 
Part A Questions 
Fill-out the response for the allocation game: where the number you have to write down is the number of tokens given by the 
participant to the receiver. 
For questions A1 and A2: remember the participants are sharing [kwekwe] with someone from a different village in their chiefdom. 
 
A1 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa 
Gbakoi (T e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal 
head, a town speaker, etc) from a randomly chosen village in your 
chiefdom, not from your village.      
Amount sent [kwekwe] 
to other 
 
A2 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu 
Gbamei ( e.g. farmer, youth, etc) not a Taa Gbakoi from a randomly 
chosen village in your chiefdom, not from your village.      
Amount sent [kwekwe] 
to other 
 
Again, write down is the number of tokens given by the participant to the receiver. 
A3 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa 
Gbakoi (T e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal 
head, a town speaker, etc) from your village. He or she may or may 
not be have come with you today from your village. 
Amount sent [kwekwe] 
to other 
 
A4 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei 
(e.g. farmer, youth, etc) not a Taa Gbakoi from your village. He or 
she may or may not be have come with you today from your 
village. 
Amount sent [kwekwe] 
to other 
 
Again, write down is the number of tokens given by the participant to the receiver. 
A5 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa 
Gbakoi (e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, 
a town speaker, etc) from the people from your village that came 
with you today from your village.  
Amount sent [kwekwe] 
to other 
 
A6 The person receiving the money is a randomly Nu Gbamei (e.g. 
farmer, youth, etc) not a Taa Gbakoi from the people from your 
village that came with you today from your village. 







Part B Questions 
Before you continue: make sure you have a copy of the Participants List. 
 
Use the Allocation Game Question Order Box, repeated here for your convenience: 
 
Allocation Game Question Order Box 
ID Question Order ID Question Order ID Question Order ID Question Order 
1 A4, B[start at #2], A6, A5, 
A1, A3, A2 
5 A4, A2, A6, A1, A3, B 
[start at #9], A5 
9 A4, B[start at #2], A6, A5, 
A1, A3, A2 
13 A4, A2, A6, A1, A3, B 
[start at #9], A5 
2 A5, A6, A1, A4, A3, B 
[start at #3], A2 
6 A3, B [start at #11], A2, 
A5, A4, A6, A1 
10 A5, A6, A1, A4, A3, B 
[start at #3], A2 
14 A3, B [start at #11], A2, 
A5, A4, A6, A1 
3 A1, A3, A6, A4, A5, A2, B 
[start at #5] 
7 A3, A2, A6, A5, A1, B 
[start at #13], A4 
11 A1, A3, A6, A4, A5, A2, B 
[start at #5] 
15 A3, A2, A6, A5, A1, B 
[start at #13], A4 
4 B [start at #7], A6, A1, 
A5, A2, A3, A4  
8 A4, A5, B [start at #15], 
A3, A6, A2, A1 
12 B [start at #7], A6, A1, 
A5, A2, A3, A4  
16 A4, A5, B [start at #15], 
A3, A6, A2, A1 
 
Circle which ID number (1, 3, 5, etc.) you started with in this interview. 
 
Put an “X” through the ID code of the person you are speaking to. 
 















***HAVE YOU ASKED BOTH PART A AND PART B QUESTIONS?? 
 
[Enumerator opinion] In how far did the participant understood the activities: ___________ 














Date of Visit (DD/MM/YY): /        / 2013   
Site Town Name:  Site Town Code:  
Respondent name:  Respondent ID:   
Chiefdom:  Chiefdom Code:  
Village Name:  Village Code:    
Enumerator Name:  Enumerator ID  
 
1. Age:  2. Gender M       F 
3. Farm size (bushels of upland rice 
planted last year) 
 
4. Number of people in your 
household 
 
5. How many chickens 
do you own? 
 6. Do you have a zinc roof? Y        N 
7. If everyone in your village was on a ladder with ten steps, and the higher you are on the ladder the 
richer you are, what step are you on?  
 
8. Ethnic group: 
           1 Mende      2 Gola      3 Fula      4 Temne     5 Loko       6 Madingo     
                     7 Kono      8 Vai      9 Other: __________________ 
9. Can you read and 
write? 
 10. Arabic education Y        N 
11. Position in community 
1.Village Chief     2.Division Head     3.Woman leader     4.Town speaker    5.Youth leader      
6.Societal head    7.Religious leader     8.Elder   9.Trader      10.Farmer    11.Student    
12.Other___________ 
12. Religion 
1.Christian        2.Muslim        
3.ATR        4.Christian/ATR         
5.Muslim/ATR 
6.Other:___________ 
13. Are you considered a 
stranger in the village you 
live in? 
Y        N 
14. Were you born in the village 
you live in> -> if yes go to 
question 17 
Y               N 
15. Year you arrived in the 
village 
 
16. Why did you move to the 
village you live in now? 
 
17. Did you leave your village 
during the war 
Y               N 
18. Did someone in your family 
die due to the war? 
Y        N 












20. Do you think one of your family 
members could become a town chief? 
Y               N 21. Are you a trader? Y        N 
22. If yes, what do you trade? 
 
 
23. How often do you go to a market day (i.e. Ndowai)?   
1.Almost 
every  day 
2.Few times a 
week 






once per year 
6.Never 
24. If you go to a market, do you 
bargain for lower prices? 
Y               N 
25. Do you sell anything that 
you produce or grow? -> if 
“No” go to question 28 
Y        N 
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27. If yes, how do 
you decide the 
selling price? 
1.I have no choice—only one price at the market 
2.I want to sell at the price everyone else is selling at 





The next questions ask about the relationships between participants. 
Take the Participants list and ask which other participant fall into that category. For example ask:  Of all the other 
participants in the market activity you just did, is any of them you friend? ( Instead of asking the question over and over 
again for each participant; Is participant (ID1) a friend of you? Is participant (ID2) a friend of you?) 
Put Y for YES and N for NO unless otherwise indicated 
Put a cross to the column this household is. 
 
Start every question with: “Of all the other participants in the market 
activity you just did,…. “ 
 
HH ID # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
28. Who is related to you 
by blood (parent, 
sibling, cousin)? 
                
29. Do you farm with 
someone from their 
household? 
                
30. Who do you meet 
and talk to at least 
twice a week? 
                
31. Do you often share 
or borrow 
food/money with any 
of their household? 
                
32. With whom were you 
displaced to the 
same area during the 
war? 
                
33. In your opinion this 
person is: [put: H = 
Taa Gbakoi, high 
status; L = Nu 
Gbamei, low status] 
                
Math test 
If they do not know or cannot answer then write “NO” 
34. If you buy 8 loafs of bread for 500 Le each, how much do you have to pay?  
35. If the price of a buttercup of rice is 1000 Le and went down by 10%, how much 
would you have to pay? 
 
36. How much is 12 + 15  
37. How much is 13-7  
38. How much is 12 x 4    
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